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ABSTRACT
This dissertation will explore the revolutionary progression in the provision of
monetary damages and the availability thereof due to the change in South Africa’s
legal system from Parliamentary sovereignty to Constitutional supremacy after the
enactment of the final Constitution in 19961.
The Constitution of South Africa brought with it the concepts of justification and
accountability as the Bill of Rights enshrines fundamental rights and the remedies for
the infringement of same.  The available remedies for the infringement of a
fundamental right flow from two sources, being either from the development of the
common law remedies in line with the Bill of Rights or alternatively from Section 38
of the Constitution, which provides for a remedy which provides ‘appropriate’ relief.
The question that will be raised in this dissertation is, ‘does appropriate relief include
an award of delictual damages?’ or a question related thereto ‘is an award of monetary
damages an appropriate remedy?’
The motivation for this dissertation arises from the plethora of case law, especially in
the Eastern Cape, that has come to the fore in the last sixteen years, highlighting the
injustice of cancellations of social assistance grants and the non-payment of such in
South Africa’s social security system, as well as the precedent that was set by our
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court in remedying that injustice.  The central case
to this dissertation is that of Kate v Member of Executive Council for Department of
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Member of Executive Council,
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA), which is
generally regarded as having paved the way for the granting of monetary damages for
the infringement of an individual’s constitutional right as same require legal
protection.
Firstly the past approach to damages will be explored in relation to South Africa’s
common law, being the Roman-Dutch law.  The common law Aquilian action is the
focal point of this dissertation in relation to the common law in that the granting of
1 Constitution of 1996.
xdamages for the infringement of an individual’s social assistance right (being a
specific constitutional right framed within the 1996 Constitution) results in pure
patrimonial loss which in our common law system was remedied by the actio legis
Aquilae.  In delict, an award of damages is the primary remedy, aimed at affording
compensation in respect of the legal right or interest infringed.
After the common law system of damages has been explored, this dissertation will
then examine the changes that have developed therefrom, and largely shaped by the
current state of disorganization in the National Department of Welfare coupled with
the all encompassing power of the final Constitution.  The final Constitution provides
the power, in section 38 of the 1996 Constitution, for the court to award a monetary
remedy for the breach of a constitutional right.  The question, however, is “does the
award of monetary damages not merely throw money at the problem, whereas the
purpose of a constitutional remedy is to vindicate guaranteed rights and prevent or
deter future violations?”
The battle for domination between the common law approach and the constitutional
approach to damages is witnessed as the two systems eventually amalgamate to form
an essentially new remedy, unique to South Africa.  South Africa’s new system is
aligned with the Constitution as the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and
underpins the awarding of all damages and, especially, the awarding of constitutional
damages.
For the sake of completeness, alternatives to monetary damages will also be
canvassed in this dissertation.
It is hoped that the reader will, in the end, realize that the final Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and as such dictates the manner and form in which damages
are provided.  If such provision is not in alignment with the Constitution, it will be
declared invalid.  The flexibility of our common law is put to the test, yet it is found
to be adaptable to the ever-developing boni mores of society exemplified in the
embracing constitutional principles and the production of this new remedy.  The
courts develop the common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution in order to
xi
keep the common law in step with the evolution of our society and the ever changing
nature of bonos mores.
xii
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1CHAPTER 1
2INTRODUCTION
This Chapter will firstly introduce the topic of this dissertation, secondly discuss the
context and issues pertaining to this dissertation, thirdly discuss the research question
or questions of this dissertation which will provide the purpose of this study, fourthly
detail the methodology utilized by the author in this dissertation, and fifthly this
Chapter will provide an essential overview of the fundamental works read during the
course of the preparation of this dissertation.  Finally, this Chapter will conclude with
the structure and overview of the Chapters to follow in this dissertation and essential
definitions utilized within this dissertation.
1.1. INTRODUCTION OF TOPIC
This section of Chapter 1 seeks to introduce the topic of this research dissertation.
The dominant field which this dissertation researches is that of constitutional law and
specifically that of constitutional damages.  However, prior to the enactment of the
South African Constitution2 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) the Roman-
Dutch common law served as the basis for South Africa’s legal system and hence it is
appropriate that the common law concept of damage and patrimonial loss should also
be explored.  It should become apparent as to what effects the Constitution has had on
the concept and essence of damages in general as we move from the common law
concept to the constitutional law concept of damage.
The function of the law, and in particular private law, is to regulate relations between
individuals in a community.  On the other hand, it is the task of public law to regulate
the relations between the State and the individual, and between the organs of the State
inter se.  A legal order would not be necessary if people lived in natural or inherent
harmony; the reality is that individual interests may and do regularly conflict.
Accordingly, it is the function of private law to recognize these interests, delimit them
in relation to each other and harmonize those that are in conflict.  In particular, it is
the role of the law of delict to indicate which interests are recognized by the law,
2 The 1996 Constitution, Act 108 of 1996.
3under which circumstances they are protected against infringement and how such a
disturbance in the harmonious balance of interests may be restored.3
It should be noted at this introductory stage that the term damages4 as utilized in this
dissertation relates to the law of delict (as found in South Africa’s common law) and,
as such, the field of this research focuses in essence on an amalgamation of the ‘old
dispensation’ being South Africa’s common law with the ‘new dispensation’ being
South Africa’s Constitution.5 Similarly, as the concept of delictual damages is
explored it will become apparent that delictual damages are now intertwined with
constitutional damages and that this area of the law is continuously developing.
Further, two areas of constitutional rights have been identified and have accordingly
been compensated with constitutional damages.  These areas are the right to social
security and the right to just administrative action – both of these are specific rights
contained in the Bill of Rights.6 The aforementioned serves to reiterate the
predominance of constitutional law as the field of research for this dissertation.
3 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 3.
4Actual loss and expenses incurred up to the date of the trial is known as damnum emergens. Damages,
that is the amount to be paid as compensation for the harm suffered, are assessed in exactly the same
way as the extent of harm is calculated, according to the sum formula approach according to Van der
Walt and Midgley, ‘Delict’ Principles and Cases 2nd edition (1997) 185.  Neethling et al, Law of
Delict, 6th edition (2010) 212 - 213.
5 The ‘old dispensation’ refers to the era in South African history prior to the enactment of our 1996
Constitution and democracy.  The ‘old dispensation’ therefore refers to the period of parliamentary
sovereignty as opposed to the ‘new dispensation’ which is premised on constitutional supremacy and
the rule of law.
6 Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, section 27 states:
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to –
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants,
appropriate social assistance. (emphasis added)
(2)   The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatments.”
Section 33 of the 1996 Constitution states:
“(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be
given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must –
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an
independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.”
4In Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern
Cape7 the High Court granted certain declaratory relief and ordered the defendant to
pay interest that had been claimed on the arrear amount of the social grant due to Kate
which had been unduly delayed.  Interest in Kate’s8 case was claimed and awarded as
a measure of constitutional damages for the unreasonable delay she had experienced
in obtaining her social assistance grant.  The delay that Kate experienced in not
receiving her social grant timeously resulted in undue hardship to her.  The question
remains:  “Is an award of monetary damages, being more than just interest due to the
claimant in terms of delictual remedies, an appropriate remedy for an admitted breach
of a constitutional right to social assistance?”
In examining the reason for the Court’s decision in Kate’s9 case, it is noted that
section 27 of the Constitution obliges the State to achieve the progressive realization
of the right that everyone has to social security, in so far as available public resources
allow.  Further, section 235 (8) of the interim Constitution10 provided for the
7 2005 1 SA 141 (SECLD).
8 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
9 Supra.
10 Act 2003 of 1993, section 235 (8) states that:
“(a) The President may, and shall if so requested by the Premier of a province, and provided the
province has the administrative capacity to exercise and perform the powers and functions in question,
by proclamation in the Gazette assign, within the framework of section 126, the administration of a law
referred to in subsection (6) (b) to a competent authority within the jurisdiction of the government of a
province, either generally or to the extent specified in the proclamation.
(b) When the President so assigns the administration of a law, or at any time thereafter, and to the
extent that he or she considers it necessary for the efficient carrying out of the assignment, he or she
may-
(i)   amend or adapt such law in order to regulate its application or interpretation;
(ii)  where the assignment does not relate to the whole of such law, repeal and re-enact,
whether with or without an amendment or adaptation contemplated in subparagraph (i),
those of its provisions to which the assignment relates or to the extent that the assignment
relates to them; and
(iii) regulate any other matter necessary, in his or her opinion, as a result of the assignment,
including matters relating to the transfer or secondment of persons (subject to sections
236 and 237) and relating to the transfer of assets, liabilities, rights and obligations,
including funds, to or from the national or a provincial government or any department of
state, administration, force or other institution.
(c) In regard to any policing power the President may only make that assignment effective upon the
rationalization of the police service as contemplated in section 237: Provided that such assignment to a
province may be made where such rationalization has been completed in such a province.
(d) Any reference in a law to the authority administering such law, shall upon the assignment of such
law in terms of paragraph (a) be deemed to be a reference mutatis mutandis to the appropriate authority
of the province concerned.”
5administrative capacity to administer the Social Assistance Act11, because the duty
was permitted only if that capacity existed, hence obliging the provincial government
to provide social grants to disabled persons, amongst others.  It was held by Nugent J
that the fact that the public purse would be depleted by interest claims does not justify
withholding the remedy.12 The only appropriate remedy in the circumstances was an
award of constitutional damages13 to recompense Kate for the breach of her right to a
social grant.
Reference in Kate’s case14 was made to the case of Fose v Minister of Safety and
Security15 where it was recognized that in principle, monetary damages are capable of
being awarded for breach of a constitutional right.  Monetary damages for a breach of
a constitutional right have been awarded by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and have
been endorsed by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) (Ltd) as compensation for the damage sustained
by the aggrieved party.16 A further case on point is that of Jayiya v Member of the
Executive Council, Eastern Cape Provincial Government17, which makes reference to
state liability for the payment of social grants.
Froneman J in Kate v Minister of the Executive Council for the Department of
Welfare, Eastern Cape18 followed earlier decisions of Leach J in the High Court in the
cases of Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council of Welfare, Eastern
Cape19 and Mbanga v Member of the Executive Council of Welfare Eastern Cape20,
which were heard simultaneously in 2002 with regard to the interpretation of the Act21
11 Act 59 of 1992.  The capacity must exist for the achievement of a substantive right, in order for the
right to be justiciable, hence, the introduction of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
in order to provide the administrative capacity and framework for the implementation of many socio-
economic rights.
12 2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 32.
13 Constitutional damages refers to compensation for a constitutional delict (in other words the
infringement of a constitutional right), which may be in the form of interest or patrimonial
compensation; in other words, monetary damages.
14 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
15 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
16 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 43; 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 65 - 66.
17 Case number 264/02 [2003] SCA.
18 2005 1 SA 141 (SECLD), the court a quo.
19 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE).
20 2001 JDR 328.
21 Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992.
6and constitutional damages. Leach J held in the above cases22 that the delay
experienced by the applicants in receiving their social grants as provided for in the
Constitution resulted in an unlawful and unreasonable infringement of the applicant’s
fundamental right to just administrative action23 as set out in section 33 (1) of the
Constitution.  Leach J awarded constitutional damages equivalent to interest for the
period of the delay.  This was done in order to place the applicant in the position in
which she would have been in had her constitutional right not been breached by the
delayed manner in which her application for a social grant was processed24.  A similar
order was made in the Mbanga case25 on the same grounds.26
Although there is nothing in the Constitution itself that prevents a court from
awarding damages as a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights, the
Constitution itself provides very little guidance on constitutional remedies.  Section
172 of the Constitution simply requires a court deciding a constitutional matter to
make an order which is ‘just and equitable’.  However, the jurisprudence of the
courts, specifically the Constitutional Court, is not encouraging.  According to the
Constitutional Court in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security27, ‘it is left to the courts
to decide what would be appropriate relief in any particular case’.  Not only must the
court’s order afford effective relief to the successful claimants, but to all similarly-
situated people in order to remain ‘community orientated’ in that justice is to be
served to all those in the same position as the claimant.  The remedy must operate
generally to eradicate inconsistencies between law or conduct and the Constitution.
Hence, constitutional remedies are forward-looking, community orientated and
structural as opposed to backward-looking, individualistic and corrective or
retributive.28 An award of damages is, historically, not a particularly forward-looking
remedy.  On the contrary, it is a remedy which requires a court to look back to the
past in order to determine how to compensate the victim.29
22 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE), 2001 JDR 328.
23 Id at footnote 6 above whereat Section 33 of the Constitution is reproduced indicating that everyone
is entitled to just administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
24 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE).
25 Supra.
26 2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 20.
27 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19.
28 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 288.
29 Id at 297.
7There is an uneasy relationship between the purpose of damages and the purpose of
constitutional remedies in that the purpose of damages is to award a person damages
with the object of eliminating his loss whereas the purpose of constitutional damages
is aimed at punishment or deterrence.  However, despite this uneasy relationship there
is nevertheless room for the development of the notion of damages as a remedy for
certain violations of fundamental rights.  This is so for at least two reasons.  Firstly,
there are some situations where a declaration of invalidity or an interdict makes little
or no sense and an award of damages is then the only form of relief which will
vindicate the fundamental right and deter future infringements.30 Secondly,
substantial awards of damages may encourage victims to come forward and litigate,
something which may serve to vindicate the Constitution and deter future
infringements.  Most directly on point, when it comes to constitutional damages, is the
decision of the Constitutional Court in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security31, which
appears at first to be rather discouraging on the subject of monetary damages.
Nevertheless, in analyzing the case it becomes apparent that all that the court held in
Fose’s case32 was that if a violation of a fundamental right could be dealt with by a
claim for damages in delict, the plaintiff cannot claim an additional amount of
damages for breach of a constitutional right.  In other words, a plaintiff cannot be
compensated twice for the same wrong.  In Fose’s case33, the court34 envisaged an
amount of delictual damages for the breach of a victim’s constitutional rights amongst
the components of the plaintiff’s common law claim and was satisfied that an award
of common law damages gave sufficient relief for the breach of a victim’s right
contained in the Bill of Rights.35
De Waal et al submit that the public law action for constitutional damages has the
following objectives in addition to the objective of compensation of the victim.
Firstly, the vindication of the fundamental right itself so as to promote the values of
30 Ibid. Currie et al states that this will be the case when, for example, an employee is forced to work
on Election Day and as a result the employee is prevented from voting.  In this type of situation, where
the employee has missed an important opportunity to exercise a constitutional right, an award of
damages is the only remedy which is logical in that the award is effective to vindicate the employee’s
constitutional right.
31 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
32 Supra.
33 Supra.
34 Currie, and De Waal Op cit note 28 at 30.
35 Id at 298.
8an open and democratic society based on dignity, freedom, equality and respect for
human rights.  Secondly, the deterrence and prevention of future infringements of
fundamental rights by the legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of
government and finally, the punishment of those organs of state whose officials have
infringed fundamental rights in a particularly erroneous manner.36
In Fose’s case37, which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 2 to follow, the
court started out positively, by stating that there is no reason in principle why
appropriate relief should not include an award of damages, where such an award is
necessary to protect and enforce the Bill of Rights.38 But, later in the judgment, the
court expressed considerable doubt whether, even in the case of the infringement of a
constitutional right, which does not cause delictual damage to the plaintiff, an award
of constitutional damages to vindicate the right would be appropriate.  The negative
comments of the court are directed at constitutional damages in the ‘strong sense’.39
In other words the court does not see any room at this stage for deriving a claim for
damages directly from the Constitution.  But the same does not apply to the
development of new claims under the law of delict to give effect to the values
contained in the Bill of Rights.  On the contrary, in this regard the court observed that
the South African law of delict is flexible and will, in most cases, be broad enough to
provide all the relief that would be appropriate for a breach of constitutional rights
provided the requirements of a delict are satisfied.  It would seem that the court is
open to recognize such claims in cases where there is no other form of appropriate
relief available, and damages will serve to deter further violations of the fundamental
rights.40
Even the most ardent supporters of constitutional remedies draw attention to
inconsistent and unsatisfactory features of a constitutional damages remedy aimed at
punishment or deterrence41.  It has been suggested that to give punitive damages the
36 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th edition (2005) 193 - 198.  It is noted
by the writer that the punishment of the organ of state would be effected by punishing the specific
individuals who display an attitude of apathy, the method of how this punishment would be
administered falls to labour law.
37 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
38 Supra para 65.
39 In other words the direct application of the Bill of Rights.
40De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th edition (2001) 195 - 198.
41 Id at 169.
9primary focus runs counter to the Anglo-Canadian tradition, which favours calculated
compensatory damages.  The deterrent effect of any award of damages is difficult to
assess, since the empirical evidence of the deterrent impact is only evident by its
absence.42
Nothing has been adduced which tends to lead to the conclusion that punitive
damages against the State will serve as a significant deterrent against individual or
general repetitions of the infringements.43 Kriegler J noted that nothing in South
Africa’s recent history, where substantial awards for death and brutality in detention
were awarded44 or agreed to, suggests that this had any preventative effect.  Further,
to make nominal punitive awards will, if anything, trivialize the right involved and
hence for awards to have any conceivable deterrent effect against the State they would
have to be exceedingly substantial and, the more substantial they are, the greater the
anomaly that a single plaintiff receives a windfall of such a magnitude.45 In a country
where there is a great demand for scarce resources, where the State has various
constitutionally prescribed commitments which have substantial economic
implications and where there are multifaceted demands on the public purse and the
machinery of government that flow from the urgent need for economic and social
reform, it seems to be inappropriate to use these scarce resources to pay constitutional
damages to plaintiffs who are already fully compensated for the injuries done to them
through delictual remedies, with no real assurance that such payment will have any
deterrent or preventative effect at all.  It would seem that this scenario is a reality as
illustrated by the cases noted above.  It would seem that funds of this nature could be
42 Ibid.
43 In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 87, Didcott J stated that the
factors which discourage awards of punitive damages against the state will not necessarily apply to
private persons.  In the case of private violators, the deterrent effect of the award would be greatly
increased due to the fact that the award would be paid directly from the violator and not from the
public.  On the other hand, when it comes to private violations of fundamental rights, the remedy of
invalidation will often be meaningless, or will hardly constitute appropriate relief for the purpose of
section 38 of the 1996 Constitution.   Section 8(3) of the 1996 Constitution does not prescribe any
particular type of relief for private violations of fundamental rights.  Rather, it directs the court to
existing legislation and the common law to find ‘constitutional remedies’ for the private violation of
fundamental rights.
44 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 71.  Kriegler J stated (para 102 –
103) that where there are systematic, pervasive and enduring infringements of constitutional rights,
delictual relief compensating a particular plaintiff may not be adequate as a means of vindicating the
Constitution and deterring future violations of it.  See also Tobani v Minister of Correctional Service
NO [2000] 2 ALL SA 318 (SE).
45 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 71.
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better employed in structural ways to eliminate or substantially reduce the causes of
the infringements.46 While punitive awards may lead to systematic change, the
process might be a slow one requiring a substantial number of such awards before
change is induced, which change the State is reluctant to institute of its own accord.
Equitable relief,47 on the other hand, could achieve such change far more speedily and
cheaply.
It is therefore evident that although there are arguments supporting the proposition of
granting constitutional damages, there are equally as many arguments opposing the
granting of such damages; both of these will be explored in this dissertation in greater
depth48.
It is hoped that this dissertation will, in the end result, be valuable to both law students
and academic institutions alike as the diverse topic of constitutional damages is
explored.
1.2. THE ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND DAMAGES IN
SOUTH AFRICA
This section seeks to introduce the concept of constitutional rights and damages in the
South African context with special emphasis on social security.  In order to
demonstrate the supremacy of the Constitution with regard to all issues effectively,
the situation prior to the era of the supremacy of the Constitution are dealt with briefly
in order to contrast the status of the individual citizen’s current rights and obligations
in the Republic of South Africa.
46 Supra at para 72.
47 Equitable relief is relief that cannot be provided by a monetary award, hence equitable relief is
usually non-monetary relief.  Equitable relief as addressed in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security
1997 3 SA 786 (CC) is relief that is also fair and reasonable and may be a specific performance award.
48 Arguments supporting the proposition of granting constitutional damages are further explored in
Section 6.2 of this dissertation.  Arguments opposing the granting of constitutional damages are further
explored in Section 6.3.of this dissertation.
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Section 165(1) of the Constitution49 contains a simple declaration.  The exercise of
judicial authority takes place when a court or tribunal which, acting under the
authority of the Constitution, decides commandingly and conclusively, controversies
between subjects of the State, or between the State and its subjects.  The maxim ubi
ius ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy), expresses one of the most
important principles of our law.  This means that the existence of a legal right implies
the existence of an authority with the power to grant a remedy if that right is
infringed.  A legal right will be incomplete if there is no remedy for enforcing it and,
further, if no sanction attaches to a breach of that right.  It is of primary importance to
any constitutional system that it makes provision for an institution that will decide
whether a right has been breached and what remedy to provide or sanction to impose.
In South Africa the principle institution empowered to provide remedies and sanctions
for a breach of a constitutional right or a common law right is the judicial authority of
the Republic.50
Prior to 1993 South Africa was not a constitutionally democratic society, but was
rather a society based on Parliamentary sovereignty (which tended to succumb to the
opinion of a particular minority).  Consequentially, there was no inherent equality of
rights before the law and the concept of fundamental rights was a concept which only
truly came into existence with the codification and enactment of the 1996
Constitution.  In contrast, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the 1996 South
African Constitution51 is a beacon of hope in a world inundated by conflict, poverty
and the failure of the State52 to perform the tasks for which they were elected.  One of
the most important functions of a modern constitution is to set limits on the exercise
of public power.  The Bill of Rights gives legal protection to the traditional liberal
rights of equality, personal liberty, property, free speech, freedom of assembly and
association, the civil and political rights.  These are negative rights, which take power
away from the State.53 Positive rights, which impose obligations on the State, have
49 Section 165(1) of the 1996 Constitution states that “The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the
courts”.  Courts follow a two-stage approach to rights interpretation.  First, there is an interpretation stage and
secondly there’s a limitations stage.  Iles, ‘Limiting Socio-economic Rights:  Beyond the Internal Limitations
Clauses’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 448, 453.
50 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 268.
51 And prior to the final Constitution (1996), the 1993 interim Constitution.
52 Currie, and De Waal, Op cit note 50 at 20.
53 Id at 29.
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also been included in the Bill of Rights.54 Thus, rather than simply protecting
members of society from the abuse of state power, it is thought that a constitution and
a Bill of Rights should secure for all members of society a basic set of social goals.55
The Supreme Court of Appeal delivered a landmark decision in the case of Member of
the Executive Council of the Department of Welfare v Kate.56 In this case57 the
constitutional breach was held to lie in denying Kate the process that is promised by
section 33(1)58 of the Constitution in that she was deprived of her constitutional right
to a social grant for many months due to maladministration of the state department.
Section 33(1) of the Constitution came into operation on the 4th of February 1997, it
conferred on every person the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair
administrative action.  Noting that the realization of substantive rights is dependant
upon an administrative process, rights that protect that process, like those that are
embodied in section 33(1) and section 237 of the Constitution and sections 8(1), and
(2) and 6(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act59 (hereinafter referred to
as PAJA), are essential to the realization of those substantive rights.  Without
protection being given to the process, the substantive rights are capable of being
denied.  Failure to meet these process obligations denies to the beneficiaries their
substantive right to social assistance.  Hence, the Constitution is an important statute
to this case and this dissertation.60
The issue of constitutional rights and damages in South Africa is pertinent and
relevant to our legal foundation at this stage of our democracy due to the growing
number of cases pertaining to the infringement or deprivation of individual’s
constitutional rights, specifically social security rights, as a result of the mal-
administration of the relevant State structures appearing before our judiciary.  The
aforementioned re occurring infringements, that vulnerable members of our society
have been subjected to; have provided the relevance of this study and the resulting
54 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 30.
55 Id at 398.
56 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
57 Supra.
58 Section 33 of the Constitution is outlined in footnote 6 above.
59 Act 3 of 2000.
60 2006 SCA 46 (RSA). Especially sections 27, 38, 237 and 33 of the 1996 Constitution; further the
Interim Constitution is noteworthy with regard to section 235 (8).
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motivation for this dissertation.  This research was initially prompted by the approach
of the judgment in the case of Member of the Executive Council of the Department of
Welfare v Kate61 to the extent that it provided a measure of constitutional damages to
Kate for the infringement of her constitutional right to social assistance.  The case has
proven to be a benchmark case in this dissertation and indeed in relation to the
provision of constitutional damages.
1.3. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose and hence focus of this study is to explore the past and present state of
the law relating to constitutional damages and, after analyzing the arguments in
favour and opposed to the awarding of constitutional damages, to make
recommendations in this regard.
The new constitutional dispensation has had a profound effect upon the common law
of South Africa since the 1996 Constitution of South Africa was enacted; the two
systems have had to discover how to function in unison.  This dissertation will
provide the reader with insight into the evolution of one phase in the protection of
constitutional rights, as it becomes evident that delictual damages and constitutional
damages operate in a synchronized fashion, essentially providing a new mechanism
for providing damages.
This dissertation has the purpose of reviewing, analyzing and amalgamating relevant
literature and specifically case law in this field, providing a relevant and succinct
synopsis of the topic, something that is currently lacking in our law.  The question of
whether monetary damages are a just and equitable remedy in a constitutional state
should shape our future thoughts and policies and indeed the way in which many
recent judgments can be viewed.
This dissertation will endeavour to delve into and possibly answer the question as to
whether monetary damages, normally in the form of interest as demonstrated by
61 Supra.
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Kate’s case62, is a just and equitable remedy for the breach of a social assistance
right.63
Over the past sixteen years there has been a plethora of case law making in-roads in
this area of law, with many courts giving contradictory judgments and with varying
ratios for such decisions furthering the contention.  It seems to have become more
acceptable to provide monetary damages for a breach of a constitutional right,
specifically a social assistance right, as demonstrated in cases such as Member of the
Executive Council of the Department of Welfare v Kate64, Mahambehlala v Member
of Executive Council of Welfare, Eastern Cape65 and Mbanga v Member of Executive
Council of Welfare Eastern Cape.66 Prior to this latest era67 there were equally as
many cases in opposition68 to ‘throwing money at the problem,’ as seen in the case of
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security.69
The question, put differently, is whether providing monetary damages for a breach of
a social assistance right is not merely throwing money at the problem.70 This
approach could lead to bankruptcy of the State and no further solution to the clear and
evident problem of disorganization within the organs of the State as illustrated by
Kate’s case.71
The Constitution provides in Chapter 2, section 7 for the democratic values of human
dignity, equality and freedom.72 The question to be posed is “Are the rights of
62Supra.
63 Noting that interest is merely an example of one of the forms of constitutional damages to be
explored and not the only form of constitutional damages provided by South Africa's judiciary.
64 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
65 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE).
66 2001 JDR 328.
67 2006 – 2008.
68 Tobani v Minister of Correctional Service NO [2000] 2 ALL SA 318 (SE), and Somyani v Minister
of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another SECLD case 1144/01 unreported
judgment undated.  Refer to point 6.3.infra.
69 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
70 Whether the ‘problem’ is the social assistance system or the lack of administrative capacity.
71 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
72 Section 7 (1) of the 1996 Constitution states:
“This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people
in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”
(2) “The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.”
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individuals being protected, respected and promoted by the State by providing
monetary compensation for an infringement of such rights, if there is still no further
guarantee that such infringement will not occur again?”
All of the aforementioned issues and questions will be explored in a structured
manner in this study by utilizing relevant case law as the foundation for the answering
of these pertinent questions which form the purpose and objective of this dissertation.
1.4.  METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach of research refers to the techniques utilized by the
researcher in conducting her research and obtaining the end result.
This dissertation is based on a theoretical study.  The theoretical study consists of
review research methodology which was conducted throughout this dissertation, in
that relevant case law and authorities were scrutinized and reviewed, which review
forms the basis for this dissertation and the resultant conclusions obtained.  The
research methodology utilized consists primarily of information gathering by
exploring the secondary sources73, as well as exploring the primary sources, in
particular extensive use was made of case law and the ratios contained therein.74.
In particular, case law (refer to Annexure A annexed hereto) will be examined as it is
pertinent to this area of research.  In essence secondary sources of information will be
used to direct the author to the pertinent primary sources, which will be scrutinized in
terms of the research topic.
Administrative law will play an essential role in South Africa’s immediate future.  The government
must bring economic development, housing, infrastructure, better education and health care, and
numerous other services to the vast majority of the population whom apartheid laws victimized and
who subsist at Third World level.  It must engage in redistributive programs, such as land restitution
and affirmative action.  It must strongly enforce laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, and sexual orientation, Asimow, ‘Administrative Law Under South Africa’s Final Constitution:
the Need for an Administrative Justice Act’ (1996) 113 SALJ 613, 613.
73 Secondary sources are statements about the law by legal experts which are non-binding.
74 Primary sources consist of the books of law and statements of law by State institutions, courts and or
the legislature.
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The appropriate case law will be interpreted, as illustrated above, with reference to the
rationale of the decision; contradicting decisions will be examined in terms of the
judicial reasoning. Socio-economic factors surrounding the circumstances of a
relevant case are explored in order to establish the context in which the decision was
reached.75
This dissertation does not exist in isolation, but has built upon what has been done
previously in this area of law.  Before embarking on this dissertation, the researcher
has reviewed previous work produced in the field of constitutional damages, mainly
consisting of case law (as detailed in Annexure A annexed hereto), this method is
known as literature review and is a valid research method.
The preliminary research which was conducted to confirm the validity of this research
included the analyzing of relevant case law with decisions relating to constitutional
and delictual damages.
This dissertation consists of the analytical study of primary sources in the form of
case law.  In addition, secondary sources, in the form of books have been explored.
Methodologically, the researcher has attempted to provide recommendations for
methods of dealing with the amalgamation of constitutional and delictual damages
although it is evident that concrete recommendations are not at hand.
Comparative and historical research was undertaken in this dissertation in that case
law ratios within South Africa’s history were compared and analyzed in order to
determine the distinction between delictual and constitutional damages as well as the
present amalgamation thereof.
Primary Sources:
This dissertation will consider inter alia, case law, the Constitution, Common Law
and pieces of relevant legislation covering the area of research.
75 Blanche and Durrheim (editors), Research in Practice:  Applied Methods for the Social Sciences
(2002) 17.
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Secondary Sources:
These include literature in the area of delict and constitutional law and constitutional
damages in particular in the form of books and articles.
World Wide Web:
The internet is utilized widely to access information, in particular articles, relating to
the research arena.
In conclusion, it is evident that the research embarked upon is relevant and useful as
there has to date been no steadfast pronouncement on the issue as judgments conflict.
Hence the topic at hand is contentious and deserves exploration.
1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW
Leading opponents and proponents of constitutional damages will be analyzed in the
context of the above research question as this research dissertation does not exist in
isolation and hence must build upon what has been done previously.  Therefore,
before embarking on this dissertation a review of case law and previous work in this
field was necessary.  A literature review involves the identification and analysis of
literature related to one’s research.
The works analyzed and utilized in this dissertation are detailed in the Table of Cases,
Table of Statutes and Bibliography.
As case law provides the foundation of this dissertation a synthesis of the relevant
case law and the outcome of such is provided in the form of Annexure A annexed to
this dissertation.  It should be noted that the scope of cases presented in Annexure A
has been limited as other cases may have emerged more recently, which have not
been explored.
The case law synthesis in Annexure A has been placed in chronological order in order
for the reader to clearly observe the timeline and trend developing with regards to the
awarding of monetary damages for a constitutional breach.
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1.5.1.  RELEVANT SECTIONS FROM THE CONSTITUTION
This dissertation explores a few relevant sections of the Constitution and as such this
section contains an exposition of some relevant sections of the Constitution which lay
the foundation for exploring the possibility of the amalgamation of constitutional and
delictual damages in the Chapters which follow.
Firstly, section 2 of the Constitution indicates the supremacy of the Constitution,
stating that:  “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”76
Secondly, section 8 of the Constitution outlines to whom the Bill of Rights applies
and what factors are to be taken into account in determining to what extent the
provisions apply.  Section 8(3)(a) and (b) are pertinent to Chapter five as it indicates
that in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, a court must apply, or if necessary
develop, the common law (which will be explored under Sections 5.2. and 5.3. below)
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.77
Thirdly, section 38 of the Constitution lists the persons who have a right to approach a
court with regards to alleged infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights.78
76 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution.77 Section 8 of the Bill of Rights states that:
“(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all
organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds the natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the
right.
(3)  When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of (2), a
court –
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to
the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in
accordance with section 36(1).
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of
the right and the nature of that juristic person.”
78 Section 38 of the 1996 Constitution states that “Anyone listed in this section has the right to
approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened,
and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.  The persons who may
approach a court are:
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interests of, a group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest;  and
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Section 39 of the Constitution is an important section to this dissertation, as the rights
in the Bill of Rights are interpreted in terms of this section, which indicates that when
interpreting legislation and developing the common law the spirit and intention of the
Bill of Rights must be taken into account.79
It should be noted that judicial authority is exercised in terms of section 165 of the
Constitution.80
The constitutional sections outlined here should be borne in mind throughout this
dissertation as we move to explore the delictual principles and ultimately the
amalgamation of the delictual and constitutional concepts.
1.6. DIVISION OF CHAPTERS
This dissertation consists of the following eight Chapters:
Chapter 1: Introduction
The topic of this dissertation is introduced with specific reference to constitutional
rights and damages in South Africa.  Thereafter, the purpose of the study is explored
together with the research methodology followed in this study being explored.
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.”
79 Section 39 of the 1996 Constitution states that:
“(2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or
conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with
the Bill.”
80 Section 165 of the 1996 Constitution states:
(1) “The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.
(2) The courts are independent and subject only [emphasis supplied] to the Constitution and
the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts.
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts
to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the
courts.
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to
which it applies.”
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Chapter 1 also provides the reader with a literature review encompassing the relevant
sections from the Constitution, followed by the essential definitions utilized in this
dissertation.
Chapter 2: The Social Security System as an example of where compensation has
been awarded for a breach of a Constitutional right
Case law relating to the compensation for breaching constitutional rights, specifically
those relating to section 27 of the Constitution (social security), is provided and
analyzed to illustrate how at present the South Africa judiciary is choosing to
compensate individuals for the breach of their fundamental constitutional rights.
Chapter 3: The approach to the provision of damages for the infringement of
rights prior to the Constitution
Chapter three grapples with the substance of this dissertation as the old dispensational
approach to damages is explored with regard to the common law.  This Chapter
consists mainly of an exposé and analysis of Roman-Dutch common law concepts of
delictual damages and compensation.
Chapter 4: The concepts of constitutional rights and damages in South Africa and
the ‘new’ approach to constitutional damages under the Constitution
Chapter four consists of two sections as follows:
Section 4.2: The concept/s of constitutional rights and damages in South Africa
Section 4.2. of Chapter four takes an analytical approach to constitutional rights and
damages in South Africa and analyzes these two concepts extrapolating section 4.2. of
Chapter four.
Section 4.3.: Section 4.3. entitled “The ‘new’ approach to the provision of
constitutional damages under the Constitution” of this Chapter stands in juxtaposition
to Chapter three, in that it evaluates and expands upon the constitutional approach to
the provision of monetary damages as analyzed in section 4.2.
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Chapter 5: The amalgamation of delictual and constitutional damages
Chapter five combines concepts from Chapter three and Chapter four and analyzes the
application of the common law in a constitutional framework with regard to damages.
This Chapter explores the concept of monetary damages in relation to the doctrine of
separation of powers as well as to the concept of the utilization of the taxpayer’s
money in order to compensate the claimants for the mal-performance of the State.
This Chapter evaluates how the courts have dealt with the inundation of claims
relating to the infringement of constitutional rights since the enactment of the
Constitution together with the further challenges that the Constitution and common
law provide.
Chapter 6: Arguments in favour of and opposing the awarding of monetary
damages in the constitutional context
The arguments, arising out of case law, in favour of monetary damages are analyzed
in Chapter six.  This Chapter expands upon the arguments extrapolated from case law
in opposition to providing monetary damages for a breach of a constitutional right.  In
this Chapter the ratio of the cases are scrutinized.
Chapter 7: The concept of remedies in general and alternative remedies to
monetary damages
Chapter seven outlines the various alternatives to providing monetary damages for a
breach of a constitutional right and the consequences of such alternatives.
Chapter 8:  Conclusions
Chapter eight seeks to predict the future of constitutional and delictual damages in
South Africa by drawing the timeline from whence we have journeyed to the present
position.  This Chapter ends with a brief conclusion of what has been found in terms
of Chapters two to seven.  Hence, the findings of this dissertation will be provided in
a succinct format.
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1.7. A NOTE ON THE USE OF CERTAIN EXPRESSIONS
It has become apparent that within the essence of the topic of this dissertation there is
uncertainty, for the usage of words and the determination of accurate terminology is
unclear and becomes part of this research.  It is therefore appropriate to provide a
brief section to ensure understanding of certain imperative terms or phrases related to
the topic, as used in this dissertation.
The expression constitutional delict refers to the infringement or breach of an
individual’s constitutional right, being a right framed within the Constitution, by
another individual, juristic person or the State.81 There is some debate regarding the
correctness of the aforementioned term.
The expression constitutional damages in this dissertation refers to the compensation
for the breach or infringement of a constitutional delict (in other words the
infringement of a constitutional right), which may be in the form of interest or
patrimonial compensation; in other words, monetary damages.  This definition is
evident from various recent judgments of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court
of Appeal.82
Similarly, the expression common law delict refers to a wrongful, culpable act by a
person that causes harm to another, whether the harm causes patrimonial or non-
patrimonial loss.83
Delictual damages, is the monetary equivalent of loss, and is awarded to a person
with the object of eliminating, as fully as possible, his past as well as future
patrimonial and, where applicable, non-patrimonial loss.  Money is thus intended as
an equivalent to damage.84
81 Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 20.
82 2006 SCA 46 (RSA); 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).  The term ‘constitutional delict’ is also explored at pages
34, 48, 84, 99 and 168.
83 Neethling et al Op cit note 81 at 3.
84 Id at 195.
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Finally, the expression damage (damnum) is an ancient concept in legal terminology.
Although it is not absolutely clear how damage should be defined, for the purpose of
this dissertation, damage is the detrimental impact upon any patrimonial or
personality interest deemed worthy of protection by the law.85 The law of damages
deals with the content of obligations for the payment of damages (including
satisfaction) for the loss caused.  The law of damages is that part of the law which
indicates how the existence and extent of damage as well as the proper amount of
damages or satisfaction are to be determined in the case of delict, breach of contract
and other legal principles providing for the payment of damages.86
85 Neethling, et al Op cit note 81 at 212.
86 Visser and Potgieter, Law of Damages, 2nd edition (2003)1.
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THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHERE
COMPENSATION HAS BEEN AWARDED FOR BREACH OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
2.1.  INTRODUCTION
This Chapter will explore case law and legislation relating to compensation for breach
of a constitutional right, specifically those contained in section 27 of the
Constitution.87 The analysis will attempt to provide the courts’ present approach to
compensation for the infringement of an individual’s fundamental constitutional right
to social assistance, as a specific area of social security because, as noted earlier, this
area is rife with violations of constitutional rights.
It is evident that South Africa is suffering under the burdens of high unemployment,
lack of sufficient funds, and the inefficient administration of available funds.  In
addition to the aforementioned, the AIDS pandemic is likely to increase dramatically
the demand for disability benefits, dependants’ benefits, foster care and adoptive care
for children orphaned by AIDS.88 In this context it is interesting to note that none of
the International Labour Organization conventions that deal specifically with social
security actually define the term.  The conventions focus rather on the various
contingencies and on the benefits that must be provided in respect of these
contingencies.  The omission was probably intentional, as it would have been
extremely difficult to define social security in globally acceptable terms in these
international instruments.89 With the aforementioned context of social security as a
foundation to this Chapter we move now to defining social security.
2.2.  DEFINING SOCIAL SECURITY
The International Labour Organization has attempted to define social security in its
publications dealing with the subject.  In a publication entitled Introduction to Social
Security (3rd edition) the Organization defines social security as follows:
87 The social security provision of 1996 Constitution.
88 Strydom (Ed), Le Roux, Landman, Christianson, Dupper, Myburgh, Barker, Garbers, and Basson,
Essential Social Security Law (2001) 3.
89 Id at 4.
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‘… it can be taken to mean the protection which society provides for its members, through a
series of public measures, against the economic and social distress that otherwise would be
caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity,
employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death, the provision of medical
care, and the provision of subsidies for families with children’.90
The International Labour Organization’s definition of social security defines what, in
essence, social security seeks to achieve in the broad sense and does not itself define
social security, but rather its objectives.  It is also apparent that the aforementioned
definition is provided in the broad sense without any provision for qualifications for
such protection.  The right to social security and an adequate standard of living are
also addressed in international human rights instruments, among these are the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948).
Due process has proven to be an effective means of protecting the recipients of social
security benefits in many foreign and international regimes and hence it is evident that
the economic and social restructuring of South Africa is fundamental to the process of
transformation in order to protect vulnerable citizens from unreasonable
infringements of their rights, especially their rights pertaining to social security.91
With the above understanding of the context in which social security rights operate in
South Africa together with the definition of social security we turn to explore the
codification of the right to social security in the Constitution.
2.3.  SECTION 27 OF THE 1996 CONSTITUTION
Section 27 of the Constitution provides the right to have access to health care
services, including reproductive health care, sufficient food and water, and social
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants,
90 Ibid.
91 The 1996 Constitution, section 27 provides that “Everyone has the right to have access to – social
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their independents, appropriate social
assistance.” Section 27 (3) of the Constitution provides “No one may be refused emergency medical
treatment.”  Devenish, A commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 367 – 368.
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appropriate social assistance.  The State is obliged to take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
each of these rights.  Finally, no person may be refused emergency medical
treatment.92
Social assistance was the first of the various strands of present-day social security to
develop, often in the form of so-called ‘poor laws’.93 The social security system that
the African National Congress (ANC) inherited when it came into power in 1994 was
a fairly complex and expensive system.  Social security was regulated through a
number of statutes, such as the Social Assistance Act94, the Compensation for
Occupational Injuries and Disease Act95, the Unemployment Insurance Act96 and
labour statutes such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.97 The State has
tackled the restructuring of the current social security system in a number of ways, the
prominent example being the entrenchment of the right to social security in section
27(1)(c) of the Constitution.98 The Constitution also provides for equality before the
law and equal protection and benefit of the law as a basic human right thereby
enforcing all other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.99
92 Id at 365.
93 Strydom (Ed), Le Roux, Landman, Christianson, Dupper, Myburgh, Barker, Garbers, and Basson,
Essential Social Security Law (2001) 7.
94 Act 59 of 1992.
95 Act 130 of 1993.
96 Act 30 of 1966.
97Act 3 of 1983.
98 “Everyone has the right to have access to – social security, including, if they are unable to support
themselves and their independents, appropriate social assistance.”
99 Strydom (Ed), Le Roux, Landman, Christianson, Dupper, Myburgh, Barker, Garbers, and Basson,
Essential Social Security Law (2001) 20.  The 1996 Constitution, section 9 provides “Everyone is equal
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit
unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is
established that the discrimination is fair.”
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Section 27 of the Constitution has resulted in changes100 to the Social Assistance Act
as well as the manner in which the social security right is provided to the ordinary
individual.
2.4. THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACT 59 OF 1992
The Social Assistance Act101 does away with the social assistance regime that was in
place prior to the establishment of the new constitutional order in 1994.  The Act
provides for a regime that applies throughout the Republic of South Africa on a non-
discriminatory basis and, together with the regulations published in terms of the Act,
makes provision for the payment of various grants, and sets out the conditions under
which a grant may be payable, to whom it may be payable, and when it will cease to
be payable.102
Social assistance in South Africa is financed out of general tax revenues, mostly
through the budgets of provincial departments of welfare.  Social assistance
constitutes the biggest element of the so-called ‘welfare expenditure’ item of the
budget, which in turn, together with health and education, forms part of the broader
‘social services’ category in the budget.  Welfare expenditure has increased quite
significantly over the past decade – even more so than either health or education,
pointing to the dire need of many people in South Africa for social assistance.103
For all the best endeavours to regulate social security by law, and for all the most
enlightened principles embodied in those laws104, the intended benefits cannot be
achieved without effective implementation.  The administration of social security is
about the translation of principle into practice, about transforming the promise of the
law into results.  After all, the principle task of any social security scheme is ‘to
100 The changes to the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 will be explored below under Section 2.6.
101 Act 59 of 1992.
102 Sections 2 to 4 of Act 59 of 1992.  Strydom et al Op cit note 99 at 31.
103 Id at 194.
104 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, Compensation for Occupational injuries and
disease Act 130 of 1993, Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, Social
Security Agency Act 9 of 2004, and Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 1966.
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provide prompt, accurate and efficient payment of benefits to members of the scheme.
Everything else which the organization does is subordinate to that task.’105
Despite the lofty ideals underlying social security schemes, evasion and attempted
evasion of responsibility and liability under these schemes is a fact of life.  It is
therefore not surprising that as most public social security schemes, particularly social
insurance schemes that are dependant upon contributions106, are regulated by
legislation which provides for mechanisms to ensure compliance107.  To the extent
that compliance orders and discovery of malpractice are not sufficient to ensure
compliance, legislation also provides for the civil recovery of arrear contributions and
the criminalization of non-compliance.  Despite this, budget and logistical constraints
often prevent compliance procedures from being effective in the face of large scale
evasion, especially by the smaller and less visible employers, for example.108 The
first challenge to the administration of social security is that of efficiency (in other
words - speed).  It is also imperative that the system of payments is not susceptible to
fraud.109
The old age grant was first introduced in South Africa in 1928, but was initially
confined to the white population.  Some black people began qualifying for the grant in
1943.110 In Europe, the industrial revolution served as the impetus for income-
protection schemes as it not only brought new working conditions and urbanization,
but also solidarity and state-interference.  Two broadly distinct approaches initially
developed, namely, the Bismarckian approach111 and the Beveridge approach.112 The
105ILO Administration of Social Security 1998 13.
106 Refer to Annexure B for particulars on contributors to social insurance schemes.
107 Ibid.
108 Strydom et al, Essential Social Security Law (2001) 216.
109 Id at 217.
110 Olivier et al, Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 274.
111 THE EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Glossary,
Bismarckian System (2008) 1. The Bismarckian approach is a system of national social security and
health insurance introduced into the 19th century German empire under the then Chancellor Bismarck.
This system is a legally mandatory system for the majority or the whole population to obtain health
insurance with a designated third-party payer through non-risk related contributions which are kept
separate from taxes or other legally mandated payments.  The scheme represented a principle means of
avoiding the adverse impact of unemployment, poverty and sickness affecting large sections of the
population. Besides Germany, typical countries with a Bismarckian system, a mandatory health
insurance system with contributions unrelated to risk, include Austria, the Netherlands, France and
Belgium (THE EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Glossary,
Bismarckian System (2008) 1).
30
formal social assistance system in South Africa has in recent years to some extent
been modified in order to reach more poor and needy people.  The social assistance
system has provided parity between the Black and non-Black beneficiaries of the
means-tested old age grant since 1993.113
Having analyzed the right to social security in isolation we, in the next section, now
explore the right to social security in action or inaction, as the case may be, in South
African case law.
2.5. MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF WELFARE v KATE 2006 SCA 46 (RSA)
2.5.1. BACKGROUND
A case pertinent to this Chapter is the landmark case of Member of the Executive
Council of the Department of Welfare v Kate.114
A brief history of the case sets the scene.  Kate, the respondent in the case115, lives in
the Govan Mbeki settlement near Port Elizabeth.  She was fifty four (54) years old
and disabled when the Social Assistance Act116 came into operation in 1992 and she
had no means of support at that time.  On the 16th of April 1996, soon after the Act117
112 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 222. THE EUROPEAN
OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Glossary, Beveridge System (2008) 1.
The system of social security and health services arising out of the Beveridge report in England and
Wales, first published in 1943.  This report recommended provision of health care for all people
through central taxation and other compulsory financial contributions and that a system of universal
benefits should give support during unemployment or sickness and after disability and retirement.  The
National Health Service Act of 1946 established the provision of services, free-of-charge, for the
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease.  A Beveridge system includes a substantial proportion
of public providers, which are often salaried staff.  Besides the United Kingdom, typical Beveridge
system type countries, providing free-of-charge services with mainly public providers for the
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease, are Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Italy.
113 Id at 40.
114 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
115 Supra.
116 Act 59 of 1992.  Social Assistance as a scheme is generally financed from the general revenue of the
State rather than individual contributions with statutory scales of benefits adjusted according to a
person’s means.  Before an individual is entitled to such assistance a means test is conducted to
determine the person’s need.  Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 15.
117 Ibid.
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came into operation, she applied for a disability grant according to the prescribed
procedures.  Kate’s application had been unreasonably delayed and there was no
explanation provided for such delay.  The application took approximately forty
months to be processed and Kate was advised in August 1999 that her disability grant
had been approved.  Once Kate was notified in August 1999, she was thereafter paid
her monthly grant, but by that date an amount had accrued to her from the date of her
application, leaving a balance that was still payable.  No explanation was given for the
shortfall not being paid.118
In March 2003 Kate consulted with an advice officer of the Centre of Human Rights,
where she was made aware that money was owing to her.  Subsequently, on the 19th
of March 2003 her attorney wrote to the Regional Director of the Department of
Welfare demanding payment of the shortfall with interest on the accrual from the 16th
of April 1996.  Receipt of the demand was formally acknowledged, but there was no
further response.119 On the 15th of October 2003 an application was launched in the
High Court at Port Elizabeth, where declaratory relief was sought together with orders
for the recovery of the balance of the accrual being the recovery claim, and interest on
that amount being the interest claim.120 The orders were granted in the High Court.
The outstanding balance of the accrual amounting to R13015 was paid in January
2004.
The principal dispute that remained was whether Kate was entitled to the interest on
the accrual as she had claimed.121 The Department appealed to the Supreme Court of
Appeal against the order to pay interest to Kate.
2.5.2. ISSUES
An issue which initially arose within Kate’s case122 was to determine what a
reasonable period of time was for an administrator to process and approve or reject an
118 2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 11.
119 Supra at para 12.
120 2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 13.
121 Supra at para 14.
122 Supra.
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application.  This depended on the enquiries that needed to be made, the volume of
similar applications that needed to be dealt with, the administrative capacity that was
available for processing such applications, and other matters of such a nature.  This
related to what ought reasonably to be expected of the administration.  The real
dispute in the present appeal, which the parties regarded as a test case, related to the
remainder of the interest on the accrual that was awarded by the court a quo.  That is,
the interest during the period from the date the application was made to the date that
Kate was notified that it had been approved.123
2.5.3. SECTION 33 OF THE 1996 CONSTITUTION
Legislation in South Africa ensures social assistance for some categories of persons
who cannot support themselves and or their families.124 The Social Assistance Act125
is the most important instrument, as it regulates the payment of social assistance
grants and other relief measures.126 In Kate’s case127 the constitutional breach was
held to lie in denying Kate the process that is promised by section 33(1) of the
Constitution.  On the other hand, to view the procedural aspect of the process that is
promised by section 33(1) of the Constitution in isolation from the provision of the
substantive right for which the procedural aspect is imperative is to approach the
matter too narrowly.  Section 33(1)128 came into operation on the 4th of February
1997; it conferred on every person the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally
fair administrative action.  Noting that the realization of substantive rights is
dependant upon an administrative process, rights that protect that process, like those
that are embodied in section 33(1) and section 237 of the Constitution and in the
PAJA129 are essentially ancillary to the realization of those substantive rights.
123 As referred to at the commencement of this chapter, it is imperative to note the change of the Social
Assistance Act as the Act determines what period is reasonable for the administration of the grant.
124Olivier et al Introduction to Social Security:  General Principles (2004) 222.  Regulations Regarding
Grants, Social Relief of Distress and Financial Awards in Terms of the Social Assistance Act,
promulgated under Government Notice R.373 in Gazette number 17016, dated the 1st of March 1996
are applicable to this case.    It should be noted that the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 in effect at the
time of the case at hand has since been updated to that of Act 13 of 2004.
125 Ibid.
126 Olivier et al Introduction to Social Security:  General Principles (2004) 38.
127 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
128 The 1996 Constitution.
129 Act 3 of 2000.
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Without protection being given to the process, the substantive rights are capable of
being denied. The realization of the substantive right to social assistance is dependant
upon lawful and procedurally fair administrative action and the diligent and prompt
performance by the State of its constitutional obligations.  Failure to meet those
process obligations denies to the beneficiary his or her substantive right to social
assistance.
2.5.4.  ARGUMENTS WITHIN KATE’S CASE
Counsel for Kate in Kate’s case averred that her case130 was centered on the
unreasonable delay in considering her application, which deprived her during that
period of her constitutional right to receive a social grant and for that deprivation she
sought to be recompensed by an order for damages.  The appellant claimed that
during the period in dispute, interest did not accrue to Kate on ordinary principles,
because the debt was not yet payable.  Further, counsel for the appellant submitted
that Kate had delictual remedies that were sufficiently restorative of any loss that was
caused to her due to the failure of the administration to perform its constitutional
duties and that, in those circumstances, a remedy of constitutional damages was not
required.  This submission did not succeed and interest during that period was claimed
and awarded as a measure of damages for the unreasonable delay that Kate had to
endure131.
The question that is now in issue is whether Kate became entitled to ‘constitutional
damages’.  Froneman J followed earlier decisions of that court per Leach J in the
Mahambehlala132 and Mbanga133 cases, which were heard simultaneously in 2002.  In
the Mahambehlala134 case, Leach J held that the delay resulted in an unlawful and
unreasonable infringement of the applicant’s fundamental right to just administrative
action as set out in section 33(1) of the Constitution.  Leach J awarded damages
equivalent to interest for the period of delay.  This was done in order to place the
130 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
131 2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 17 and 26.
132 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE).
133 2001 JDR 328 (SE).
134 Supra.
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applicant in the position in which she would have been had her constitutional right not
been breached by the tardy manner in which her application for a social grant was
processed.  A similar order was granted on the same grounds in the case of
Mbanga.135 It is common cause that the PAJA136 had no application in Kate’s case137,
as the Act138 only came into operation on the 30th of November 2000.
Section 27 of the Constitution obliges the State to achieve the progressive realization
of the right that everyone has to social security according to available resources.
Section 235(8) of the interim Constitution provided for the administrative capacity to
administer the Social Assistance Act,139 because the duty was permitted only if that
capacity existed, hence obliging the provincial government to make social grants to
disabled persons, amongst others.  Without protection being given to the process the
substantive rights are capable of being denied.  What had been denied to Kate was not
merely the enjoyment of a process in the abstract, but through the denial of that
process she had been denied her right to social assistance, which was dependant for its
realization upon an effective process.
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security140 recognized that, in principle, monetary
damages are capable of being awarded for a constitutional breach.  Delictual
principles are capable of being extended to encompass state liability for the breach of
constitutional obligations, but the relief that is permitted by section 38 of the
Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only when there is no
alternative and indirect means of asserting and vindicating constitutional rights.
It is submitted that the ultimate solution lies in the administration ‘getting its house in
order’ so that all applications are dealt with expeditiously rather than encouraging yet
more litigation.  It is evident that the only appropriate remedy in the circumstances
surrounding Kate’s case141 and similar cases is to award constitutional damages142 to
135 Supra.
136 Act 3 of 2000.
137 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
138 Act 3 of 2000.
139 Act 59 of 1992.
140 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
141 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
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recompense people in the position similar to that of Kate for the breach of their
constitutional right/(s).
What remains is how to measure the loss in monetary terms.  It was not shown that
Kate suffered direct financial loss and it is most unlikely that she did, for the grant
was destined to be consumed and not invested, but the loss was just as real as she
suffered immensely due to not having the grant.
2.6. AMENDMENTS TO THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACT 59 OF 1992
We noted earlier in Section 2.4. of this dissertation that there have been amendments
to the social assistance legislation in South Africa since the enactment of the
Constitution, although we did not explore such amendments.  We turn now to explore
these amendments.
The recent amendments to the Social Assistance Act of 1992143 as effected in the
Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 made an important adjustment of the date of
application of grants to the date on which the application was made as opposed to
when the application was granted as was the case prior to the amendments to the
Social Assistance Act.  This has implications for the date of accrual, which was also
altered to the date of application, as opposed to the date of approval of the grant, and
has been limited to a maximum of three months.  These measures represent an attempt
to improve the administrative time frames in processing grants, and to avoid unfair
limitations in back payment as experienced in Kate’s case.144
2.7. ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME
South Africa has some arrangements in place solely for the purpose of affording a
remedy to those individuals and, or groups of persons aggrieved by the manner in
which they have been treated in the process of acquiring or enjoying social assistance
142 As defined in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.  Constitutional damages refers to the compensation for a
constitutional delict, which may be in the form of interest or patrimonial compensation; in other words,
monetary damages.
143 Act 59 of 1992.
144 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).  Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 356.
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benefits.  The applicable international standard requires that anybody who claims a
benefit be afforded the right to appeal if his or her application is rejected, or if a
conflict arises because of the quality or quantity of the benefit.  Dispute resolution in
the South African social assistance system is regulated by means of both the statutory
law and the common law.  Statutory social assistance dispute resolution mechanism
and remedies can be found in a number of social assistance statutes.  In the event that
no or inadequate provision is made for dispute resolution in the social assistance
legislation, an aggrieved party may approach the court of law on a common law
basis.145 The South African social assistance system is characterized by a host of
contradictory and overlapping dispute resolution routes and mechanisms that are
spread over all the social assistance statutes.146
All institutions, whether public or private, entrusted with the administration of social
security schemes are under an obligation to abide by the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa.  This duty originates from the supremacy of the Constitution147,
which obliges the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights enshrined in
the Bill of Rights from the binding effect of the Bill of Rights on all organs of state148
and from the binding effect of the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights on natural
and juristic persons.149
In view of the foregoing, it follows that social security institutions have an obligation
to abide by section 33 of the Constitution, and in particular section 33 of the
Constitution obliges the State to:
a) enact national legislation, in order to give effect to the rights contained therein
b) to provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal.
Section 33 of the Constitution further imposes a duty on the State to give effect to the
rights in subsections (1) and (2) and to promote effective administration.
145 Id at 231.
146 Olivier et al Op cit note 144 at 232.
147 Section 1(c) and 2 of the 1996 Constitution.
148 Section 8(1) and section 239 of the 1996 Constitution.
149 Section 8(2) of the 1996 Constitution.
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2.8. THE PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRARIVE JUSTICE ACT 3 OF 2000
Section 33 of the Constitution gave rise to the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act (hereinafter referred to as PAJA).150
PAJA151 is aimed at the promotion of efficient administration and good governance,
as well as the creation of accountability, openness and transparency in the public
administration or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of a public
function, by giving effect to the right to just administrative action.152 Given the
objectives of PAJA153 it can be said that it conforms with the basic values and
principles governing public administration, as stipulated in the Constitution, as well as
with the eight principles of Batho Pele.154
Poor social security administration and disappointing levels of service delivery has
proven to be the major criticism against the South African social security
administration.  The brunt of this unfortunate situation is always felt by the poorest
and the most vulnerable component of the South African society, resulting in an
unacceptable situation of poor service delivery within our constitutional framework.
A great obstacle awaits the country to correct this state of affairs, and it is submitted
150 Act 3 of 2000.
151Ibid.
152 Preamble to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
153 Act 3 of 2000.
154 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 58; 400- 401. Batho Pele is Sotho for
‘putting the people first’.  The eight principles of Batho Pele can be identified as:
a) Consultation:  which means that customers should be consulted about the level and quality of
the public services they receive and,
b) wherever possible, should be given a choice about the services that are offered.
c) Service standards:  which means that customers should be told what level and quality of
public services they will or should receive so that they are aware of what to expect.
d) Access:  means that all customers should have equal access to the services to which they are
entitled.
e) Courtesy:  customers should be treated with courtesy and consideration.
f) Information:  means that customers should be given full and accurate information of public
services they are entitled to receive.
g) Openness and transparency:  customers should be told how national and provincial
departments are run, how much they cost and who is in charge.
h) Redress:  means that if the promised standards of services are not delivered, customers should
be offered an apology, a full explanation and a speedy and effective remedy.  When
complaints are made, customers should receive an empathetic and correct response.
i) Value for money:  public service should be provided economically and efficiently in order to
give customers the best possible value for money.
The officials who provide social assistance must abide by the abovementioned fundamental principles
in customer services at all times when rendering services.
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that it will take more than the outsourcing of some or all of the social security
services, Batho Pele and the replacement of inefficient and corrupt personnel, for the
South African social security administration to finally attain an acceptable level of
service.155
The purpose of PAJA therefore is to provide the mechanism by which the substantive
rights framed within the Constitution, especially section 27 of the Constitution, are
realized through the lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action of
the substantive right.  The purpose of PAJA is far reaching and ambitious and should
provide the ultimate solution to the failure of the State to perform in terms of the
provision of the right to social assistance to individuals, however, PAJA is not always
achievable as will be viewed is subsequent Chapters of this dissertation.
2.9. THE IMPACT OF THE 1996 CONSTITUTION ON SOCIAL SECURITY
There are various reasons why it is necessary to have regard to the impact of the
South African Constitution156 on social security.  Firstly, the Constitution itself makes
it157 abundantly clear that it is the supreme law of the country as mentioned above158,
while the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2 thereof is said to apply to all law and
to bind the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of the State.
Secondly, the Constitution enjoins every court, tribunal or forum to promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation and when
developing the common law.
2.9.1. SOCIAL SECURITY RIGHTS
It is sometimes argued that social security rights are second generation or socio-
economic rights and that they place a duty upon the State to act in a positive manner.
Socio-economic rights have to be contrasted with rights that protect an individual
155 Id at 68.
156 The 1996 Constitution.
157 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 117.
158 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution and explored in Section 4.2. of Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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against undue interference by the State.159 Due to the peculiar nature of social
security rights, it is said that these rights cannot be enforced by the courts without
intruding upon the terrain of the legislature and or the executive branch of the
government.160 It has become evident that these rights are capable of enforcement, if
only the legislature or executive is ordered to take action or is sent back to the
drawing board to arrange for a more equal distribution.161 The Constitution further
adopts an innovative approach by placing a specific duty on the State to take positive
measures in order to give effect to (some of) these rights.162 The Constitutional Court
is specifically empowered to decide that Parliament, or the President, has failed to
comply with a constitutional duty163.  The question is how far will the court go?  The
court may require the State to review programs and policies, but it is doubtful whether
it may be prepared to order a specific distribution of financial and other sources164.
In certifying the text of the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court stressed that
the socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution are justiciable, even though
the inclusion of the rights may have direct financial and budgetary implications.165
2.9.2. THE DUAL TEST
The Constitutional Court adopted a relatively cautious approach by invoking the dual
test of
a) rationality, and
b) bona fides as the yardstick in this regard.
The Constitutional Court opined:  “A court must be slow to interfere with rational
decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and authorities whose
responsibility it is to deal with such matters.”166 The Constitutional Court has
acknowledged on several occasions that socio-economic rights are in fact justiciable.
159 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 118.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Olivier et al, Introduction to Social Security (2004) 118.
163 Id at 118 – 119.  Section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution.
164 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 118.
165 Ex parte Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly: In re:  Certification of the constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) 800 D – F (para 77). Ibid.
166 Soobramoney v Minister of Heath (KwaZulu – Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 29.
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The question that remains unanswered is how these rights can be enforced.167 When
the obligation imposed on the State in terms of section 27(2)168 is read in conjunction
with section 2, the assumption can be made that the fundamental right to access to
social security is enforced, because section 2 explicitly states that duties imposed by
the Constitution must be performed.169
In answering the question as to how far the court will be prepared to go, in the first
certification judgment the Constitutional Court remarked:
“ It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in the courts making orders
which have direct implications for budgetary matters.  However, even when a court enforces
civil and political rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the
order it makes will often have such implications.  A court may require the provision of legal
aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class of people who formerly were not beneficiaries
of such benefits.  In our view it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights within
a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred
upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the separation of powers.”170
According to the court, effective implementation requires at least adequate budgetary
support by national government.  It is hence essential for a reasonable part of the
national budget to be devoted to the granting of relief to those in desperate need.  The
precise allocation in this regard is for national government to decide itself.  The court
must be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political
organs.  There are instances where the larger needs of society, as opposed to the
specific needs of particular individuals, may have to be given priority.171
The court in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign172 refused to hold that
the granting of a mandatory order, as opposed to a mere declaratory order, would
amount to an unwarranted infringement of the separation of powers.  In fact, the court
167 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 119.
168 The 1996 Constitution.
169 Olivier et al Op cit note 167 at 125.
170 Ex parte Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly:  In re:  Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) 800 D – F par 77. Id at 128.
171 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 128.
172 2002 5 SA 721 (CC).
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enunciated that it indeed retains the power to exercise some form of supervisory
jurisdiction, in order to ensure that its orders are implemented.173
Courts have the power to enforce socio-economic rights and in particular the right to
access to social security.  Wide-ranging remedies are at the disposal of the courts in
this regard.  This may result in courts making orders which have direct implications
for budgetary matters.174 The Constitution in sections 27(2) and section 36 read
together requires the devising, formulation, funding and implementing, as well as the
constant review, within the resources available, of a comprehensive and co-
coordinated programme with well-targeted policies.  These have to be reasonable both
in their conception and their implementation, and must be implemented by the
executive and through legislative intervention.  Provided that the measures adopted
are reasonable, the Constitutional Court will, generally speaking, also uphold a social
security programme which institutionalizes social security provisions.  It will be
discussed in Chapter four that the courts are empowered, whenever they decide on
any issue involving the interpretation, protection and enforcement of a fundamental
right contained in the Constitution, to make any order that is just and equitable and
may grant “appropriate relief.”
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security175 appropriate relief is described as follows:
“Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the
Constitution.  Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a
declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to
ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced.  If it is
necessary to do so, the courts may even fashion new remedies to secure the protection and
enforcement of these important rights.” 176
173 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 104.  Olivier
et al Op cit note 171 at 130.
174 Id at 131.
175 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
176Grootboom and Others v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 3 BLLR 277 (C).
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2.10. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
The Constitution provides specific constitutional remedies which include the
following:
a) orders of invalidity,
b) the development of the common law to give effect to the constitutional rights,
c) the creation of procedural mechanisms necessary for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, and
d) procedural remedies derived from some of the substantive rights177.
Where parliament or the provincial legislature fails to comply with a constitutional
obligation that requires positive State action the Constitutional Court or the High
court may grant appropriate relief.  In such circumstances appropriate relief will be to
make a declaratory order, where the relevant organ of state fails to act in compliance
with the provisions regarding the specific right.  It may also include mandatory or
injunctive relief.178
Supervisory jurisdiction is a new manner of addressing the problem of enforcing
social security rights.  This entails the courts directing the legislative and executive
branches of government to bring about reform as defined in terms of their objectives
and then to retain such supervisory jurisdiction as to ensure the implementation of
those reforms.  This is to a large extent the impact of the order given by the
Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom179
where the court ordered (national and provincial) government to redraft its housing
policy and programme in such a way as to make provision for those without any form
of temporary housing.180
In the past, the courts merely pronounced that non-compliance with the principles of
administrative justice, particularly in the area of social assistance, was a reflection of
177 Section 172(1)(a), 173, 8(3), 32(10), 33(2) and 34 of the Constitution.  Currie, and de Waal, The Bill
of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 199 - 218.
178 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 BCLR 1033 (CC)
para 96 – 107.  Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 134.
179 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC).
180 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169
(CC) para 39, 66, 68, 52 and 69. Olivier et al Loc cit note 178.
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poor and inefficient administration and of a flagrant disregard for basic legal tenets.
More recently, however, the courts do not hesitate to intervene and to assist
beneficiaries where statutory entitlements to, for example, social assistance grants,
have not been complied with or where administrative law principles or constitutional
prerequisites have not been adhered to.181 In some cases, the courts have made it
clear that the grant must be made within a reasonable time of application.  In one case
the court awarded punitive ‘interest’ against the State respondents as a result of the
unacceptable manner in which the respondents dealt with the applicant’s application
for a social grant.182 Hence, it is evident that the courts have moved from merely
pronouncing that non-compliance by the departments of welfare is unacceptable to
now actively intervening to provide some form of relief to those individuals who are
negatively affected.
The question remains whether a constitutional remedy should be granted at all.  The
infusion of constitutional normative values into delictual principles itself plays a role
in protecting constitutional rights, albeit indirectly.  Delictual principles are capable of
being extended to encompass state liability for the breach of constitutional
obligations, but the relief permitted by sections 38 of the Constitution is not a remedy
of last resort, as noted above.183 There will be cases in which a direct assertion and
vindication of constitutional rights is required (such as a direct section 38 remedy).  It
is evident that the breach in Kate's184 case warranted vindication directly for two
reasons.  Firstly, there is no reason why a direct breach of a substantive constitutional
right (as opposed to merely a deviation from a constitutionally normative standard)
should be remedied indirectly.  Secondly, the prevalent breach of rights that is now in
issue justifies the clear assertion of the independent existence of these rights.
181 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 510.
182 Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 2002 1 SA 342 (E). Olivier et al
Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 510.
183 Referred to in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
184 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA).
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2.11. CONCLUSION
This Chapter has defined Social Security, explored section 27 of the Constitution,
extrapolated essential concepts from the Social Assistance Act185, analyzed the case of
Kate v Member of Executive Council of Welfare186, identified amendments to the
Social Assistance Act187, explored the administration of the social security system,
discussed how PAJA188 contributes to the implementation of social assistance,
explored the impact of the Constitution on social assistance, and identified
Constitutional remedies.
Whether an award of monetary damages is an appropriate remedy for an admitted
constitutional breach remains a contentious issue, but monetary damages for a
constitutional breach have since been awarded by the Supreme Court of Appeal and
endorsed by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.189 Whether relief in that form is appropriate in a
particular case must be determined casuistically with due regard to, inter alia, the
nature and importance of the rights in issue, the alternative remedies available to
assert and vindicate them, and the consequences of the breach for the claimant
concerned.
The conclusion can be reached that the protection and enforcement of the right to
access to social security and social assistance will require the development of new
remedies by the courts.  Developing current and new remedies will require the courts
to act proactively and in an inquisitorial fashion.190
We turn now in the next Chapters to examine the common law approach to damages,
the constitutional approach to damages and ultimately the possible amalgamation
thereof.
185 Act 59 of 1992.
186 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD, 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
187 Act 13 of 2004.
188 Act 3 of 2000.
189 2005 5 SA 3 (CC).
190 Olivier et al Social Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 135.
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THE APPROACH TO THE PROVISION OF DAMAGES FOR THE
INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE CONSTITUTION
3.1. INTRODUCTION
South African law is essentially based on an uncodified civil law191 system with
Roman-Dutch law, and originally Roman law, as its major formative element.  Since
the beginning of the nineteenth century a strong thread of English law has been woven
into the fabric of that system.192
This Chapter will provide an overview of the common law approach to damage and
compensation within the topic of delict.  The approach of our common law to the
concept of awarding damages prior to the inception of the 1996 Constitution will be
explored with a view to identifying which interests were protected and awarded
damages, what form the damages took and how this system has developed.  Since this
is not the primary task of this dissertation, the entire history of South Africa’s
common law cannot be considered.  For illustrative purposes this Chapter will focus
on the Aquilian action.
3.2. THE CONCEPTS OF DELICT AND DAMAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA
Since the topic of this dissertation is the awarding of patrimonial damages, normally
in the form of interest, the most closely corresponding common law remedy, that of
the actio legis Aquiliae, has been chosen for closer examination.  After the concept of
a delict has been defined, the history of this remedy will be explored, the competing
casuistic approach and the generalizing approach examined and finally the notion of
damages will be defined.
191 Hanks (editor), Collins Dictionary of the English Language (1979) 276. The law of a state relating
to private and civilian affairs, also known as the body of law in force in ancient Rome, especially the
law applicable to private citizens.  Civil law is also known as any system of law based on the Roman
system as distinguished from the common law and canon law.
192 Zimmermann and Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 141.
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A delict is the act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to
another or it is the infringement of another’s interests.  The second description of a
delict is misleading.  On the one hand, there is an omission to state fault as a general
delictual requirement [statutory and common law exceptions of no fault or strict
liability aside], and on the other hand, the erroneous impression is created that all
individual interests, and not only those that are legally recognized and protected, are
relevant in this regard.193 All five requirements or elements, namely:  act,
wrongfulness, fault, harm and causation must be present before the conduct
complained of may be classified as a delict.194 From the aforementioned it flows that
the question of delictual liability is governed by a ‘generalized approach’.  It is self-
evident that a legal system embracing general principles of delictual liability is able to
accommodate changing circumstances and new situations more easily than one that
adopts the casuistic approach.  One definition of a delict relates to the infringement of
a legally recognized right.  A right currently framed within the Constitution
(specifically within Chapter 2) is codified and therefore it is conceivable that an
infringement of a right that is protected within the Constitution which causes
patrimonial damage may be compensated with patrimonial damages by utilizing the
remedy of the actio legis Aquiliae195, provided of course that all the elements of a
delict196 are present.  Law is a form of social engineering.  This is particularly true of
the law of delict, which operates close to the core problem faced by a legal system of
balancing individual freedoms against collective security.  Delict seeks to achieve this
balance by tempering broad principles of liability with limiting interpretations of
wrongfulness, fault and causation.  It follows that a proposed legal rule should never
193 Ibid.
194 Neethling et al Op cit note 81 at 3 – 4.
195 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 18 – 19.  The entrenchment of
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights enhances their protection and gives them a higher status in that
all law, state actions, court decisions and even the conduct of natural and juristic persons may be tested
against them, taking into account that any limitation of a fundamental right must be in accordance with
the limitation clause of the 1996 Constitution.  In exercising this value judgment, the general principles
which have already been crystallised in our law with regard to the reasonableness or boni mores
criterion for delictual wrongfulness may serve as prima facie indications of the reasonableness of a
limitation in terms of the Bill of Rights.  In the case of an infringement of or a threat to a fundamental
right, a prejudiced or threatened person is entitled to approach a competent court for appropriate relief.
In this respect there is the possibility of developing a “constitutional delict”, in other words, that the
infringement of a fundamental right per se constitutes a “delict”.  Further discussed in chapter 5 below.
196 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 4 defines a delict “A delict is the
act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another”.
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be propounded without due regard to its social implications, and that the merits of a
rule depend on its functional effects rather than the purity of its origin.197
The casuistic approach stands in juxtaposition to that of the generalizing approach to
the law of delict.  According to the casuistic approach the law of delict consists of a
group of separate delicts, each with its own set of guidelines, hence in order to render
a wrongdoer liable for a delict within the casuistic approach an aggrieved party will
have to satisfy the court that the wrongdoer’s action or conduct satisfies all the
requirements of a specific delict198.  The South African law of delict, unlike the
English law of torts, is based on the generalizing approach and is therefore able to
recognize and protect individual interests which have only come to the fore in recent
times in that the generalizing approach recognizes delict which comply with general
requirements.199 The generalized approach is subject to an important qualification in
our law.  A distinction is made in principle between delicts that cause patrimonial
damage (damnum iniuria datum) and those that cause injury to personality (iniuria).
These two ground the actions which form two of the pillars of the law of delict,
namely the actio legis Aquiliae in terms of which damages for the wrongful and
culpable causing of patrimonial damage are claimed and the actio iniuriarum which is
directed at satisfaction (solatium or sentimental damages) for the wrongful and
intentional injury to personality.200
Damage (damnum) is an ancient concept in legal terminology.  Although it is not
absolutely clear how damage should be defined, the following definition is generally
accepted:  damage is the detrimental impact upon any patrimonial or personality
interest deemed worthy of protection by the law.201 It stands to reason that the rights
encompassed in the Bill of Rights202 are interests deemed worthy of protection by the
law.  The word ‘damnum’ entered into legal terminology with the lex Aquilia in 287
197 Boberg, The Law of Delict, Volume 1 (1984) 26 - 27.
198 Koch, Damages for lost income (1984) 1.
199 Id at 4 - 500
200 Ibid.  A third pillar of the law of delict,  which is not relevant here, but noted for completeness sake,
is the action for pain and suffering by which compensation for injury to personality as a result of the
wrongful and negligent (or intentional) impairment of bodily or physical-mental integrity is claimed.
201 Koch, Damages for lost income (1984) 196.  Visser and Potgieter, Law of Damages, 2nd edition
(2003) 24 defines ‘Damage’ as the diminution, as a result of a damage-causing event, in the utility or
quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the legally recognized needs of the person
involved.
202 Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution.
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BC.  Since then it has developed into a complex concept involving numerous
principles.  The concept of damage plays a role in many branches of law.  The origin
of the modern concept of patrimonial damage can be traced back to the treatise of the
prominent German jurist Mommsen in 1855203.  According to Mommsen, damage
(interesse) is the difference between the present patrimony of the plaintiff and the
patrimonial position which would presently have existed if the damage-causing event
had not occurred204.  This approach, known as the sum-formula approach205, which
was confirmed by the case of Transnet Limited v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd206 was
taken over as the measure of damages in our law on the authority of Windscheid and
Gruber207.  This is not a satisfactory definition of damage but rather a comparative
method or standard by which the extent of patrimonial loss may be assessed or
measured.  The concept of damage in our law has developed in the context of
delictual and contractual liability and it should also be noted that our law accepts a
wide concept of damage which includes both patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss.208
Erasmus and Guantlett209 hold the view that an accurate understanding of the hybrid
nature of our law of damage is necessary for the correct approach to problems
encountered in this field of law.  The hybrid nature of our law of damage
demonstrates that our law is composed of elements of both Roman-Dutch law and
English common law (as mentioned at the commencement of this Chapter), but that
the relative importance of these two component elements has fluctuated at different
times in history.  One’s view on the history of the law of damage is of course
determined by what one actually accepts to be the content of the law of damage.210
The principles and terminology of the English law of damage could not displace
Roman-Dutch law completely and especially since 1910 the Appellate Division in
203 Lee, RW, Cupidae Legum Juventuti The Elements of Roman Law with a translation of the Institutes
of Justinian 3rd edition (1952) 20 – 21.
204 McKerron, RG, The Law of Delict, 6th Edition (1965) 109 – 110.
205 Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 4, Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke
1911 AD 657.
206 Transnet Limited v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 1 SA 299 (SCA), (reportable) case number
98/03 SCA the court declared:  “It is now beyond question that damages in delict (and contract) are
assessed according to the comparative method.”
207 Lex Aquilia:  The Roman Law of Damage of Property (1886) 269. Visser, and Potgieter, Law of
Damages (1993) 24.
208 Ibid.  Koch, Damages for lost income (1984) 20.
209 Erasmus and Guantlett 7 LAWSA 4 state that ‘a knowledge and appreciation of the historical
perspective is therefore of considerable assistance in evaluating decided cases dating from different
periods’.
210 Visser, and Potgieter, Law of Damages (1993) 8 - 9.
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South Africa has placed more emphasis on Roman-Dutch law.211 It was especially in
the area of delictual damages that English influence waned in that our courts stressed
certain basic principles related to Roman-Dutch law such as the compensatory nature
of the actio legis Aquiliae and the requirement of actual patrimonial loss.  It would
seem that this development has not yet succeeded in finally banishing the idea of
nominal damages from modern law.  The clear distinction between the actio legis
Aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum had again been accepted and it was appreciated that
there is a difference between the actio iniuriarum and English torts for which punitive
damages could be recovered.212
The synthesis of civil and common law elements in the South African law of damages
was facilitated by the fact that during the nineteenth century the two systems had
adopted a similar governing rule for assessing the measure of damages in that the
plaintiff is to be placed in the position he or she would have been in but for the
commission of the wrongful act.  It is interesting to note that when the South African
courts adopted the rule during the early years of the twentieth century, they derived it
in the case of delict from the Roman-Dutch law and in the case of contract from the
English common law.213 It is in all probability correct to conclude that a distinctive
South African law of damages has evolved, which does in a sense have a hybrid
nature but which consists of more than merely the sum of its historical components.
In the current South African law of damages there is a tendency to try to remove the
shortcomings in the doctrine of damages through individualization, objectivication or
by replacing the object of damage by other objects.  According to Van der Walt214, the
search to solve problems in the field of the law of damages has always followed an ad
hoc approach.215
211 Id at 13.
212 Erasmus 1975 THRHR 366 -7.  Visser, and Potgieter, Law of Damages (1993) 14.
213 Id at 14 – 15.  Erasmus 1975 THRHR 369.
214 Van der Walt, Sommeskadeleer 284, 3 – 5.
215 Visser, and Potgieter, Law of Damages (1993) 14. - 15.
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3.2.1. EXTENDING THE AQUILIAN ACTION IN ROMAN LAW AND ROMAN-
DUTCH LAW
The common law delictual Aquilian remedy underwent much growth and adaptation
in Roman Law and Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa.
Liability for patrimonial damage (damnum iniuria datum) is one of the most
important sections of Roman law that still exists in our law, although time has
produced many changes and extensions thereto.  Roman law relating to the liability
for patrimonial damage was based on an Act (plebiscitum) from 287 BC known as the
lex Aquilia, which was originally only applicable to certain forms of damage to
tangible assets, for example it dealt only with the killing or wounding of a slave or
four-footed animal, and the burning, breaking and destroying of other tangible assets,
and was only available to the owner of the damaged property216.  With the progression
of time the field of application of the Aquilian action was extended considerably as a
result of the extensive interpretation of the lex and the granting of actiones utiles and
in factum.  Consequently, Aquilian liability could ensue after any kind of physical
infringement of a tangible asset and not only after infringement of an asset with a
specific and defined nature217.
A further important development in Roman liability for the law of patrimonial
damages was that the wrongdoer had to compensate the wronged individual not only
for the damage that had been caused to the ‘thing’ or tangible asset itself but also for
all patrimonial damage which resulted from his wrongful act (id quod interest).  In
Justinian’s time, the extension was such that apart from the owner, other holders of
real rights were also protected against damage to property.218 In addition to damage
to property, the actio legis Aquiliae was made applicable to two further instances of
patrimonial loss resulting from bodily injury.  Nevertheless, the general opinion
seems to be that although interests other than ownership were also protected, a
perceptible, physical infringement of a tangible asset or the body of a person was still
216 Lee, RW, Cupidae Legum Juventuti The Elements of Roman Law with a translation of the Institutes
of Justinian 3rd edition (1952) 5 and 41. Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition
(2010) 8.
217 Mc Kerron RG, The Law of Delict, sixth edition (1965) 7, 8, 9 – 10. Id at 8.
218 Ibid. Neethling, et al Op cit note 216 at 8 – 9.
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required219.  The reasons for this are probably two-fold.  Firstly, the lex Aquilia was
initially only applicable to certain physical infringement of tangible legal interests.  It
is therefore understandable that the extension by analogy of Aquilian liability was still
connected to physical infringements.  Secondly, the wrongfulness of a physical
infringement was readily apparent to the less sophisticated mind220.
In Roman-Dutch law the proportions of Aquilian liability under-went very important
extensions, going beyond the limits of Roman law221.  Firstly, there were definite
indications that the requirement of physical impairment of a thing or tangible asset
was no longer required.  Secondly, damages could be claimed with the Aquilian
action for patrimonial damage resulting from any injury to personality and not only,
as was the case in Roman law, for an injury to personality in the form of bodily
injury.  Thirdly, Roman-Dutch law went much further than Roman law in granting an
action to the holder of a personal right in respect of a thing.  The availability of the
Aquilian action was extended to the borrower, the fullo and the lessee of the services
of a slave or servant.  Lastly, the actio legis Aquilia in Roman-Dutch law was also
available to the dependants of a free person who had been killed.222
It is true to say that the actio legis Aquiliae underwent a process of adaptation by
which it was extended far beyond the limited scope of the first and third chapters of
the original lex.  The first chapter provided that the wrongful killing of somebody
else’s slave rendered the wrongdoer liable to pay damages to the owner equal to the
highest value of that object during the previous year.223 The third chapter imposed
liability for wrongful damage to property; here the wrongdoer had to pay the highest
value of the object in question within the preceding thirty days.  The process of
extension commenced with the interpretation of the lex Aquilia by Roman lawyers
throughout the classical period and down to the days of Justinian.  Through extensive
interpretation of the words of the lex, and by the granting of actiones in factum and
219 Ibid.
220 Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 8 – 9.
221 Explored above at pages 50 – 51.
222 Grotius, H, The Jurisprudence of Holland (translated by Lee RW) First Edition Volume 1 (1926)
469.
223 Lee, RW, Cupidae Legum Juventuti The Elements of Roman Law with a translation of the Institutes
of Justinian 3rd edition (1952) 386. Zimmermann, and Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South
Africa (1996) 559.
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actiones utiles in situations not covered by the provisions of the enactment itself, the
Romans brought about a situation where a remedy was available in all cases of
wrongful damage to corporeal property, as well as for injuries to slaves and freemen,
by means of which the wrongdoer was held liable for id quod interest, in other words,
including consequential damages, to the  owner of the object damaged or to the
person injured.  In a limited number of cases immaterial damage was covered and
occasionally the action was also granted to non-owners.224
3.2.2. AQUILIAN ACTION DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW – A
SUMMARY
This chapter provides the reader with a foundation from which to view the law of
damage by observing how the common law has developed.  The fact that the common
law is capable of development and change is key to the proposition of this
dissertation.  This will become even more apparent later in the dissertation when we
consider the concurrent operation of the common law of delict and the Constitution.
It is not necessary providing a summary of the development of the Aquilian action to
commence before the seventeenth century.  This is so because during the course of the
seventeenth century the actio legis Aquiliae was transplanted to the Cape of Good
Hope as a part of the Roman-Dutch law brought by the settlers of the Dutch East India
Company.
By the seventeenth century the actio legis Aquiliae had developed to embrace general
principles of liability for patrimonial loss to person or property wrongfully and
culpably caused.  It had lost its penal nature and become purely compensatory, which
was reflected in the rules governing its transmissibility.225
At the beginning of the twentieth century the South African courts seemed poised
finally to round off the long process of historical development of the Aquilian action
224 Id at 560.
225 Lee, RW, Cupidae Legum Juventuti The Elements of Roman Law with a translation of the Institutes
of Justinian 3rd edition (1952) 394. Zimmermann, and Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South
Africa (1996) 561.
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by accepting the simple, general proposition that all damage caused intentionally or
negligently is actionable, unless it can be justified.226
When the twentieth century drew to a close the Aquilian liability was very much
closer to reaching the logical end point of its long process of historical development.
Dramatic developments, particularly over the past two decades have opened the door
in principle to liability for negligent omissions, negligent misstatements, and for
negligently inflicted loss of a purely economic nature227.  The key to these
developments has been the revitalization of the old requirement of iniuria, in its new
appearance of wrongfulness as a criteria for liability.  This requirement, distinct from
and logically anterior to that of fault, provides a place for the open consideration of
policy factors in the development of liability for negligent conduct, and hence has
come to perform a vital role as a mechanism of control over the gradual expansion of
Aquilian liability in South African law.  Some have stated that it substitutes
‘discretion for principle’, but its positive impact on our law is undeniable.228
However, armed with this discretionary tool, the courts have boldly ventured into
territory previously thought too hazardous229, secure in the knowledge that they can
always retreat if the danger of expanding the Aquilian liability or making the wrong
decision becomes too great.  Significant as these developments are, the stage has not
yet been reached where it can be said that all financial harm culpably caused is prima
facie wrongful and therefore actionable.  That is certainly true in the field of
omissions, where the boni mores do not require one to take positive action whenever a
failure to do so would foreseeably cause harm to another; and it seems also still to be
true in the case of purely economic loss.230
226 Ibid.
227 Zimmermann, and Visser Op cit note 225 at 634. Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict,
6th edition (2010) 9. Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492 504.
228 Ibid.  Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 11. Lillicrap, Wassenaar
and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 503 – 504 states that South
African law approaches the matter in a more cautious way …and does not extend the scope of the
Aquilian action to new situations unless there are positive policy considerations which favour such an
extension.
229 Examples in case law are Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46
(CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC), and Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal 1998 1 SA
765 (CC).
230 Zimmermann, and Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 634.
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If Aquilian liability is to be reduced to one general principle today, that principle
would have to be that all patrimonial loss caused wrongfully and culpably is
actionable, which is essentially what Watermeyer J stated in Perlman v Zoutendyk.231
In expressing South African law this extensively the learned Judge emphasizes its
inherently civilian nature and makes it look very different to that of England.
Outward appearances can however sometimes be misleading232
There is no deficiency of decisions233 highlighting the viewpoint that the Aquilian
action has in fact reached its logical end development in South African law.  In
contradistinction to earlier cases234 which require physical injury to person or property
to found Aquilian liability, it is today established law that compensation for so-called
“pure” economic loss may in principle be claimed ex lege Aquilia.  In Coronation
Brick (Pty) Ltd v Stachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd235, Booysen J clearly stated that
the legal basis of the plaintiff’s claim is that of the lex Aquilia.  In essence the
Aquilian action lies for patrimonial loss caused wrongfully and culpably.  Although
the contrary view had long been held by many authorities236, it seems clear that the
fact that the patrimonial loss suffered did not result from physical injury to the
corporeal property or person of the plaintiff, but was purely economic, is not a bar to
the Aquilian action.237
It may be concluded that despite a few decisions238 to the contrary, there is a very
strong tendency in case law to recognize Aquilian liability for all patrimonial loss
caused wrongfully and culpably.  It is in any event apparent that the extent of this
liability has increased a great deal in modern law and can still be expanded.239 Our
courts tend to adopt a conservative approach to the expansion of the Aquilian action
231 1934 CPD at 151.
232 Zimmermann, and Visser Op cit note 230 at 635.
233 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers South Africa Proprietary Limited 1985 1
SA 475 (A).
234 Combrinck Chiropraktiese Kliniek (Edms) Bpkv Datsun Motor Vehicle Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1972
4 SA 185 (T) at 191 - 192, Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956
1 SA 577 (A) at 585 - 586.
235 1982 4 SA 371 (D) para 377.
236 Supra.
237 Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 9 – 10.
238 Combrinck Chiropraktiese Kliniek (Edms) Bpkv Datsun Motor Vehicle Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1972
4 SA 185 (T) at 191 - 192, Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956
1 SA 577 (A) at 585 - 586.
239 Supra.
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and will therefore, according to Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington
Brothers South Africa Proprietary Limited240 only allow such an extension if it is
justified by policy considerations:  “South African law approaches the matter in a
more cautious way. . . and does not extend the scope of the Aquilian action to new
situations unless there are positive policy considerations which favour such an
extension”.241
3.3. PATRIMONIAL LOSS, EXPECTATIONS AND INTEREST
This subsection of paragraph three will discuss firstly the definition of patrimonial
loss as a subdivision of damage, secondly, the concept of an expectation and finally,
the notion of interest.242
Patrimonial loss (as a subdivision of damage) is defined as the diminution in the
utility of a patrimonial interest in satisfying the recognized needs of the person
entitled to such interest. 243 It may also be defined as the loss or reduction in value of
a positive asset in someone’s patrimony or the creation or increase of a negative
element of his patrimony, such as a patrimonial debt.244 An expectation of benefits,
as in the case of an expectation for a social assistance grant, is the legally recognized
expectation of a person to acquire patrimonial rights or benefits in the future (through
which his patrimony will be enhanced) or the recognized expectation that his
patrimony will not diminish.  Such an expectation may be so ‘convincing’ that the law
recognizes and protects it by awarding damages if it has been infringed.245
An expectation must meet certain general requirements before it can be said to form
part of someone’s estate or patrimony, which are:
240 1985 1 SA 475 (A) at 500.
241 Neethling, et al Op cit note 237 at 11.
242 Interest here is referred to as the compensation provided to an individual who has foregone a benefit
due to an infringement of his or right.  The writer is not referring to interest as interesse or a
patrimonial interest.
243 Neethling, et al Op cit note 237 at 42.
244 Ibid.
245 Visser, and Potgieter Op cit note 215 at 48.
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Firstly, that the law must in principle recognize the type of expectation as worthy of
protection; secondly, that there must be a sufficient degree of probability or
possibility that the expectation would be realized; thirdly, that the expectation must
have a monetary value; and fourthly, that the expectation, though recognized in
principle, must not contain an illegal element.246
Interest is relevant in the law of damages in the discounting of damage for prospective
loss and as a measure of damages which is sustained on account of the non-possession
of money.  The present discussion is mainly concerned with damage caused by a
delay in the possession of ‘damages’ as an amount of money which is due to the
plaintiff.  In general, a debtor, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, is
required to pay interest on the amount of money owed by him from the moment he is
in mora (delay).  This also applies in regard to a liquidated amount of damages or
satisfaction and the interest becomes part of the compensation.  In a claim for
unliquidated damages247 the defendant is not liable to pay interest in the absence of an
agreement as to such quantum unless the amount has been assessed.  If the damage is
capable of prompt and ready ascertainment and of speedy proof, such damage is
liquidated and interest will commence to run from the moment of delay.248
In the meantime the legislature has stepped in by providing section 2A of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, which provides for the granting of mora
interest on an unliquidated debt which at common law was not possible until the debt
had been liquidated either by way of an agreement between the parties or by a court of
law or arbitrator.  Section 2A(2)(a) of this Act provides that subject to any other
agreement between the parties the interest contemplated in subsection (1) shall run
from the date on which payment of the debt is claimed by the service on the debtor of
a demand or summons, whichever date is the earlier.  In terms of Section 2A(5) of the
Act a court of law may make such order as appears just in respect of the payment of
interest on an unliquidated debt, the rate at which interest shall accrue and the date
from which interest shall run.249
246 Id at 49 -50.
247 Where the precise amount is to be determined through a long and complex investigation.
248 Visser, and Potgieter Op cit note 215 at 164 – 165.
249 Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975.
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3.4. CONCLUSION
From the uncodified nature of the South African civil law, based on Roman Dutch
law and English law, arises the benefit of flexibility, a legal system, which allows for
flexibility regards:
a. Interests that are to be legally protected and consequently
b. Those parties to whom damages can be awarded
Development of the law of delict, especially the Aquilian action, in relation to the
expansion of the base of potential claimants has been incremental and responsive to
the changes in the boni mores of society.  This flexibility and development potential is
at the core of the generalized approach to damages explored above.
This Chapter has explored how an individual’s legally recognized expectation of a
benefit (patrimonial) is protected by the awarding of damages in the form of interest
should such expectation be infringed.  In this regard interest is regulated by the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.250
The generalized approach also forms the foundation or starting point of the new
approach to damages in the constitutional era of South African law to be discussed in
the next Chapter.
250 Act 55 of 1975.
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CHAPTER 4
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THE CONCEPTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND DAMAGES IN
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ‘NEW’ APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL
DAMAGES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter four takes an analytical approach to constitutional rights and damages in
South Africa and unpacks these two concepts.  This Chapter will thereafter evaluate
and expand upon the constitutional approach to the provision of monetary damages in
South Africa.
This Chapter will seek to introduce the concept of constitutional rights and damages
in the context of South Africa, illuminating the applicable legislation and the
supremacy of the Constitution with regards to all issues.  In order to do this
effectively the situation prior to the supremacy of the Constitution will be dealt with
briefly in order to establish the status of an individual citizen’s current rights and
obligations in the Republic of South Africa.  Specifically, it will be noted that the
right to just administrative action in relation to our social assistance rights will be
used as an example of a constitutional right and the consequences that flow from this
right will be explored.
4.2. THE CONCEPT/S OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND DAMAGES IN
SOUTH AFRICA
As with the common law principles and the necessity of exploring same, the
constitutional principles are explored hereunder to provide the basis for further
argument and discussion below and in the Chapters to follow.
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In Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana251 the court, per Friedman JP, held that the
courts should play a proactive role in changing society in accordance with the aims
and spirit of the Constitution.  Furthermore, the learned judge stated that a court is
entitled to have regard to the circumstances and events leading up to the adoption of
the Constitution and the human, social and economic impact that any decision of the
court will have on society as a whole. This is a progressive approach that reflects
judicial activism.252
The supremacy clause253, which introduces a break with our constitutional experience
since 1910, must be read with section 8, the application provision of the 1996
Constitution.  The former confirms that a new grundnorm has come into existence,
which requires a paradigmatic shift in jurisprudential theory in South Africa.  This
grundnorm introduces the philosophy of constitutionalism and everything that it
entails into our legal system.  Parliamentary sovereignty and its concomitant
executive aggrandizement of power or authority are now part of our history.254
The Bill of Rights consisting of thirty three sections is contained in Chapter 2 of the
1996 Constitution.  Twenty-seven of the sections list the protected rights themselves.
The remaining six sections are ‘operational provisions’.  These provisions govern the
manner in which the Bill of Rights operates and the manner in which it can be
enforced by the courts.255
According to the Constitution256, the High Court’s power of judicial review of
decisions of inferior courts is no longer limited to situations falling within section 24
251 1995 8 BCLR 1018 (B) para 239 and 246.
252 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 574.
253 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution.
254 Devenish Op cit note 252 at 19.
255 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 319 - 320.
256 1996 Constitution, sections 169 states that:
“A High Court may decide –
(a) any constitutional matter except a matter that –
(i) only the Constitutional Court may decide; or
(ii) is assigned by an Act of Parliament to another court of a status similar to a High Court; and
(b) any other matter not assigned to another court by an Act of Parliament.”
Section 172 of the 1996 Constitution:
“(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the
extent of its inconsistency; and
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(1) of the High (Supreme) Court Act257, it is now determined by the provisions of the
Constitution.  Therefore, the High Court may indeed grant appropriate relief where a
decision of an inferior court has the effect of infringing a fundamental right.258
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including –
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to
allow the competent authority to correct the defect.
(2) (a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may make an order
concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct
of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by
the Constitutional Court.
(b) A court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary interdict or
other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the proceedings, pending a decision of the
Constitutional Court on the validity of that Act or conduct.
(c) National legislation must provide for the referral of an order of constitutional invalidity to the
Constitutional Court.
(d) Any person or organ of state with a sufficient interest may appeal, or apply, directly to the
Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an order of constitutional invalidity by a court in terms
of this subsection.”
Section 173 of the 1996 Constitution:  “The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High
Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common
law, taking into account the interests of justice.”
257 Act 59 of 1959, which states that:
“(1) The grounds upon which the proceedings of any inferior court may be brought under review
before a provincial division, or before a local division having review jurisdiction, are—
(a) absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court;
(b) interest in the cause, bias, malice or the commission of an offence referred to in Part 1 to 4, or
section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, on the part of the presiding
judicial officer;
(c) gross irregularity in the proceedings; and
(d) the admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the rejection of admissible or
competent evidence.”
Section 167(3) of the 1996 Constitution:
“The Constitutional Court –
(a) is the highest court in all constitutional matters;
(b) may decide only constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on constitutional
matters; and
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is
connected with a decision on a constitutional matter.
(4) Only the Constitutional Court may –
(a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the
constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs of state;
(b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill, but may do so only in
the circumstances in section 79 or 121;
(c) decide applications envisaged in section 80 or 122;
(d) decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution;
(e) decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfill a constitutional obligation; or
(f) certify a provincial constitution in terms of section 144.
(5) The Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial
Act
or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status, before that order has any
force.”
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4.2.1. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
An important issue in relation to this dissertation is the nature of the cause of action
envisaged in section 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution, and the remedies that flow from
such cause.  Much will depend on the circumstances of the case in question.  It is
submitted that in each case, although the Constitution will inform such cause and
remedy, such a cause of action will be couched in the terms and language of the
common law, which must be developed in accordance with section 8(2) and (3) of the
Constitution, and consequently the remedy will emerge therefrom.  The inherent
flexibility of the common law should empower the courts to effect a harmony
between it and the Constitution.259
The precise manner in which the Bill of Rights is enforced is best understood by
describing the manner in which litigation which involves an alleged violation of the
Bill of Rights is conducted.
It is required that a limitation of a fundamental right must find expression in ‘law of
general application’.  This is obviously intended to give expression to the concepts
found in the rule of law.  The limitation clause260 plays an important role in the
Section 168(3) of the 1996 Constitution:
“The Supreme Court of Appeal may decide appeals in any matter. It is the highest court of appeal
except in constitutional matters, and may decide only –
(a) appeals;
(b) issues connected with appeals; and
(c) any other matter that may be referred to it in circumstances defined by an Act of Parliament.”
Section 170 of the 1996 Constitution:
“Magistrates’ Courts and all other courts may decide any matter determined by an Act of Parliament,
but a court of a status lower than a High Court may not enquire into or rule on the constitutionality of
any legislation or any conduct of the President.”
258 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 4.
259 Id at 31.
260 1996 Constitution, section 36 states:
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including –
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”
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interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights and is fundamental to the kind of
constitutional review involving the principle of proportionality, set out in the leading
Canadian case of R v Oakes261, involving a two stage process.262
The first stage involves asking the question:  “has there been an infringement of a
right protected by the Bill of Rights?”  The nature and content of the fundamental
right must be interpreted according to the principle of constitutional interpretation, as
set out in section 39 of the Constitution263, in which democratic values and social
policy play a crucial role.  The definition of the scope of the right is the privilege of
the judiciary.  This scope is increased by the value-based method of interpretation
authorized by section 39(2) of the Constitution.264 A limitation, unless there is an
internal modifier, should be addressed separately under the second stage of the
inquiry.265
The Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law of this country, and thus any
conduct or law which is inconsistent with it, is invalid.  Certain fundamental rights, to
which juristic persons are also entitled, are entrenched in Chapter 2 of the
Constitution.  Chapter 2 is applicable to all law, therefore also to the law of delict, and
does not only vertically bind the State (the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and
all organs of the State), but also horizontally all natural and juristic persons.266 There
is one main difference between constitutional law and private law, which is that
private law deals with the relations between individuals in a state whereas,
constitutional law is concerned with the relations between the individual and the State
261 1986 26 DLR 4th 200.
262 Devenish Op cit note 258 at 543.
263 Section 39 of the 1996 Constitution states:
“(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2)   When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
(3)   The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised
or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent
with the Bill.”
264 Devenish Op cit note 258.at 544.
265 Ibid.
266 Neethling et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 16.
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as well as the relationships between individuals within the state.267 The fundamental
rights are not absolute rights as noted above.  In determining the lawfulness of a
limitation, all relevant factors must be taken into account, including the nature of the
limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and less restrictive
means of achieving this purpose.268 The vertical and horizontal application of the
Constitution can take place in a direct as well as an indirect manner, although because
of unavoidable overlaps a clear-cut distinction cannot be made between them.
The second stage of the enquiry, which only becomes operative if there has been an
infringement of the relevant fundamental right, involves first asking whether the
policy underlying the act or omission which caused the infringement is reasonable and
justifiable in a free and open democratic society, and second, whether an acceptable
method has been used for its implementation.269
There is a final stage in which the question of an appropriate remedy is considered.
The Constitutional Court has dealt with the issue of apportionment of onus or burden
of proof explicitly only in respect of the interpretation and limitation sub-stages.  It
held that “the task of interpreting the . . . fundamental rights rests, of course, with the
courts, but it is for the applicants to prove the facts upon which they rely for the claim
infringement of the particular right in question”.270 It is for the legislature or the party
relying on the legislation to establish this justification (in terms of the limitation
clause), and not for the party challenging it, to show that it was not justified.271
4.2.1.1. DIRECT AND INDIRECT APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Before proceeding to explore the concept of constitutional rights further it is
imperative to grasp the concept of direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights.
267 Cockram, Constitutional Law in the Republic of South Africa (1975) 1.  Controlling the
relationships between individuals is the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights as opposed to the
vertical application of the Bill of Rights, which is the controlling of the relationship between the State
and individuals.  The vertical application of the Bill of Rights implies a downward flow of power and
authority.
268 Neethling, et al Op cit note 266 at 19.  Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.
269 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 545.
270 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 320.
271Ibid.
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Direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights means that the State must respect the
fundamental rights of individuals and may therefore not infringe them except insofar
as such infringement is reasonable and justifiable according to the limitation clause.272
Direct horizontal application entails that the courts must give effect to an applicable
fundamental right by applying and, where necessary, developing the common law
insofar as legislation does not give effect to that right, except where it is reasonable
and justifiable to develop the common law to limit the right in accordance with the
limitation clause.  The fundamental rights relevant to the law of delict must in this
manner find application.273 The entrenchment of fundamental rights in the Bill of
Rights enhances their protection and gives them a higher status in that all law, state
actions, court decisions and even the conduct of natural and juristic persons may be
tested against them, taking into account the fact that any limitation of a fundamental
right must be in accordance with the limitation clause of the Constitution.  It is
submitted that in exercising this value judgment, the general principles, which have
already been entrenched in our law with regard to the reasonableness or boni mores
criterion for delictual wrongfulness may serve as prima facie indications of the
reasonableness of a limitation in terms of the Bill of Rights.  In the case of an
infringement of or threat to a fundamental right, a prejudiced or threatened person is
entitled to approach a competent court for appropriate relief.274
The indirect operation of the Bill of Rights means that all private law rules, principles
or norms – including those regulating the law of delict – are subjected to, and must
therefore be given content in the light of the basic values of Chapter 2 of the
Constitution.275 This promoting of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights
will in all probability deliver the same results as the direct application of the Bill of
Rights, and applies in particular to the so-called open-ended or flexible delictual
principles, and the boni mores test for wrongfulness, the imputability test for legal
causation, and the reasonable person test for negligence.276
272 Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.
273 Neethling, et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 17.
274 Id at 19 - 20.
275 The 1996 Constitution.
276 Neethling et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 20.
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In addition to the applicant’s onus at the substantive stage of litigation, the applicant
must also show at the preliminary (procedural) stage of litigation that the Bill of
Rights applies to the challenged law or conduct, that the issue is justiciable, that he or
she has standing, and that he or she is in the right forum to obtain the desired relief277.
Only once these issues have been decided in the applicant’s favour, and a violation of
the Bill of Rights is found, will the party relying on the validity of the challenged
decision or legislation be called upon to justify it in terms of section 36 of the
Constitution, the limitation clause.278
As far as the retrospective application of the Bill of Rights is concerned, it must be
noted that neither the Interim nor the 1996 Constitution provides for this.  This rule
does not inhibit the courts from applying the Bill of Rights indirectly to the law, for
instance, by developing the common law or reading a statute down, even if the statute
arose before the commencement of the Constitution.279 In Zimbabwe Township
Developers v Lou’s Shoes 1984 2 SA 778 (ZSC) at 783 Georges CJ states as follows:
“Clearly a litigant who asserts that an Act of Parliament or a regulation is
unconstitutional must show that it is.  In such a case the judicial body charged
with deciding the issue must interpret the constitution and determine its
meaning and thereafter interpret the challenged piece of legislation to arrive at
a conclusion as to whether it falls within that meaning or it does not.  That
challenged piece of legislation may, however, be capable of more than one
meaning.  If that is the position, then, if one possible interpretation falls within
the meaning of the constitution and the others do not, then the judicial body
will presume that the lawmakers intended to act constitutionally and uphold
the piece of legislation so interpreted …One does not interpret in a restricted
manner in order to accommodate the challenged legislation.  The constitution
must be properly interpreted, adopting the approach accepted above.
Thereafter the challenged legislation is examined to discover whether it can be
interpreted to fit into the framework of the constitution.”280
277 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 321.
278 Ibid.
279 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 27 - 28.
280 Zimbabwe Township Developers v Lou’s Shoes 1984 2 SA 778 (ZSC) at 783.  Currie, and De Waal,
The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 326.
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The question of who bears the onus when considering the appropriate relief for
unconstitutional legislation or conduct is more complicated.  When the Bill of Rights
is indirectly applied, an ordinary legal remedy is granted and the ordinary legal rules
apply in respect of the burden of proof.  When the Bill of rights is directly applied, the
remedy which flows from a finding of inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and
law or conduct is for the court to invalidate the offending law or conduct.  A party
proposing a variation of this form of relief in terms of section 172(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of
the Constitution281 or additional relief must justify such a request.282
It must be stated that in practice the indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the
law must always be considered before its direct application to law or conduct283.  The
reason for this is the principle, laid down by the Constitutional Court in an early
decision, that where it is possible to decide a case without reaching a constitutional
issue, that is the course that should be followed.284 Where a legal dispute cannot be
resolved without reference to the Constitution, the principle clearly prefers indirect
application of the Bill of Rights over direct application285.  The Bill of Rights contains
a set of values that must be respected whenever ordinary law is interpreted, developed
or applied286.  This form of application is termed the indirect application of the Bill of
Rights.  When indirectly applied, the Bill of Rights does not override ordinary law or
generate its own remedies; nevertheless, being part of the Constitution legal remedies
must conform to it287.  The special rules contained in the Constitution that handle the
procedural issues of standing and the jurisdiction of the courts are also irrelevant.
Rather, the Bill of Rights respects the procedural rules and remedies of ordinary law,
but demands furtherance of the values of the Bill of Rights through the operation of
ordinary law.288
De Waal, Currie and Erasmus289 identify that the indirect application of the Bill of
Rights to the common law can take many forms:
281 The 1996 Constitution. .
282 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 322.
283 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 37.
284 S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) para 59.
285 De Waal et al Loc cit note 283.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
289 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 75.
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a) The first method is to argue for a change in the existing principles of the
common law so that the law gives improved effect to the Bill of Rights.  This
argument has been made in the areas of defamation and restraint of trade.290
The Supreme Court of Appeal has now revised its approach to defamation in
cases involving the media and the press, albeit with little reference to the Bill of
Rights in National Media Ltd v Bogoshi.291
b) The second method is to ‘apply’ the common law with due regard to the Bill of
Rights.  As Currie et al have observed, this method was employed by Davis AJ
in Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins.292 In that case, Davis AJ declined to consider the
constitutionality of the presumption relating to animus iniuriandi in defamation
cases, but clearly took the Bill of Rights into account in reaching the conclusion
that the statements made in the case were not defamatory.293 Section 35(3) of
the interim Constitution provided that in the interpretation of any law and the
application and development of the common law and customary law, a court
shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  In
the new section 39 (2)294 reference to the application of the common law is
omitted but the provision for development of the common law is retained.295 In
the Rivett-Carnac case296 Davis AJ, it seems, applied the common law with due
regard to the Bill of Rights and the question is posed as to whether this approach
is still permissible under the 1996 Constitution297.  The answer is that there is no
difference between ‘a development’ and ‘an application’ of the common law.
Every development presupposes an application and almost every application
results in a development.  Under the 1996 Constitution, the approach of Davis
290 See Potgieter v Killian 1996 (2) SA 276 (N) and Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins 1997 (3) SA 80 (C).  De
Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 75.
291 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA).  In this case, the defence by the newspaper was two-fold:  firstly, that the
application was not unlawful and was constitutionally protected and, secondly, that the distributor and
printer were unaware of the defamatory nature of the article.  The Court held that it had not applied the
Constitution indirectly – through section 35(3) of the interim Constitution (now section 39(2)) but that
it nevertheless regarded the conclusion it had reached to conform with the Constitution.
292 1997 3 SA 80 (C) at 573D.  De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition
(2001) 76.
293 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 76.
294 The 1996 Constitution.
295 De Waal et al Loc cit note 293.
296 1997 3 SA 80 (C).
297 De Waal et al Loc cit note 293.
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AJ will therefore meet the criteria as a permissible development of the common
law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution.298
c) The third method, which is closely related to the second, is to give content to
vague and open-ended common-law concepts, such as ‘public policy’ or
‘contra bonos mores’ or ‘unlawfulness’.299 This concept was explained in De
Klerk v Du Plessis300 by Van Dijkhorst J as follows:
“Section 35(3)[IC] is intended to permeate our judicial approach to
interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law with the
fragrance of the values in which the Constitution is anchored.  This means that
whenever there is room for interpretation or development of our virile system
of law that is to be the point of departure.  When in future the unruly horse of
public policy is saddled, its rein and crop will be that value system.”301
d) The fourth and final method is that in the case of contracts, to interpret
contracts with reference to the values entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  This
method is confined to contracts.302 For example in Farr v Mutual and Federal
Insurance303 Louw J interpreted the word ‘family’ to include members of a
permanent homosexual relationship in which the partners lived together.
In respect of common-law disputes, the direct application of the Bill of Rights makes
little sense.  A Constitutional Court declares legislation unlawful because it is the role
of the legislature and not the courts to remedy the defect in the legislation.  But the
correction of the common law is the role of the courts.  Therefore, rather than strike
down an unconstitutional provision of the common law, the court will reformulate it.
Whenever a rule of the common law is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights the rule
needs to be changed, or developed.  And, as far as common law disputes are
concerned, there seems little difference between the indirect application of the Bill of
298 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 76.
299Ibid.
300 1995 2 SA 40 (T).
301 De Klerk v Du Plessis 1995 2 SA 40 (T) at 127.  De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights
Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 76 - 77.
302 De Waal et al Op cit note 298 at 77.
303 2000 3 SA 684 (C). Ibid.
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Rights to the common law in terms of section 172(1)304 and, for that matter, the direct
application of the Bill of Rights to private or state conduct.  In each case a common-
law remedy needs to be fashioned to cater for the infringement of a fundamental
right.305 In most cases, this will mean that an existing common law remedy is
extended to apply to a new set of circumstances; but in some cases a court will be
asked to develop a completely new remedy as will be illustrated with regards to
constitutional damages in Section 4.3.3. below.  The question is then whether there
are any limits on the indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law.306
We turn now to compare and contrast the horizontal and vertical applications of the
Bill of Rights.
4.2.1.2. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
This section will firstly discuss the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights,
followed by the vertical application of the Bill of Rights.
The extent and nature of the horizontal application is a matter of profound
jurisprudential controversy.  In this regard there are two antithetical views as
presented by Devenish and expressed respectively by Mahomed DP and Kriegler J in
the contentious judgment of the Constitutional Court in Du Plessis v De Klerk.307
Firstly, there is the approach of Mahomed DP, who adopts the view that all conduct
by persons in contemporary society is underpinned by law and consequently a
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights must indeed impact on all private
relationships between persons308.  Second, there is the standpoint of Kriegler J, who
proposes that there is indeed an area of private conduct into which the law does not
encroach, and consequently even a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights would
have no relevance or impact in relation to such an area of conduct.309
304 Supra at 228.
305 De Waal et al Loc cit note 302.
306 Id at 78.
307 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 45, 49, 57 and 62
308 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 20.
309 Ibid.
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The Constitutional Court may find that statutory bodies are bound by Chapter 2 of the
Constitution.  The problem arises with regards to completely private bodies that have
no statutory basis.  Here the Constitutional Court may find that the conduct of these
bodies is wholly or partly exempted from the application of Chapter 2 of the
Constitution.  Each case in which the horizontal application of fundamental rights is
claimed by an individual will have to be examined and decided according to the
circumstances and merits of the particular case.310
Since the Bill of Rights does not provide for a hierarchy of fundamental rights, the
Constitutional Court will have to decide which particular right would apply in the
event of a conflict between two rights, flowing from the horizontal application of the
Bill of Rights.311 The horizontal application of fundamental rights in appropriate
circumstances must indeed have a significant impact on our jurisprudence.  This is
part of the paradigmatic shift that the 1996 Constitution and its justiciable rights must
inevitably produce.312
Section 8 (1)313 stipulates that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 314 Therefore, since the
Bill of Rights applies to all law, it applies to legislation, common and indigenous law
that impacts and regulates private relationships.315 It is clear that section 8 (1)316
applies to all law in all its forms.  Section 8 (2) of the Constitution stipulates that the
Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons if and to the extent that it is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the duty imposed by the
right.  A careful consideration of all the jurisprudential and semantic factors indicates
that the purpose of section 8(2) of the Constitution is to extend the application of
Chapter 2 beyond the ambit of public law into the realm of the conduct of private
persons.  In effect it is submitted that section 8(2) of the Constitution mandates a court
310 Devenish Op cit note 308 at 24.
311Id at 26.  Although the Bill of Rights does not provide for a hierarchy of fundamental rights, it does
provide that some rights are non-derogable, such as those encompassed in sections 37, 30 and 31 of the
1996 Constitution.
312 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 27.
313 The 1996 Constitution.
314 Supra Chapter 2.  Indicating the inclusion of the Social Welfare Department.
315 Devenish Op cit note 312 at 28.
316 The 1996 Constitution.
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of law to examine all private relationships to determine whether a constitutional
principle is applicable to such a relationship.317
The purpose of section 8(3)318 is to guarantee that when an explicit rule of the
common law exists to address a relationship to which a Chapter 2 right applies, the
court concerned should regard the common law rule as a starting point and then
develop it to give effect to the right concerned.  In so doing, the court may restrict the
ambit of the right in accordance with the prescriptions of the limitation test, as set out
in section 36(1) of the Constitution.  One of the distinctive characteristics of the
common law system is that it is dynamic in character and is therefore able to adapt to
changing circumstances.319
4.2.2. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RIGHTS
Prior to 1993, South Africa was not a constitutionally democratic society, but rather a
society based on parliamentary sovereignty.  Democracy tended to succumb to the
opinion of a particular minority320.  Consequentially, there was no equality before the
law and the concept of fundamental rights was a distant dream.  At the beginning of
the twenty first century the 1996 South African Constitution is a beacon of hope in a
world inundated with conflict, poverty and the failure of governments to perform the
tasks for which they were elected.321
One of the most important functions of a modern constitution is to set limits on the
exercise of public power.  A constitution should give a government enough power to
govern, but should not allow it to abuse such power.  The Bill of Rights gives legal
protection to the traditional liberal rights of equality, personal liberty, property, free
speech, assembly and association, and the civil and political rights.  These are
negative rights, which take power away from government.322
317 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 30.
318 The 1996 Constitution.
319 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 31.
320 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 20.
321 Ibid.
322 Currie et al Op cit note 320 at 29.
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Positive rights, which impose obligations on the State, have also been included in the
Bill of Rights.323 Thus, rather than simply protecting members of society from the
abuse of state power, it is thought324 that a constitution and a Bill of Rights should
secure for all members of society a basic set of social goods.  There is the argument
that such socio-economic rights325 are non-justiciable and therefore should not be
enforceable against the State by the judiciary since the judiciary is a privileged,
undemocratically appointed branch of the State, thus making the judiciary an
unsuitable institution to determine the manner in which the Executive utilizes the
State’s resources.326 This is indicative of the argument relating to the separation of
powers, which will be discussed below under Section 5.6 infra.
4.2.2.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Socio-economic rights are positive rights and include the right to social security,
which is the focus of this dissertation.
Traditionally, socio-economic rights are distinguished from civil and political rights.
Rather than being prohibitory, socio-economic rights oblige the State to (within its
available resources) secure a basic set of social goals.  It is stated by Currie and De
Waal in their work, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law327, that it has
been argued that since these are positive rights and that their application requires the
courts to direct the way in which the government distributes the State’s resources,
they are beyond the proper scope of the judicial function.  Such actions so the
argument goes are beyond the judiciary’s traditional function in that such function is
not to direct how the State’s resources are to be utilized, but, rather, to ensure that the
enacted law is correctly interpreted and applied.  However, the fact is that in South
Africa, socio-economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights328 and there
is no indication in the text itself that they are non-justiciable.
323 Id at 30.
324 Ibid.
325 Socio-economic rights include the rights to housing (section 26 of the Bill of Rights), healthcare,
food, water and social security (section 27 of the Bill of Rights).
326 Currie et al Op cit note 320 at 321.
327 Id at 398.
328 Refer to footnote 311 above.
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As the Constitutional Court held in Government of the Republic of South Africa v
Grootboom329, socio-economic rights cannot exist on paper only, the courts must be
enabled to enforce them.  The question is how to enforce them.330 It has been argued
that their application requires the courts to direct the way in which the State
distributes the State’s resources and is thus beyond the scope of the judicial function.
This is because the judiciary is usually an elite and undemocratically appointed
branch of the State.  Therefore, it lacks the democratic legitimacy due to the
separation of powers necessary to decide on the division of social resources between
factions, groups, and communities in society.331
However, the enforcement of these rights may also have an influence on the
development of the common law applicable to disputes between private parties.332
Section 38333 confers standing on a broad range of individuals and groups to approach
courts for ‘appropriate relief’, alleging that a right in the Bill of Right has been
infringed or threatened.  In terms of section 172(1) of the Constitution, the courts have
broad remedial powers in constitutional matters, including the power to declare any
law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid and to make ‘any
order that is just and equitable’.334
The Bill of Rights was conceived and designed to protect individuals against abuse of
state power.  The relationship between the individual and the State is not one of
equality, since the State is obviously more powerful and has far more resources than
any individual.335 It is clear that Chapter 2336 applies to all law in force, which must
of necessity, include the common law, such as the law of property, the law of
succession, the law of contract and customary or indigenous law.  Furthermore, the
phrasing of many specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as those that address
329 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC).
330 Currie, and De Waal Loc cit note 326.
331 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 30.  See
separation of powers discussed infra under Section 5.6.
332 Andrews, and Ellmann, (Editors), The Post Apartheid Constitutions:  Perspectives on South Africa’s
Basic Law (2001) 426.
333 The 1996 Constitution.
334 Andrews, and Ellmann Loc cit note 332.
335 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 24.
336 The 1996 Constitution.
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children and labour relations, indicates clearly that they have a horizontal
application.337
Generally speaking, socio-economic rights can at least be negatively enforced.  They
prohibit the State from adopting ‘deliberately retrogressive measures’ such as, for
instance, depriving citizens of existing rights.338 The positive dimension of socio-
economic rights requires the State to adopt reasonable measures to fulfill the socio-
economic rights.339 Even though a considerable margin of discretion is given to the
State in this regard, a court may still evaluate the reasonableness of the measures
implemented.  In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom340 the
Constitutional Court found the measures of the State to provide housing to be
unreasonable341 since they made no provision for temporary shelter for homeless
people.  This omission was unreasonable since it ignored those who are most in need.
The requirement of reasonableness also means that the courts can require an
explanation from the State of the measures chosen to fulfill the socio-economic rights
or they can require the State to give an account of its progress in implementing such
measures.342 The State, in essence, has an obligation to justify the means it chooses to
fulfill its obligation to realize socio-economic rights.  The positive dimension of the
socio-economic rights is qualified by the use of the phrase employed in section 26(2)
and 27(2) of the Constitution obliging the State to take those steps ‘within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of … [the] right’.  Despite
these qualifications, the central question remains, namely, whether the State has acted
reasonably.343 In answering this question, the words ‘progressively realize’ afford
some flexibility to the State, but should not be read to detract from the obligation to
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the goal of realizing the
socio-economic rights.  A genuine absence of resources is a reasonable excuse for not
337 Devenish Op cit note 335 at 25.338 Ibid. A negative violation of the right to housing would be, for example, to create homelessness
through forced eviction without provision of alternative accommodation.  In 1996, South Africa took
the bold step of including directly enforceable socio-economic rights in its new Constitution, Wesson,
‘Grootboom and Beyond:  Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African
Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 284.
339 Ibid.
340 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC).
341 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 398 - 399.
342 Id at 399.
343 Currie, and De Waal Loc cit note 341.
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fulfilling the rights, but only if the State is able to justify its use of those resources at
its disposal.344
Despite the strong statements of the Constitutional Court in Government of the
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom345 about the justiciability of socio-economic
rights, it remains difficult to envisage effective judicial remedies for their
enforcement.  In so far as the negative aspect of the right is infringed, the appropriate
remedy would in most cases be a declaration of invalidity of the infringing measure.
In respect of a failure to fulfill a positive measure, more innovative measures will
have to be developed to vindicate the Constitution.  So far, the structural interdict and
declaratory relief have been granted346.  More effective forms of relief are likely to be
granted in the future347, as has been indicated by the progressive granting of
constitutional damages.
4.2.3. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION – SECTION 33 OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Under the common law, where a duty lies with the administrative authority to perform
some or other action, the authority cannot refuse to do so.348 Any such refusal or
failure to act by the administrative authority within a reasonable time would allow an
individual who is adversely affected to launch an application for a mandamus to force
the authority to act positively.  The use of this ground of review was confirmed after
the adoption of the 1993 Constitution.  Section 24(a)349 entitled every person to lawful
administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests were affected or
threatened.  The dominant approach has been followed in so far as section 33(1) of the
1996 Constitution350 is concerned351.
344 Ibid.
345 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC).
346 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), 2000 11 BCLR 1169
(CC).  Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 399.
347 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 399.
348 Ibid.
349 Act 59 of 1959. Supra 229.
350 Supra 3.
351 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 184.
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Relating to the example of administrative law, the Draft Bills of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act352 of the South African Law Commission from 1986 to
1994 did not contain an express provision relating to a refusal or failure to take a
decision although it could be seen to have been included in the catchall phrase ‘that
the decision is otherwise contrary to law.’353 The Draft Bill of the Project Committee
of the South African Law Commission in January 1999 similarly did not include an
express reference to this ground of review.  The definition of administrative action,
providing that it ‘means any act performed, decision taken or rule or standard made,
or which should have been performed, taken or made,’ was wide enough to include a
failure or refusal to act.  One of the remedies provided for in the Draft Bill was
‘directing the organ of state or natural or juristic person concerned to act.’  Express
provision for a refusal or failure to take a decision as a ground of review, was made
during the committee stage of the drafting process.354
During the second reading debate of the Bill, Adv JH de Lange stated that the express
inclusion of the provision for a refusal or failure to take a decision as a ground of
review stems from submissions made by churches and the Black Sash concerning
members’ and clients’ experiences with state departments, specifically the inordinate
delays in the processing of applications for benefits.355 This provision in the Bill,
would particularly advantage ‘the rural poor and the disadvantaged’.  The statement
of de Lange that ‘[w]e have now created, for the first time in this country, a special
review, according to which there is a duty on someone to take a decision within a
reasonable period – they must do so’356 is somewhat of an overstatement.  This
ground of review is not completely new to administrative law.357
352 Act 3 of 2000.
353 Clause 3(1)(h) of the November 1992 Draft Bill and clause 3(1)(i) of the 1994 Draft Bill.
354 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 184 -
185.
355 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 184.
356 Hansard Tuesday 25 January 2000 279 at 287.
357 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 184 -
185.
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4.2.3.1. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AS A LENS  FOR EXAMINING
CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
An important question is whether challenges to administrative action which infringes
fundamental rights are to take place in terms of section 6(2)(i) of the PAJA358, or in
terms of the Constitution.
Currie and Klaaren359 point out that if infringements of fundamental rights are to be
challenged in terms of PAJA, all the remedial and procedural requirements of the
Act360 would be applicable to such challenges.  They advise against such an
interpretation of PAJA.
“Legislation giving effect to section 33361 should not overreach itself and seek
to control (and, through procedural provisions such as s7 (1)362, to limit) any
constitutional challenge to administrative action.  PAJA provides statutory
causes of action substituting for direct constitutional challenges within the
scope of application of the right to administrative justice”363.
Should section 7 of PAJA be interpreted in line with the Constitution or declared
invalid in so far as it conflicts therewith, the Constitution empowers PAJA.  PAJA is
not independent from section 33 of the Constitution.  Administrative action which is
conflicting with the Constitution would then also be invalid in terms of section 6(2) of
PAJA.364
358 Section 6(2)(i) of PAJA states:
“(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if –
i) the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.”
359 Currie and Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Benchbook (2001) 174.
360 The procedural and remedial requirements of Act 3 of 2000 are envisaged in sections 3, 6, 7 and 8.
361 The 1996 Constitution.
362 Section 7(1) of Act 3 of 2000 states:
“1)  Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6 (1) must be instituted without
unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the date-
a) subject to subsection (2)(c), on which any proceedings instituted in terms of internal
remedies as contemplated in subsection (2)(a) have been concluded; or
b) where no such remedies exist, on which the person concerned was informed of the
administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons for it or might
reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons.”
363 Currie and Klaaren The Promotion of Admnistrative Justice Benchbook (2001) 174.
364 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 192 -
193. Section 6(2) of PAJA states:
“2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if-
80
PAJA nevertheless appears to contain various provisions which place an onus on the
authority in relation to challenges to the validity of administrative action. When a
public authority fails to furnish adequate reasons for a decision in circumstances
required to do so, the onus will be on the public authority to show that the decision
falls within ‘good reason’.365
Under the Bill of Rights the infringement of a fundamental right by administrative
action would have to be authorized by a law of general application in terms of section
36 of the Constitution.  If it is not, such infringement would be invalid.  Where the
infringement of a fundamental right is authorized by legislation which has passed
constitutional scrutiny, the administrative action can still be challenged366 in that the
infringement does not comply with the requirement of proportionality (or that any of
the grounds of review in section 6 (2) of PAJA367, are present).  Case law supports the
argument that where an infringement of a fundamental right is alleged to have taken
place, the person affected will have to prove the facts indicating an infringement of
a) the administrator who took it-
i) was not authorized to do so by the empowering provision;
ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not authorized by the empowering
provision; or
iii) was biased or reasonably suspected of bias;
b)  a mandatory and material procedure or condition prescribed by an empowering provision was not
complied with;
c) the action was procedurally unfair;
d) the action was materially influenced by an error of law;
e) the action was taken-
i) for a reason not authorized by the empowering provision;
ii) for an ulterior purpose or motive;
iii) because irrelevant considerations were taken into account or relevant considerations
were not considered;
iv) because of the unauthorized or unwarranted dictates of another person or body;
v) in bad faith; or
vi) arbitrarily or capriciously;
f)  the action itself-
i) contravenes a law or is not authorized by the empowering provision; or
ii) is not rationally connected to-
aa) the purpose for which it was taken;
bb) the purpose of the empowering provision;
cc) the information before the administrator; or
dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator;
g)  the action concerned consists of a failure to take a decision;
h) the exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorized by the empowering
provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable
that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or performed the function; or
i) the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.”
365 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 315.
366 Ibid.
367 Act 3 of 2000.
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that fundamental right or showing that they are entitled to exercise the right.  The
onus of proof will be on the party attempting to uphold the validity of the
administrative action to prove the facts showing the absence of a ground of review.
The above would also apply in the case where a final or temporary interdict is
sought.368
4.2.4. THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
The case of Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern
Cape Province Government and Another369 provides our starting point in the
emergence of constitutional damages.
The applicant in this case had applied for a disability social grant on the 7th of March
2000.  By October of the same year her application had still not been considered and
she therefore brought an application to court for a mandamus.  On the date of the
hearing the State consented to an order that the department concerned consider her
application within fifteen days.  On the day following the court order, her application
was granted.  In December the matter was heard again to determine the date from
which the grant would be payable.  Leach J stated that the nature of the application
was such that a period of three months to consider whether or not it should be granted
could be regarded as a reasonable amount of time.  The failure to consider the
application within this time-period constituted an infringement of the applicant’s right
to lawful and reasonable administrative action.  The applicant was therefore entitled
to back payment from the 7th of June 2000.  Interest on arrears would be payable to
the applicant from the date on which the application should have been granted to date
of payment.370 The competency of a court to grant this form of relief has now been
called into question by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
368 De Ville Op cit note 365 at 320.
369 2001 9 BCLR 899 (SE), 2002 1 SA 342 (SE).
370 2001 9 BCLR 899 (SE) 909D-E, 2002 1 SA 342 (SE) 354. De Ville Op cit note 356 at 185.
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In Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another371,
Conradie JA for the Supreme Court of Appeal held that an award (in a lump sum) of
back payment and interest thereon (in circumstances similar to those in
Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape
Province Government and Another372) was not a competent form of relief under
section 8 of PAJA.  He pointed out that PAJA instead provides for compensation373 to
be awarded in exceptional circumstances.  It is not clear from the judgment whether
an award for back payment and interest would qualify as ‘compensation’.  A finding
that this form of relief is not competent under section 8 effectively ignores the
introductory words of section 8 (1), providing that a court may grant ‘any order that is
just and equitable.’  It is submitted that an award as in the Mahambehlala’s case374
should in appropriate circumstances be competent under section 8 of PAJA as the
order provided is the only ‘just and equitable’ order that can be made in the
circumstances.375
According to Kriegler J in Fose’s case376, as is the case with the common law,
constitutional rights and remedies are complementary.  The nature of a remedy is
determined by its object.  The harm caused by violating constitutional rights is a harm
to society as a whole.  The violation impedes the realization of the constitutional
project of creating a just and democratic society. Therefore the object in awarding a
remedy should be, at least, to vindicate the Constitution and deter future
infringements.  Vindication is necessary because harm to constitutional rights, if not
addressed, will diminish the public’s confidence in the Constitution.377
The judiciary therefore bears the burden of vindicating rights by striking effectively at
the source of their infringement.378
371 2003 2 ALL SA 223 (SCA) para 9, 16 - 18.
372 2001 9 BCLR 899 (SE), 2002 1 SA 342 (SE).
373 Section 8 (1) (c) (ii) (bb) of Act 3 of 2000.
374 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE).
375 De Ville Op cit note 365 at 186.
376 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 96.
377 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) paras 19, 87, 94, 96, and 98 – 99.
378 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 173.
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4.3. THE ‘NEW’ APPROACH TO THE PROVISION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
4.3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
Section 165(1) of the Constitution contains a simple declaration.  The Section states
that judicial authority of the republic vests in the courts.  The exercise of judicial
authority takes place when a tribunal, which acting under the authority of the State,
decides commandingly and conclusively, controversies between subjects of the State,
or between the State and its subjects.
The maxim ubi ius ibi remedium – where there is a right there is a remedy - expresses
one of the most important principles of our law.  This means that the existence of a
legal right implies the existence of an authority with the power to grant a remedy if
that right is infringed.  A legal right will be incomplete if there is no remedy for
enforcing it and, further, if no sanction attaches to a breach of that right.  It is
therefore of primary importance to any constitutional system that it makes provision
for an institution that will decide whether a legal right has been breached and what
remedy to provide or sanction to impose. In South Africa, the principal institution
empowered to provide remedies and sanctions for a breach of the Constitution or the
ordinary law is the judicial authority of the Republic, consisting of the courts and the
judiciary which staffs them.379
From the outset it should be clear that the need for an effective remedy that achieves
its purpose must be counterbalanced by the deference that a court owes to the other
branches of government.  As will be seen under Section 5.6. below, that this deference
flows from the doctrine of separation of powers, which dictates that a court should be
careful not to trespass onto the terrain of the legislature or the executive.  Apart from
budgetary implications, which loom large at the remedial stage of analysis, there are
379 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 268.
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questions of timing and of resistance or evasion.380 Any monetary award ordered by
the courts envisages a budgetary implication to the state department which has to
implement the award, although as commonly witnessed the state department may
resist the award or just avoid it through sheer disobedience381.
From our discussion in Section 4.2. of this Chapter it appears that an award of
constitutional damages will only be regarded as appropriate relief if no other effective
compensatory remedy is available.  If such a remedy is available – and here delictual
remedies in particular can often play an important part – the remedy will be regarded
as appropriate constitutional relief if it effectively vindicates the relevant fundamental
right and deters future infringements thereof382.  In this respect mention should be
made of the possibility of the development of a ‘constitutional delict’, that is to say,
where the infringement of a fundamental right per se constitutes a delict.  It is
submitted by Neethling et al that a clear distinction should be made between such a
constitutional wrong and a delict.383 Even though these two concepts may overlap,
the requirements for a delict and those for a constitutional wrong are essentially
different.384 As a result, not every delict is necessarily also a constitutional wrong and
vice versa.  Contrasting a delictual remedy which is aimed at compensation, a
constitutional remedy, even in the form of damages, is directed at affirming,
enforcing, protecting, and vindicating a fundamental right and at preventing or
deterring future violations of Chapter 2 rights.385 A constitutional wrong and a delict
or their remedies should therefore not be treated alike.386
The purpose of section 8 (3) of the Constitution387 is to guarantee that when an
explicit rule of the common law exists to address a relationship to which a Chapter 2
right applies, the court concerned should regard the common law rule as a starting
380 Id at 289.
381 The government was called to Court in the case of Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the
Department of Health, Gauteng and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Department with the Centre
for Constitutional Rights CCT 19/07 [2008] ZACC 8; 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC) for
disobedience to a court order.  In Kate v Member of Executive Council of Welfare 2005 1 SA 141
SECLD the government resisted an order; see also Welfare Department v Kate 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
382 Neethling, et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 19 - 20.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 The 1996 Constitution.  As clarified in Chapters 1, 3 and 4.
386 Neethling, et al Loc cit note 382.
387 The 1996 Constitution.
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point and then develop it to give effect to the right concerned.  In so doing, the court
may restrict the ambit of the right in accordance with the prescriptions of the
limitation test, as set out in section 36 (1) of the Constitution.  One of the distinctive
characteristics of a system of common law is that it is dynamic in character and is
therefore able to adapt to changing circumstances.388
As Devenish389 has observed, the High Courts and, on one occasion, the Supreme
Court of Appeal, have awarded ‘constitutional damages’390 in circumstances where no
other form of relief seemed effective or appropriate.  These cases deal with
maladministration of social assistance grants and the failure to evict squatters from
private property.  We first consider the general approach to constitutional damages set
out by the Constitutional Court in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security.391
Thereafter, we briefly outline the development of new claims for damages through the
indirect application of the Bill of Rights.  In this area the Constitutional Court has led
the way with the ground-breaking decision of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and
Security392, and with a number of judgments following suit, thus considerably
expanding the liability of the State for personal injuries resulting from negligent
conduct.393 However, a similar expansion in respect of pure economic loss for
negligent administrative decision-making has been blocked by the Supreme Court of
Appeal,394 thus resulting in a difference between the way the law of damages resulting
in personal injury and pure economic loss has developed.
In Fose’s case395, the plaintiff sued the Minister for damages suffered as a result of an
alleged assault and torture at the hands of the police.  The plaintiff claimed under the
usual delictual heads of damage:  pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and
shock, contumelia and past and future medical expenses.  However, in addition to
these damages, the plaintiff sought ‘constitutional damages’ for the infringement of
388 Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 31.  Currie, and De Waal, The
Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 164, and 222.
389 Ibid.
390 Kate v Member of Executive Council of Welfare 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Welfare Department v
Kate 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
391 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
392 2001 4 SA 938 (CC).
393 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 220.
394 Ibid.
395 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
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his constitutional right to dignity and the right not to be tortured396.  Exception was
taken to this aspect of the claim [the section of the claim wherein the plaintiff sought
constitutional damages for the infringement of his constitutional right to dignity and
the right not to be tortured], and the issue reached the Constitutional Court as an
appeal against the upholding of the exception by the Supreme Court of Appeal.  In its
decision, the Constitutional Court stressed that it only had to decide the appeal before
it, which was whether the constitutional damages claimed by the plaintiff would
constitute ‘appropriate relief’ in the circumstances.  It held that, in this case, an award
of constitutional damages in addition to delictual damages would not be appropriate.
Delictual damages were considered by the court to be an adequate vindication of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  On the issue of punitive damages, it held that it was
not persuaded that such damages would effectively deter the police from torturing
suspects in the future.  The court went on to state that in a country where there is a
great demand on scarce public resources, it was inappropriate to use them to pay
punitive damages to plaintiffs who were already compensated by delictual damages
from the injuries caused to them.  The funds could be better employed in structural
and systemic ways to eliminate or substantially reduce the cause of infringements
(possibly through structural interdicts the use of which has increased in recent
cases).397
4.3.2. INDIRECT APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW DAMAGES CLAIM
4.3.2.1. COMMON LAW:  DELICT
396 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 220.
397 Id at 221.   Bearing in mind that compensation is the normal form of delictual damages, thus
compensation is merely the calculation of the economic loss experienced by the affected individual.
Punitive damages on the other hand are financial damages in addition to the normal compensation.
Punitive damages have been experienced in administrative law.  For further discussion on punitive and
compensation calculation refer to chapter 3 above.  Structural interdicts were used in Strydom v
Minister of Correctional Services 1999 3 BCLR 342 (W) and in Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality
2000 3 BCLR 277 (C); City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 5 SA 39 (C) and in Rail Commuter Action
Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2003 5 SA 518 (C); Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of
Health 2002 4 BCLR 356 (T).
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The development of the common law of delict has resulted in a situation where almost
any negligent State conduct or omission resulting in personal injury will attract
liability398.
A more cautious approach has been adopted in claims for pure economic loss
resulting from negligent administrative decision-making.  The Supreme Court of
Appeal has rejected a claim for loss of profit resulting from the alleged negligent
award of a tender to another and a claim for damages resulting from delay caused by
an unlawful land-use planning decision.399 Compensation for loss of profit has,
however, been awarded in a case where a tenderer had been fraudulently prevented
from winning a tender.400 For the moment this seems to be the dividing line (in other
words it is necessary to show bad faith), at least as far as claims for loss of profit are
concerned.401 Out-of-pocket expenses (the costs of the materials and resources
utilized) are usually minimal in this type of situation, where the complainant applied
for permission to obtain the contract for work or tendered for state work and negligent
administrative decision-making caused him or her to fail.  A claim for out-of-pocket
expenses may succeed402.  Therefore, there appears to be room for continued growth
and development in the area of damages in the common law.
We turn now to explore the Promotion of Administrative Act and compensation in
relation to the above discussion.
4.3.2.2. PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT (PAJA) AND
COMPENSATION
PAJA403 allows a court in review proceedings, in exceptional cases and in addition to
setting aside a decision, to direct an administrator or any party to the proceedings to
398 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 222.
399 Premier, Western Cape v Fair Cape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA).  There has
not been a similar development on the horizontal level.  In other words, the common law liability of
private persons has not been expanded. Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA
1247 (SCA)
400 Transnet Limited v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 1 SA 299 (SCA).
401 Telimatrix (Pty) Ltd v Advertising Standards Authority of SA [2005] 2 ALL SA 97 (W).
402 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 222.
403 Act 3 of 2000.
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pay ‘compensation’. 404 The provision is somewhat unusual as the intention was not
to replace the common law delictual action for damages.
It is difficult to imagine how the provision could find application if the requirements
for that action (unlawfulness, causality and fault) are not present.  Predictably it has
not featured in litigation.  Instead, as we saw above, those aggrieved by unlawful
administrative acts have elected to sue in delict, mostly unsuccessfully405, as it
appears.406
We turn to explore damages claims derived directly from the Constitution.
4.3.3. DAMAGES CLAIMS DERIVED DIRECTLY FROM THE
CONSTITUTION
It appears that two types of claims for damages have been derived directly from the
Constitution.
In Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President of the RSA407, a large group of
people illegally occupied a portion of a farm.  By the time the land owner was granted
an eviction order the numbers of occupiers had grown to thirty six thousand, and the
sheriff insisted on payment of a deposit of 1, 8 million Rand to execute the eviction as
the sheriff required the assistance of private contractors.  The State refused to
contribute to the cost of eviction.  The High Court granted a structural interdict,
ordering the State to produce a plan to end the unlawful occupation and find
alternative accommodation for the squatters.  The Supreme Court of Appeal produced
a more imaginative order, declaring that the fundamental rights of both the land owner
(property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution) and the squatters (housing in
terms of section 26 of the Constitution) had been impaired, that the squatters were
entitled to remain on the land until alternative accommodation was made available for
404 Section 8 (1) (c) (ii) (bb) of Act 3 of 2000.
405 Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA); Telimatrix (Pty) Ltd v
Advertising Standards Authority of SA [2005] 2 ALL SA 97 (W); and Knop v Johannesburg City
Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A).
406 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 222.
407 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T).
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them by the local government.  Moreover, the landowner was entitled to constitutional
damages, calculated in terms of the Expropriation Act408 for the loss of the use of the
land during the period in which it had been occupied and that the State had failed to
provide alternative land for the occupiers.409
The rights of access to adequate housing and to protection from arbitrary evictions
have been developed in tandem with each other, and have signiﬁcantly qualiﬁed the
normality assumption, as courts have begun to refuse to grant eviction orders which
could lead to homelessness.  In short, the Modderklip case410 is authority both for the
proposition that evictions which lead to homelessness are a violation of section 26(1)
of the Constitution and that an unreasonable failure to give effect to the obligation to
provide at least basic temporary alternative shelter for unlawful occupiers, resulting in
the loss of the owner’s use and enjoyment of the land, may give rise to an action for
constitutional damages.  The Modderklip case411 attracted a great deal of commentary.
The case certainly featured a novel and interesting remedy for the clash between
property rights and the right of access to adequate housing.  The Supreme Court of
Appeal’s order (which survived an appeal to the Constitutional Court) effectively
required the State to hold the balance between these the two competing rights of
access to housing and freedom of use and enjoyment of one’s property by providing
access to alternative shelter.  By providing for constitutional damages, the order held
the State to account for its failure to do so.
The second line of cases (resulting in the second type of damages claims derived
directly from the Constitution) emerged as a result of delays in the processing of
social assistance grants under the Social Assistance Act.412 By the mid-1990’s
corruption amongst officials and applicants for grants was prominent in the provinces
of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal.  The decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza413
arose as a result of the Eastern Cape government’s attempt to remove ‘ghost’
408 Act 63 of 1975, Sections 2 and 10.
409 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T) para 44 and 51.  Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th
edition (2005) 223.
410 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T) para 44 and 51.  2003 6 BCLR 638 (T).
411 Supra.
412 Act 59 of 1992.
413 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA).
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beneficiaries from their system by suspending the payment of grants and requiring
every recipient to re-register before their benefits would be reinstated.
In this case414 and a number of others415, beneficiaries successfully challenged the
termination of their grants in the High Court on the basis that their grants had been
terminated without affording them a hearing.  A flood of litigation followed.  Faced
with increasing numbers of applicants for welfare grants, tens of thousands of new
applications every month, the two provinces soon started to fall behind with the
processing of the applications.416 This generated the second phase of litigation.  The
usual remedy for compelling the State to act by way of an interdict ordering the
appropriate administrator to consider making a decision appeared ineffective, so the
courts started to substitute their own decisions for those of the State on a wider
scale.417 If a decision was not made within a reasonable time, the High Courts were
prepared, as a form of ‘constitutional relief’, to approve social assistance grants
themselves.418 In addition, the State was ordered to make available back-payment and
interest calculated on the basis that the applications should have been assessed within
a reasonable time.419 For such purposes, a period of three months was considered
reasonable time.  To an extent, the courts became an alternative forum for the
processing of social assistance grants.  This approach was criticized by the Supreme
Court of Appeal, per Conradie JA, in Jayiya v Member of Executive Council for
Welfare, Eastern Cape420, albeit in an obiter dictum, on the basis that these orders
ignored the provisions of the PAJA,421 which only provides for compensation to be
awarded in exceptional circumstances.
The next difficulty that arose in a number of cases was that the Eastern Cape and
KwaZulu Natal provincial governments failed to pay the awards of constitutional
damages that had been ordered.  This generated another phase of litigation, dealing
414 Supra.
415 Jayiya v Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government Case
number 264/02 Case [2003] SCA (unreported), Mahambehlala v Member of Executive Council of
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE).
416 Currie, and De Waal Loc cit note 409.
417 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 224.
418 Ibid.
419 Mahambehlala v Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 342 (SE);
Mbanga v Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 359 (SE); Bacela v
Member of Executive Council for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525
(E). Ibid.
420 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) para 8, 9, 10, and 19 – 22.
421 Act 3 of 2000.
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with contempt of court.  The Constitutional Court has not pronounced on these
developments.  In both the Modderklip case422 situation and that of the social
assistance cases, the choice is essentially one between awarding constitutional
damages to individual litigants on the one hand and structural relief on the other,
aimed at addressing the systemic problem that caused the infringements.  The former
may appear to be an effective short-term remedy from a litigant’s perspective, but it
does not abide well with the purpose of constitutional relief, which is forward-looking
and community orientated.   In the view of Currie and De Waal, the Constitutional
Court is more likely to support an approach aimed at restoring capacity where there is
systemic failure by way of positive interdicts or declarators, rather than one that
attempts to persuade the wrongdoer state institution to reform by way of awards of
damages.423
As far as court orders for the payment of money are concerned, the common law
position is that a judgment debtor may not be held in contempt of court for failing to
comply with an order to pay money.424 In the social assistance cases in the Eastern
Cape, the judiciary had ‘developed’ this part of the common law to provide for a
contempt of court remedy in cases where the provincial government did not comply
with monetary orders.425 This development was overturned by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Jayiya v Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape426, inter
alia, on the basis that the courts cannot retrospectively develop a new criminal
offence and that it would be unfair to hold a State official in contempt of court for
failing to pay the State’s debts while the same person cannot be held in contempt for
failing to pay his or her personal debts.427 The State Liability Act428 precludes
execution against State assets because of the disruption it may cause to the
performance of State functions.  Unless another manner of holding State officials
accountable, such as utilizing the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act429
422 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T).
423 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 224.
424 Mjeni v Minister of Health & Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk); East London LTC v MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape 2001 3 SA 1133 (Ck).
425 Mjeni v Minister of Health & Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk).
426 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) para 14 - 17.
427 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 225.
428 Act 20 of 1957.
429 Act 1 of 1999.
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and the Municipal Finance Management Act430 to discipline or prosecute those
responsible for failing to comply with court order, is devised, an attack on the
constitutionally of the State Liability Act431 seems inevitable.432
The looming showdown between the executive and the judiciary may not materialize
as the delivery of social benefits is about to be privatized and the new South African
Social Security Agency Act433 came into force on the 15th of November 2004.  The
purpose of this Act434 is, inter alia, to ensure that national standards are set for the
efficient, economic and effective use of the limited resources available to the State for
social security.  In terms of this Act435, the South Africa Social Security Agency is
established, which will become the service provider in respect of the administration of
social assistance.  The shift of accountability and liability to external agents is
pending, however it remains questionable as to whether this shift will result in an
improvement of service delivery for the public or whether this shift will result in the
same complacency but merely from a different agent.
4.3.4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion of both sections 4.2. and 4.3. of this Chapter it is once again
emphasized that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.  However, because
South Africa’s common law is flexible, harmony can be achieved between the
Constitution and the common law as the common law can develop and adapt and
therefore is not declared null and void by the Constitution.
In exploring constitutional rights and damages in South Africa it was established that
there are three stages of Constitution litigation.  Firstly, it must be established if an
infringement of a fundamental right has occurred.  Secondly, it must be established
whether or not the infringement is protected by the limitation provided for in section
430 Act 56 of 2003.
431 Act 20 of 1957.
432 Currie, and De Waal Op cit note 427 at 128. York Timbers v Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry
2003 4 SA 477 (T).
433 Act 9 of 2004.
434 Ibid.
435 Ibid.
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36 of the Constitution (the limitation clause).  The infringement is protected if the
limitation of the fundamental right is reasonable, justifiable and if an acceptable
method of the implementation of the limitation has been utilized.  Thirdly, it must be
established that the remedy provided for the infringement is ‘appropriate’ in the
circumstances.
The Bill of Rights finds horizontal, vertical, direct and indirect application in South
Africa.  It is established that the Bill of Rights must in all circumstances be applied
indirect first before direct application is considered.  The indirect application of the
Bill of Rights takes four forms.  Firstly, the common law can be changed. Secondly,
the common law can be applied with regards to the Bill of Rights.  Thirdly, content is
given to the common law’s vague terms or concepts and fourthly, contracts are
interpreted with regards to the Bill of Rights.
In exploring the constitutional approach to the provision of monetary damages in
South Africa it was established in this Chapter that the object of constitutional
damages is to vindicate the Constitution and deter future infringements.  There have
been two types of damages claims derived directly from the Constitution, which have
been discussed above.  Namely, the form of damages provided in the case of
Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty)
Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae)436 firstly and secondly the
form of damages provided in Kate v Member of Executive Council of Welfare.437
The cases of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal
Studies intervening)438, Kate v Member of executive Council of Welfare439 and others
will be discussed in Chapter 5 below.
It is apparent that although South African law has developed immensely since the
inception of the 1996 Constitution, South Africa’s ‘rights conscious culture’ is still
developing.  If American history is any guide, the only certainty may be that South
436 2004 6 SA 40.
437 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Welfare Department v Kate 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
438 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 962 - 963.
439 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Welfare Department v Kate 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
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Africa will soon encounter further problems, and consequently devise solutions that
will respond to exigencies the framers did not foresee.  If the Constitution is a
success, the rights it protects and the institutions it establishes should continue to
govern the nation for years and generations to come.440
440 Andrews, and Ellmann (Editors), The Post Apartheid Constitutions:  Perspectives on South Africa’s
Basic Law (2001) 18.
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CHAPTER 5
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THE AMALGAMATION OF DELICTUAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DAMAGES
5.1.  INTRODUCTION
This Chapter seeks to combine concepts from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this
dissertation and analyze the application of the common law in a constitutional state
with regard to monetary damages as a remedy for a constitutional breach.  The
Chapter will further evaluate how the courts have dealt with the inundation of claims
relating to the breach of constitutional rights since the enactment of the Constitution
together with the further changes that the Constitution has brought to the common
law.  The primary question that this dissertation, and specifically this Chapter
endeavours to explore and answer is: “Can delictual remedies be sufficiently
expanded upon and revolutionized in order to vindicate a constitutional right?”
This Chapter will commence with an examination of the general principles of delict.
It will conclude with an exploration of the possibility of combining constitutional and
delictual principles (as remedies for breach of a constitutional right).
The relevant sections of the Constitution applicable to this Chapter have been
provided above in Section 1.5.1 and the reader is requested to refer to this Section as
he or she proceeds to read this Chapter.
5.2. RELEVANT COMMON LAW DELICTUAL PRINCIPLES
It was noted in Chapter 3 of this dissertation at Section 3.2. that the definition of a
delict is misleading in that it omits to state fault as a general delictual requirement and
creates the erroneous impression that all individual interests, and not only those that
are legally recognized and protected, are relevant.441
441 Neethling et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 3.
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When reference is made to legally recognized and protected rights one is, in the
context of this dissertation, referred to the Constitution and the fact that the
Constitution indicates the rights which are legally recognized and protected by our
State in codified format.  It is noted further in Chapter 3 that all five requirements of a
delict442 must of necessity be present before the conduct complained of may be
classified as a delict.443 It is pertinent to note that the question of delictual liability is
governed by the ‘generalized approach’, which provides delict the ability to adapt and
provide for the changing environment.  The common law remedy of delict as shown
in Chapter 3 may adopt a flexible approach with regard to the Constitution, which is
the supreme law of the land.444
Damage (damnum) is said to be the detrimental impact upon any patrimonial or
personality interest deemed worthy of protection by the law.445 The inference can
therefore be drawn that law encompasses the many sources of law that South Africa
has developed over the years including the common law, customary law and the
Constitution.446
It has also been noted in Chapter 3 supra that the awarding of damages for
patrimonial loss, if in the form of interest, is achieved through the actio legis Aquiliae.
It is noted that within the definition of a delict reference is made to the infringement
of a legally recognized right.  Therefore, it is conceivable that any right protected
under the Constitution which is infringed, is equally protected and compensated by
the use of a common law remedy, that is, the actio legis Aquiliae provided that the
elements of delict are proven.  It is pertinent to note that the requirements of the
delictual remedy must be met in order for the remedy to be awarded.  This course is
possible due to the fact that South Africa utilizes the generalized approach which
allows the adaptation and growth of the common law remedies to provide for
442 Which refers to the act or omission, wrongfulness, fault, harm and causation. Ibid.
443 Neethling et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 3 - 4.
444 The 1996 Constitution. The casuistic approach is outlined in Chapter 3 supra.
445 Neethling, et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 212.  Visser and Potgieter state that the term
‘damage’, however, is wide enough to include compensation and satisfaction for both patrimonial loss
and non-patrimonial loss, Visser PJ, and Potgieter JM, Law of Damages, 2nd edition (2003) 1. Van der
Walt JC, and Midgley JR, Principles of Delict, 3rd edition (2005) 1.
446 Ibid.  Refer to Chapter 1.
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changing circumstances.  Without this reformation being possible, one would have to
envisage a total overhaul of our legal system in order to accommodate the changes
that South Africa has experienced in the past fourteen years.447
An example of an overlap of conduct which constitutes both a delict and an
infringement of a constitutional right and thereby contains all the requirements of a
delict and constitutional right infringement is an intentional infringement of the right
to privacy which constitutes both a delict as well as a constitutional wrong.  For this
purpose the Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security
(Centre for Applied Legal Studies intervening)448 stated that the net of delictual
liability should be cast wider by emphasizing its objective and by defining it more
widely in order to provide enhanced protection to, inter alia, recognized fundamental
rights.  The court was also of the opinion that fault and legal causation should fulfill a
more important role in limiting liabilities.  A proper application of the delictual
elements should dispel the fear of opening the floodgates of liability without limits449.
The validity of all law, state action, court decisions and the conduct of natural and
juristic persons is tested against the Constitution and Bill of Rights in particular,
taking into account that any limitation of a fundamental right must be in accordance
with the limitation clause.450 The entrenchment of fundamental rights in the Bill of
Rights, as noted at the commencement of this Chapter, enhances their protection and
raises them to a higher status.
In exercising this value judgment [determining whether law is valid as tested against
the Bill of Rights], the general principles which have already been crystallized in our
common law with regard to the reasonableness or boni mores criterion for delictual
wrongfulness may serve as prima facie indication of the reasonableness of the
limitation in terms of the Bill of Rights.451 In the case of an infringement of or a
threat to a fundamental right a prejudiced person is entitled to approach a competent
court for appropriate relief.  In this respect there is the possibility of developing a
447 Neethling, et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 3- 5.
448 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 962 - 963.
449 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 962 – 963.  Neethling, et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 20.
450 Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.
451 Neethling, et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 19.
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‘constitutional delict’, in other words, that the infringement of a fundamental right per
se constitutes a delict and would entitle the injured person to an appropriate delictual
remedy.  This may result in the overlapping of the remedy for a common law delict
and infringement of a constitutional right.452 The requirements for a delict and those
of a constitutional wrong differ materially, as a result not every delict is necessarily
also a constitutional wrong entitling the injured person to a constitutional remedy, and
visa versa.  Besides, unlike a delictual remedy, which is aimed at compensation, a
constitutional remedy, even in the form of damages, is directed at affirming,
enforcing, protecting and vindicating fundamental rights and preventing or deterring
future violations of the Bill of Rights.453
5.3. DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW (GENERALIZED APPROACH)
The cohesion between the Constitution and the common law is quite evident and one
must take cognizance of the fact that although the common law was present before the
Constitution, the Constitution now takes precedence over the common law in all areas
and where the common law is in conflict with the Constitution the Constitution
prevails.  There is however no need to prefer constitutional remedies above common
law remedies where common law remedies do not contradict the Constitution.454
The law of delict is closely related to the core problem of balancing individual
freedoms against collective security, a balance that is ultimately to be achieved by
tempering broad principles of liability with a limited interpretation of wrongfulness.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation it was noted that constitutional remedies are forward
looking and community orientated thereby seeking to always benefit the community
over the individual.  This possible contradiction in the distinct purposes of common
law remedies versus constitutional remedies may affect the availability of common
law remedies to constitutional infringements.  It was however noted in Chapter 3
supra that although there have been significant advances in the development of the
Aquilian action in South African law, the remedy has not developed to the point
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454 However, noting further that the constitutional remedies are not remedies of last resort.  Section 38
of the 1996 Constitution.
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where it can be said that all financial harm culpably caused is prima facie wrongful
and actionable.
An example of this lack of extension of the common law remedy is in the field of
omissions, where the boni mores of society do not require one to take positive action
whenever a failure to do so would inevitably cause harm to another.455 Further, it
seems still to be true that there is a lack of extension of the common law remedy in
the case of pure economic loss.  It is evident with regards to the research question at
hand that damages, normally in the form of interest as demonstrated by Kate’s
case456, are a just and equitable remedy for the breach of a social assistance right.457
We are exploring the pure economic loss of an individual due to the lack of
attainment of an economic benefit at the time when the economic benefit should have
been granted [i.e. a social grant].458 In terms of damages, interest on the amount
which should have been granted at the appropriate time would be awarded in order to
compensate the individual for the delay in providing the economic benefit.459 It is
clear that the gradual expansion of the Aquilian action in South African law has not
quite reached the desired end.  As mentioned above, our law is amenable to change
and reform and therefore such desired end may be reached in due course.
Our courts tend to adopt a conservative approach to the expansion of the Aquilian
action and will only allow such an extension if it is justified by policy considerations
which favour such extension.  It will be essential to determine policy considerations
which will justify extension of the Aquilian action to provide a remedy in the cases of
pure economic loss as outlined in this dissertation.460
455 Zimmermann, and Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 634.
4562006 SCA 46 (RSA).
457 Noting that interest is merely an example of one of the forms of constitutional damages to be
explored and not the only form of constitutional damages provided by South Africa's judiciary.
458 Zimmermann, and Visser, Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 634.
459 Visser, and Potgieter, Law of Damages (1993) 164 – 165. Kate v Member of Executive Council of
Welfare 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Welfare Department v Kate 2006 SCA 46 RSA.
460 Such loss which could be occasioned by the infringement of a constitutional right, specifically those
enshrined in the 1996 Constitution with relation to socio-economic rights and the social security
benefits at section 27 of the 1996 Constitution, Supra Chapter 3.  Another example, the infringement of
the right to dignity which causes pure economic loss by the loss of a contract or tender.
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5.4. SOCIAL SECURITY
It is common logic that a proposition should never be made without due regard to the
consequent social implications.  In Chapter 2 above we discussed that social
assistance in South Africa is financed out of general revenues, mostly through the
budget of the Provincial Departments of Welfare.  The question to be posed is:  where
will the finances for a breach of the social assistance rights in terms of section 27461
be paid from?
If the breach of such a right is to be compensated by interest and monetary damages
by the use of a new constitutional remedy or the adaptation of the common law
Aquilian remedy, the funds for such compensation would have to be sought by the
relevant provincial department.  One is led to believe that such money would come
out of such department’s welfare budget.  If this be the case, then the remedy would
not be directly linked to the purpose of constitutional remedies.  The argument is
submitted that a remedy which grants money from a welfare budget for the breach of
a specific individual’s social security right cannot be said to be community orientated,
and forward looking since the community would then be left with less available
finances to be distributed amongst themselves.  Although this argument is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, it is recognized that the argument is limited to the extent
that the community is comprised of individuals and hence a welfare grant provided to
an individual in the community would benefit the ‘community’ in the general sense.
Although there is the possibility of the cohesion or possible development of the
constitutional as well as the common law remedies to a point where there is an
overlapping of remedies, it is still seen at this stage in our law that the requirements or
purpose of constitutional remedies must at all times be met and the requirements of a
delictual remedy must also at all times be met individually.  Bearing in mind that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the common law should be open to
adaptation and forward development in providing a relevant remedy, as discussed
above under 5.3.462 Constitutional rights should be protected or compensated by a
461 The 1996 Constitution, Supra Chapter 2.
462 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution.
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relevant and effective remedy.  Therefore, it is submitted that the criteria for the new
era of the movement towards a relaxed approach should be that the remedy must:
a) be relevant and effective,
b) provide for the infringed person’s needs, and
c) simultaneously provide for the requirements of the common law or the
constitutional law requirements respectively.
Bearing in mind the above three criteria for the new era of the movement towards the
relaxed approached remedy we turn to apply the principles already detailed to relevant
case law.
5.5. RELEVANT CASE LAW
In the case of Member of the Executive Council of the Department of Welfare v
Kate463 the appellant claimed that during the period in dispute, interest did not accrue
to Kate on ordinary principles, because the debt was not repayable and that the
interest did not accrue to Kate in the ordinary sense.464 This was in essence a
reference to the common law definition of interest and damages which we discussed
in Chapter 3 supra, thus linking the idea that in order for a remedy to be granted the
remedy must meet the requirements necessitated by the purpose of the remedy465.  It
was noted further by counsel for the appellant that Kate had delictual remedies that
were sufficiently restorative of any loss that was caused to her due to the failure of the
administration to perform its constitutional duties and that, in those circumstances, the
remedy of constitutional damages was not required466.  This submission did not
succeed and interest as claimed, was awarded as a measure of damages for the
unreasonable delay that Kate had endured.  This indicates that constitutional
remedies, specifically in the form of the new constitutional damages, are not a remedy
of last resort.467 It is suggested that the remedy of constitutional damages is similarly
463 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
464 Supra at page 9.
465 Supra at page 14.
466 Supra at page 15.
467 Section 38 of the 1996 Constitution.
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associated with the new expanded version of the Aquilian action.  Pausing here we
may ask the question:  “is the granting of constitutional damages a revolutionized
form of the Aquilian action?”
It was recognized in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security468 that, in principle,
monetary damages are capable of being awarded for a constitutional breach.
Delictual principles are capable of being extended to encompass state liability for the
breach of constitutional obligations, but the relief that is permitted by section 38 of
the Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only when there is no
alternative, indirect means of asserting and vindicating constitutional rights. The
judges now have the option of utilizing the common law remedy of the Aquilian
action or the remedies encompassed in section 38 of the Constitution for the
vindication of a breach of a constitutional right.  Bearing in mind that the remedy
provided must be the remedy that is appropriate and equitable in the circumstances in
order to provide an effective and efficient remedy, it is pointless to provide a remedy
that is merely a façade, which does not in substance provide that relief which the
infringed person requires in order to restore himself or herself to the position in which
he or she would have been in had the damage-causing event not occurred.469
The court, in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign470, refused to
acknowledge that the granting of a monetary order, as opposed to a mere declarative
order, would amount to an unwarranted infringement of the separation of powers.  In
fact the court enunciated that it indeed retained the power to exercise some form of
supervisory jurisdiction in order to ensure that its orders are implemented.471 In one
case the court awarded punitive interest against state respondents as a result of the
unacceptable manner in which the respondents dealt with the applicant’s application
for a social grant.472
468 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
469 This reference is obviously pointing to a delictual claim within a constitutional framework.
470 2002 5 SA 721 (CC).
471 2002 BCLR 10 1033 (CC) para 25, 26 – 39, 68 and 98 – 112.  Olivier, Okpaluba, Smit, and
Thompson (Ed’s), du Toit, Greyling, Jansen van Rensburg, Liffmann, Ogunrombi, and Porter, Social
Security Law:  General Principles (1999) 130.
472 Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another 2002 1 SA 342 (E).
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It is submitted that the remedy that was granted in Mahambehlala v Minister of the
Executive Council of Welfare, Eastern Cape and another473 was in terms of punitive
interest whereas the common law remedy of an Aquilian action has moved away from
its punitive nature towards a purely compensatory nature.  There is a possible
contradiction if one is to utilize the common law Aquilian action to provide punitive
interest due to an individual whose constitutional right has been infringed.  In such a
case a constitutional remedy would be more appropriate as it would comply with the
requirements of a constitutional remedy as discussed above whereas the requirements
of a common law remedy are in contradiction to what is being provided.  The question
remains whether a constitutional remedy should be granted at all.  The infusion of
constitutional values into delictual principles itself plays a role in protecting
constitutional rights, albeit indirectly.  Delictual principles are capable of being
extended to encompass state liability for the breach of a constitutional obligation, but
the relief permitted by section 38 of the Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, as
noted above.  There will be cases in which direct vindication of a constitutional right
is appropriate, such as a direct section 38 remedy.  Our Constitution clearly empowers
courts to be the guardians of the Constitution and to ensure that the State respects,
protects, and promotes the Bill of Rights474.
In Mahambehlala v Minister of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape and
another475 it was held that failure to consider the applicant’s application within the
reasonable time of three months and the consequent delay of five months resulted in
an unlawful and unreasonable infringement of the applicant’s fundamental right to
just administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution.  As the
common law remedies were not adequate to remedy the infringement of the
applicant’s right, Elite J held that it was necessary to fashion an appropriate remedy
and that his power to do so was to be found in section 38 of the Constitution.  He
held: 476
“In the determination of appropriate relief, it is important to bear in mind that, although
constitutional remedies will often be forward looking to ensure that the future exercise of
473 Supra.
474 1996 Constitution, section 165, 172, and 173.
475 2002 1 SA 342 (SE).
476 Supra at 355 J – 356 D.
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public power is in accordance with the principal of legality . . . they may also be backward
looking.  Moreover, in my respectful view, in order to vindicate the Constitution one should
have regard to the basic values and principles enshrined therein.  In this regard section 195(1)
of the Constitution is of importance.  It provides that public administration should be governed
by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the
maintenance of the high standard of professional ethics, the provision of services impartially,
fairly, equitably and without bias, and the necessity to respond to the needs of the people.
Bearing in mind the observation of Kriegler J in Fose’s case . . . that appropriate relief means
that which is ‘specifically fitted or suitable’, it seems to me that it would be just and equitable
for an aggrieved person in the position of the applicant to be placed in the same position
which she would have been had her fundamental right to lawful and reasonable administrative
action not been unreasonably delayed, and that relief placing her in such a position would be
appropriate as envisaged by the Constitution.”
A particularly bizarre defence raised by the respondents was that they were not
obliged to pay interest because the department had not budgeted for interest on grants.
Elite J disposed of this defense by holding that “the fact that the department of
welfare has not budgeted for the payment of interest on social grants cannot excuse it
from its obligation to pay if such interest is legally due”.477 As in Mahambehlala478,
Elite J in Mbanga479 arrived at the conclusion that at common law no claim for
interest had been established by the applicant but that interest on the arrears due to
him was appropriate relief for the infringement of the applicant’s fundamental right to
just administrative action.  He held that:
“Although the ultimate approval of the applicant’s application for a social grant resulted in it
accruing to him with effect from the date upon which he had applied for it, if the period of
thirty two months it took the second respondent to approve the application was unreasonable
and constituted a breach of the applicant’s constitutional right to lawful and reasonable
administrative action, it would be just and equitable (as envisaged by section 172(1) of the
Constitution) for the applicant to be placed in the same position in which he would have been
had his application been dealt with within a reasonable time and that an order designed to do
so would be ‘appropriate’ relief as envisaged by section 38 of the Constitution”.480
477 2002 1 SA 342 (SE) para 365C - 365D.
478 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 0327 (SE).
479 Mbanga v Member of Executive Council of Welfare Eastern Cape 2001 JDR 328.
480 Supra at 368I – 369B.
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In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies
intervening)481, the court warned against ‘overzealous judicial reform’, and
emphasized that development of the common law must take place ‘within its own
parameters’.  An alleged infringement of a fundamental right can in principle be
evaluated in a dual enquiry:  firstly enquiring whether there was a prima facie
infringement of the relevant right; and secondly, whether the infringement can be
justified by use of the limitation clause.482 The person who alleges the infringement
bears the onus of proving it.
The warning in Bernstein v Bester483 is to the effect that common law principles
cannot, as a matter of course, be applied to the interpretation of fundamental rights
and their limitation.  In terms of section 38 of the Constitution it appears that an
award of constitutional damages will only be regarded as appropriate relief if no other
effective compensatory remedy is available.484 If such a remedy is available, and here
delictual remedies in particular can often play an important role, the remedy will be
regarded as appropriate constitutional relief if it effectively vindicates the relevant
fundamental right and deters future infringements thereof.485 It is important to note
that the courts will not, mainly for reasons of public policy, readily order a
compensatory remedy in circumstances where another effective remedy is available to
the prejudiced person as appropriate relief.486 An effective remedy can include
amending a statute, judicial review of an administrative decision, an appeal against an
administrative decision, a declaratory order and an interdict (mandamus).  It is
apparent that many of the so-called ‘effective’ remedies may be of no practical use to
an individual whose right has been infringed.
A further inconsistency between the granting of constitutional damages and damages
in terms of the common law Aquilian action is that in terms of the common law in
order to grant interest the amount must be a liquidated amount whereas in terms of the
481 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) at 962.
482 In terms of section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution.
483 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) at 790.
484 Dendy v University of Witswatersrand Johannesburg 2005 5 SA 357 (W) 369; Modderklip
Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council;  President of the Republic of South Africa vs Modderklip
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) at 62.
485 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 2 BCLR 232 (W).
486 Supra.
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granting of constitutional damages the amount does not need to be liquidated.  The
legislature has, however, stepped in and section 2A of the Prescribed Rate of Interest
Act 55 of 1975 also provides for the granting of mora interest on an unliquidated debt
which at common law was not possible until the debt had been liquidated by either
agreement between the parties, by a court of law or an arbitrator.487
5.6. THE EFFECT OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
We turn now to examine the effect of the separation of powers on the amalgamation
of the delictual and constitutional damages.  The doctrine of separation of powers
requires the functions of the State to be classified as either:  legislative, executive or
judicial, and requires each function to be performed by separate branches of
government.488
In other words the functions of making law, executing the law and resolving the
disputes through the application of law should be kept separate and, in principle, they
should be performed by different institutions and persons.  The purpose of separating
functions and persons in this manner is to prevent the excessive concentration of
power in a single person or body.489 In this regard some judges of the Constitutional
Court have recognized that a delicate balance must be developed between the need, on
the one hand, to control the State by separating powers and, on the other, to avoid
defusing powers so completely that the State is unable to take timely measures in the
public interest.
A court’s approach to the application, interpretation and limitation of the Bill of
Rights and particularly to remedies for the violation of the Bill of Rights may have
serious implications for the doctrine of separation of powers.  Since the courts make
the final determination on the scope of their own powers, they have therefore
developed several mechanisms of self-restraint, which serve to prevent them from
interfering with the functions of the other branches of government.  For example, in
487 Visser, and Potgieter, Law of Damages, 2nd edition (2003) 183.  Refer to Section 3.3 above.
488 Section 8 of the 1996 Constitution.
489 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 568 - 569.
108
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal490 the Constitutional Court refused
to order the State to provide treatment to keep a critically ill patient alive.  In the
matter of Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2)491 on the other hand,
the Constitutional Court demonstrated that it will not hesitate to order monetary relief
which affects policy and has manifest cost considerations, when it reaches the
conclusion that the State has not performed its constitutional obligations diligently
and without delay.  In respect of state actors, the Bill of Rights applies directly to:
1. the common law and to legislation of the central, provincial and local
government legislators as well as to non-legislative conduct of these
legislators492,
2. administrative action which must, in addition, comply with the
criteria listed in the just administrative action right in section 33 of
the Constitution and in PAJA493,
3. conduct of the organs of state as defined in section 239 of the
Constitution,
4. conduct of the executive (deference will however be shown to
political decisions taken by the executives, particularly when
exercising the constitutional executive and Head of State powers)494,
and
5. non-lawmaking conduct of the judiciary (the conducting of trials,
administrative action).495
Under the Bill of Rights the infringement of a fundamental right by an administrator's
action would have to be authorized by legislation, if it is not, such an infringement
would be invalid.  Where the infringement of a fundamental right is authorized by
legislation it would then pass constitutional scrutiny.  Nevertheless, the
administrator’s action could still be challenged496 on the basis that the infringement
490 1998 1 SA 765 (CC).
491 2002 5 SA 721 (CC).
492 Currie, and De Waal Op cit note 489 at 49.
493 Act 3 of 2000.
494 Currie et al Loc cit note 489.
495 Ibid.
496 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 319.
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did not comply with the requirement of proportionality.497 Case law supports the
contention that where it is alleged that an infringement of a fundamental right has
taken place, the person affected has to prove the infringement of that fundamental
right.498 The onus of proof will fall to the party attempting to uphold the validity of
the administration action to prove the facts and show absence of a ground of
review.499
Section 38 of the Constitution governs remedies in cases of direct application of the
Bill of Rights.  It does so in very general terms by simply providing that a court may
grant appropriate relief for the violation or threat to fundamental rights.  The source of
constitutional remedies may be found in legislation, the common law or the
Constitution itself.  As has been found, when the target of the remedy is private or
state conduct, the source of the remedy will usually be found in the common law,
whereas when the law itself is challenged, the remedy will be derived from the
Constitution.500 Whereas the validity of conduct may be tested against the law
including the Constitution, the validity of the law itself is only tested against the
Constitution.  Like their common law counterparts, constitutional rights and their
remedies are complementary.
The nature of a constitutional remedy is determined by its objects.  The harm caused
by violating constitutional rights is not merely harm to an individual applicant, but to
society as a whole since the violation impedes the realization of the constitutional
project of creating a just and democratic society.  The object of awarding a remedy
should be, at least, to vindicate the Constitution and deter future infringements.  The
vindication is necessary because harm to constitutional rights, if not addressed, tends
to diminish the public’s confidence in the Constitution.  The judiciary bears the
burden of vindicating rights by striking effectively at the source of the infringement.
The object is to make reality more consistent with the Bill of Rights.  In general,
497 Or that any of the grounds of review in Section 6 (2) of Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3
of 2000 are present.
498 Larbi –Odam and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education and Another 1996 12
BCLR 1612 (B) 1620I; [1996] 4 All SA 185 (B) 194a – b. Minister of Education v Harris 2001 11
BCLR 1157 (CC); 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC). City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 3 BCLR 257 (CC);
1998 2 SA 363 (CC).
499 De Ville Op cit note 496 at 320.
500 This concept relates to the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights, which is explored
further in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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constitutional remedies are forward looking, community orientated and structural
rather than backward looking, individualistic or retributive.  As the Constitutional
Court held in the Metro-rail case501, private law damages claims are not always the
most appropriate method of enforcing constitutional rights.  Private law remedies tend
to be retrospective in effect, seeking to remedy loss caused rather than preventing loss
in the future.  Moreover, the use of common law remedies to claim damages to
vindicate an individual may place heavy financial burdens on the State as previously
explored.502
5.7. CONCLUSION
Section 8 (3) of the Constitution lays down guidelines to be followed by the courts
when the Bill of Rights is directly applied to private conduct but does not prescribe
any particular type of relief for private violations of fundamental rights.  Rather, the
section directs the court to consider existing legislation and the common law to find
constitutional remedies for the private violation of fundamental rights.  Section 8 (3)
of the Constitution provides that when applying the Bill of Rights to private conduct
the court must apply, or if necessary, develop the common law to the extent that
legislation does not give effect to a particular right.503 In addition, the court may
develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution.  This subsection504 clearly envisages
that a court must first seek a constitutional remedy for the private infringement of a
fundamental right in legislation, failing which the court must seek the remedy in the
existing law, failing which the court must develop the common law to give effect to
the right.  In other words, section 8 (3) of the Constitution directs a court to look for a
constitutional remedy in the ordinary law and if there is none, to develop one.505 The
process is therefore as follows:
501 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Limited t/a Metro-Rail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC).  Currie, and
De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 196.
502 As previously explored under 5.4. above. Re:  The National Education Policy Bill No. 83 of 1995
1996 3 SA 289 (CC) para 16; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) paras 17, 59;
Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Limited t/a Metro-Rail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 106.
503 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 226.
504 Section 8 (3) of the 1996 Constitution.
505 Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 190, 194, and 226.
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a) the first question to be posed is always whether the statutory or common law
remedies sufficiently address the violation of a fundamental right;
b) if not, section 8 (3) of the Constitution requires that a court must first look for
a constitutional remedy in existing legislation:
a. The starting point is to look for statutes that specifically give effect to
fundamental rights and are not unconstitutional.  If there is such a
statute, and the statutory provision is appropriate to vindicate the
fundamental right and deter its further infringement, there is no room
for development of any constitutional remedy.  The ordinary statutory
remedy then also serves as an appropriate constitutional remedy;
c) if there is no statute that gives effect to the fundamental right, then section 8
(3) directs the court to look to existing common law principles for a
constitutional remedy that does give effect to the right.  If this cannot be found
in common law principles, then the common law must be developed to give
effect to the fundamental right.  This in effect means that new common law
remedies must be created to address the private violations of fundamental
rights506.
In seeking a constitutional remedy for a violation of a fundamental right between two
individuals (horizontal violation), a court must first look at legislation, then turn to
existing common law and finally, if all else fails, develop a new common law remedy.
In awarding remedies for breach of constitutional rights, the court in effect
constitutionalizes that part of the statute, or existing common law, since, to the extent
that the statute or common law principle gives affect to the Constitution, it is to that
extent, constitutionalised.  This does not mean that statutory remedies cannot be
abolished by the legislator.  The legislator may do so, but it must then replace the
remedy with another appropriate constitutional remedy, failing which the courts will
have to do so.507
506 Id at 227.
507 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 325.
Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 227.
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It is evident that in order for common law remedies to be applicable in terms of
constitutional infringements, a relaxed approach to the fulfillment of the requirements
of a constitutional infringement as well as a common law delict is required.  It
requires that the purpose and substance of the remedy be sought as opposed to the
procedural correctness.
It is apt to conclude this Chapter with a thought from Boberg that “the merit of a rule
depends on its functional effect rather than the purity of its ancestry.”508
508 Boberg, The Law of Delict, Volume 1 (1984) 26 - 27.
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CHAPTER 6
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ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF AND OPPOSING THE AWARDING OF
MONETARY DAMAGES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
6.1. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter seeks to introduce the arguments in favour of and opposing the
provision of monetary damages for constitutional breaches.  The rationale for certain
judgments in favour of constitutional damages as well as those opposing same will be
explored.  Non-payment of social grants, including inadequate implementation of a
social security system in South Africa, is one of the more vicious breaches of the
Constitution and which has complainants proposing arguments in favour of monetary
damages; this will be explored further in the subsequent Chapter.509
We firstly turn to the exploration of arguments in favour of monetary damages for
breach of a constitutional right.
6.2.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF MONETARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
A case at hand pertinent to the research topic of this dissertation is the landmark case
of Member of the Executive Council of the Department of Welfare v Kate510, which
has been outlined in detail in Chapter 2 supra.
The real dispute in Kate’s511 appeal relates to the remainder of the interest.  Interest
during the period of delay in processing Kate’s application for a grant was claimed
and awarded as a measure of constitutional damages for the unreasonable delay that
Kate was forced to endure.512 Monetary damages for a constitutional breach have
509 Deneys Reitz Attorneys:  Legal Update no. 7, Duty To Pay Social Grant-Arrears (2008) 1.
510 2006 SCA 46 (RSA); case 580/04 pages 7 - 8.
511 Supra.
512 Within Kate’s case 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) at paragraph 69 the Court recognized that in principle
monetary damages are capable of being awarded for a breach of constitutional right.  The High Court
granted certain declaratory relief and ordered the appellant to pay the interest that had been claimed,
reported as Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004
6 SA 40 (SCA), being the case in the court a quo.
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been awarded by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and been endorsed by the
Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip
Boerdery (Pty)(Ltd).513 A further case in point is that of Jayiya v Member of the
Executive Council, Eastern Cape Provincial Government514, which makes reference
to state liability for the delay in paying of social grants.
There is nothing in the Constitution itself that prevents a court from awarding
damages as a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights.515 The jurisprudence of
the courts, more specifically that of the Constitutional Court, is not encouraging.
Constitutional remedies should in principle be forward looking, community orientated
and structural as observed from case law.516 An award of damages is historically not
a particularly forward-looking remedy.  On the contrary, it is a remedy, which
requires a court to look back to the past in order to determine how to compensate the
victim517 Despite the uneasy relationship between damages and the purpose of
constitutional remedies, there is nevertheless room for the development of damages as
a remedy for certain violations of fundamental rights.  This is so for at least two
reasons:
First, there are some situations where a declaration of invalidity or an interdict makes
little sense and an award of damages is then the only form of relief which will
vindicate the fundamental right and deter future infringements, and Secondly,
substantial awards of damages may encourage victims to be willing to litigate,
something which may serve to vindicate the Constitution and to deter further
infringements.
In Njongi v Minister of the Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern
Cape518 Njongi, the applicant, received a state disability grant until November 1997,
when it was terminated without explanation by the relevant provincial government.
Njongi re-applied for the grant and payment of the grant resumed in July 2000,
513 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 43; 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 65 -66; case 580/04 page 13 para 24.
514 Case number 264/02 [2003] SCA, unreported.
515 Case number 580/04 page 15, unreported.
516 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); 1997 17 BCLR 851.
517Currie, and De Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 219.
518 2008 4 SA 237 (CC).
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together with a part back-payment.  Four years later Njongi approached the High
Court for an order setting aside the decision to terminate her grant payment, and for
payment of the balance of arrears still owed to her.  The provincial government
argued that Njongi’s claim had prescribed.
The general principle is that a debt must be immediately enforceable before it can be
claimed.  In this case prescription should begin to run as soon as the provincial
government indicated that it will not rely on the relevant administrative action of the
termination of the grant, as from that moment the debt was immediately enforceable.
Full reinstatement of the grant may well have indicated that the State conceded that its
decision to terminate the grant was unlawful.  Njongi’s grant was never fully
reinstated, which in turn suggested that the State was still relying on the
administrative decision, which in turn indicated that prescription had not commenced.
With that being said, it is doubtful whether prescription could ever run against a debt
that is a social grant, where the debt is in respect of an obligation which the State must
perform in terms of the Constitution and where non-performance by the State
represents conduct that is in breach of the Constitution.  The Constitutional Court
reinstated the grant from November 1997, with interest, and ordered the State to pay
the costs on an attorney and client scale in the High Court, Full Bench appeal,
Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court.519
In Fose’s case520, the Court521 envisaged an amount of damages for the breaching of a
victim’s fundamental rights amongst the components of the plaintiff’s common law
claim and was satisfied that an award of this amount gave sufficient effect to the
values contained in the Bill of Rights.522
In Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape523 Jafta J held that
committal for contempt of court is competent in cases against the State, even where
the order ignored was for the payment of money, because section 3 of the State
519 2008 4 SA 237 (CC). at para 22, 28, 30, 37, and 56.
520 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) page 798.
521 Currie, and De Waal Loc cit note 517.
522 Id at 298. 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) page 798.
523 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk).
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Liability Act524 forbids ‘execution, attachment or like process’, contempt proceedings
are the only means available to compel compliance.525 A contrary interpretation, Jafta
J observed, would mean that ‘courts would be condoning and encouraging deliberate
disobedience of their order or even conduct which holds such orders in utter
contempt’.  Jafta J remarked on the paucity of authority on contempt of court against
the State, saying that this:
“…may indicate that until recently government departments complied with orders issued by
courts of law.  Therefore, in the past it … [had not been] necessary for the courts to decide the
matter.  However, the attitude of State departments towards courts’ orders has changed lately.
The number of similar applications brought before this Court has risen at an alarming rate and
regrettably that is a cause for concern”.526
Leave to appeal was refused in this matter, as was a petition for leave to the Supreme
Court of Appeal.  Despite this, Mjeni’s case was held, albeit obiter, by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in Jayiya v Minister of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern
Cape and Another527 to have been wrongly decided.  Conradie JA held that the
development of the common law to provide that organs of state who fail or refuse to
comply with orders to pay money may be committed for contempt of court, was a
‘novel’ response by the courts of the Eastern Cape to the ‘[w]holesale non-
compliance’ with court orders on the part of the Welfare Department and to the
‘laziness and incompetence which is the root of the malaise in the Eastern Cape
Department of Welfare’, but was misconceived.528 What the Supreme Court of
Appeal did not do was to consider the need to interpret the State Liability Act529 in
conformity with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, as Jafta J had
done in Mjeni’s530 case.  There is not a single word in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
judgment about the possibility that its approach may place the State above the law
when it has been ordered to pay money.  Nor does it display any real understanding of
or concern for those who are the victims of the laziness and incompetence that
524 Act 20 of 1957.
525 However, note that this principle has now been changed by Nyathi v Member of the Executive
Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng and Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development with the Centre For Constitutional Rights 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC).
526 Plasket, ‘Administrative Justice and Social Assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494 519.
527 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA).
528 Jayiya v Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) para 18.
529 Act 20 of 1957.
530 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk).
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Conradie JA rightly criticized.531 Harsh words of condemnation do not constitute a
remedy in terms of section 172 of the Constitution.  It would be cold comfort to
litigants with useless orders against the State that the common law has been
“preserved in amber”.532 The damage that this judgment does to the cause of human
rights goes beyond this issue.533
The first possible argument in favour of the awarding of monetary damages for the
infringement of a constitutional right would be the possibility of the consequence of
the award leading to greater accountability in the future by the respondent.  In the case
of the respondent being a state department, the hope is that the award would be a
deterrent for future behaviour being the same, bearing in mind that a constitutional
remedy should be forward looking.  The awarding of monetary damages, to rephrase,
could provide the motivation that is required in order to launch the State into action
(as opposed to the evident inaction) towards performing their tasks with the necessary
skill and speed that would result in a reduced number of infringements of individuals’
constitutional rights.  This motivation may be stirred further by the realisation of those
that are batho pele534 orientated that by utilising scarce resources for the payment of
monetary damages, the amount of resources remaining for the granting of necessary
grants is severely diminished thereby further prejudicing the poor and underprivileged
of our society who in effect should be protected by the rule of law.535
Secondly, it can be argued that the granting of monetary damages would restore the
harmonious balance of interest referred to in Chapter 3.536 It is argued that the
infringement of an individual’s constitutional right causes a disturbance in the
harmonious balance of interests which then requires a remedy to restore the
balance.537
531 Plasket, ‘Administrative Justice and Social Assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494:  525. Jayiya v
Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) para 18.
532 Ibid.
533 Ibid.
534 Refer to Chapter 2 of this dissertation at footnote 154.
535 Currie, and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 219.
536In particular, it is the role of the law of delict to indicate which interests are recognized by the law,
under which circumstances they are protected against infringement and how such a disturbance in the
harmonious balance of interests may be restored. Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th
edition (2010) 3.
537 Currie, and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th edition (2005) 219.
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Thirdly, it can be argued that the remedy of provision of monetary damages as
opposed to the granting of an interdict or an order of invalidity is vastly more
appropriate to the individual (as opposed to the community) who has had his or her
right infringed.  The aforementioned orders, although appropriate in certain
circumstances, may in many cases fail to remedy the situation or provide substantial
relief to the individual who has had his or her right infringed.  An order for monetary
damages goes beyond an interdict or an order of invalidity.  If the essence of the
provision of a constitutional remedy relates to its effectiveness based on the notion of
appropriateness, it is evident that in certain circumstances the granting of monetary
damages would stand as the only appropriate and effective relief or remedy for the
victim.538
Fourthly, the progress towards the provision of monetary damages is necessary in that
in certain circumstances the provision of any other remedy may be inappropriate.
Any remedy granted by the Constitutional Court must be ‘just and equitable’ and the
provision of monetary damages is at present in certain circumstances the only just and
equitable award available.539
Fifthly, it is argued that the remedies provided for in section 38 of the Constitution are
not remedies of last resort and hence should be utilized where necessary and where it
is just and equitable to do so, hence promoting the use of direct constitutional
remedies.
With reference to Chapter 2 of this dissertation it is clear that there are two further
reasons for the provision of monetary damages:
a) there is no reason why a direct breach of a substantive constitutional right
should be remedied indirectly, and
b) there is an endemic breach of rights that are now in issue and this justifies the
clear assertion of the independent existence of these rights.
538 Ibid.
539 Ibid.
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We now turn to arguments opposing monetary damages for the breach of a
constitutional right.
6.3. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING MONETARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Although there may be arguments in favour of the provision of monetary damages as
a remedy for the breach of a constitutional right, there are equally as many arguments
opposing the provision of monetary damages which the writer has identified and
extrapolated hereunder.
Firstly, the author identifies that there is the concern relating to the calculation of the
amount to be provided to the individual whose right has been infringed.  The
provision of monetary damages may amount to an inconsistency in the amounts
awarded, unless a method of calculating the amount to be awarded to the individual is
established.  At present each award is based on the judge’s discretion leading to an
inconsistency in the amounts of the awards.  In terms of a constitutional remedy the
Constitutional Court has determined that the remedy should be forward looking and
community orientated.  It can be argued that the provision of monetary damages is
traditionally in terms of delict not forward looking, but backward looking and the
provision of monetary damages to an individual cannot be said to be community
orientated, for the remedy is aimed at providing retribution to an individual.  On the
other hand, it can be argued that an award to an individual may have an impact on the
community as a whole and a deterrent value and thereby serves the values of the
Constitution.  The origin of the modern concept of patrimonial damage can be traced
back to the treatise of the prominent German jurist Mommsen in 1855.540
According to Mommsen, damage (interesse) is the difference between the present
patrimony of the plaintiff and the patrimonial position which would presently have
existed if the damage-causing event had not taken place.
540 Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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The second argument opposing the provision of monetary damages for the
infringement of an individual’s constitutional right is the possible trivialization of the
harm inflicted on the individual by equating and relating such in monetary terms.
This refers back to the first opposing argument wherein the concept of how the
calculation of the amount to be awarded would be determined.  A solid basis for the
calculation would need to be established in order for the award to be justifiable and
meaningful to the victim.  The determination of the monetary damages should not
result in a windfall for individuals in certain cases and nominal damages to others in
similar situations.  Bearing in mind that in cases where state departments are
defendants or respondents, the award of monetary damages would not have the
desired impact on the state department officials for they are not individually forced to
part with their money.  The payment of the monetary damages would be paid from the
respective department’s budget, hence the remedy may not indeed be punitive to the
department but rather to the community who are now further deprived of the much
needed finance for the processing of further grants.
On the contrary where an individual has infringed another individual’s constitutional
right, the awarding of monetary damages may indeed provide the retributive effect
desired by the remedy.  If the infringer has a large cash flow base available the
desired effect may not be felt as desired, as those who are rich would not hurt to part
with a little.  It could be argued that the infringer’s relative wealth should be taken
into account in order that the award would provide the desired result in that the
infringer would be adequately ‘punished’.  If this be the case it would clearly result in
a further anomaly in the amounts awarded to the victim based on the financial
viability of the infringer.  This would leave the infringed individual begging the
question, “why is my right worth less than another’s right?”
The third opposing argument relates to delict and poses the question ‘does a monetary
award cancel out the wrongfulness of the act performed by the infringer in the
delictual sense, since monetary awards have emanated from our common law
remedies?’  Once the community is led to believe that wrongfulness is cancelled out
by wealth, lawlessness will rule and the rule of law will become futile.  The judiciary
will be left powerless but to award even larger quantums of damages.
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The fourth opposing argument for the provision of monetary damages is the possible
consequence that this forward movement of the provision of such awards may have
on awards in the future.  In a sense the provision of monetary damages as a remedy
for a constitutional breach would open the door for the provision of monetary
damages for the breach of a right which did not result in patrimonial loss, resulting in
further questions related to the valuing of one’s rights. An expectation of benefits, as
for example the benefit of a social assistance grant, is the legally recognized
expectation of a person to acquire patrimonial rights or benefits in the future (through
which his patrimony will be enhanced, in other words once his or her application for
the social assistance grant has been approved) or the recognized expectation that his
patrimony will not diminish.  Such an expectation may be so ‘convincing’ that the law
recognizes and protects it by awarding damages if it has been infringed, such as in the
delay of receiving a social assistance grant.541 An expectation must meet certain
general requirements, which were explored supra at Section 3.3.542
The fifth opposing argument begs the question that the judiciary will be required to
answer in the future when the financial well is depleted and claims for damages
become exceedingly inflated is “Where will the line be drawn?”  The provision of
monetary damages tends towards the reviving of the penal nature of awards as
opposed to the compensatory nature for which the award is required.  The awarding of
constitutional damages is traditionally, as per the Constitutional Court543,
compensatory in nature and not penal.  The answer to the above question will be
based on the calculation referred to in the first opposing argument.  As discussed
earlier, the provision of monetary damages is at present left to the discretion of the
judges.  This is a powerful tool which at present is open to potential abuse until such
time as constraints and checks and balances are provided to counteract the power of
541 Visser, and Potgieter, Law of Damages (1993) 48.
542 Id at 50 -51.  From the above general requirements of an expectation it is evident that the applicant
in Kate’s case 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Welfare Department v Kate 2006 SCA 46 RSA had a legitimate
expectation of additional patrimony in her estate by the granting of a social grant as do many other
applicants who seek a social grant from the government in that the law provides for the expectation of a
social grant, the applicant complies with the requirements for a social grant thereby providing a
sufficient degree of probability that the expectation of a social grant would be realised, the social grant
has a monetary value and the expectation of a social grant does not contain an illegal element.
543 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA
and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 6 SA 40; Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare,
Eastern Cape 2008 4 SA 237 (CC).
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the discretion currently available.  As noted above, the tool of a formula to calculate
the amount to be awarded could act as a check to the unrestricted power of the judges.
The awarding of monetary damages by the judiciary, particularly in the Constitutional
Court, directing the executive to distribute finances in a specific manner results in the
judiciary directing the way in which the executive distributes state resources and is
thus beyond the scope of the judicial function and thereby threatens the separation of
powers specifically provided for in the Constitution.  The judiciary is usually an elite
and undemocratically appointed branch of the State and lacks the democratic
legitimacy required to decide social resource division.544
The sixth opposing argument indicates that the judiciary could compromise the
separation of powers by providing monetary damages, which is the function of the
executive, and thereby jeopardizing the legitimacy of South Africa’s democracy.
The seventh opposing argument analyses the awarding of a department’s valuable
scarce resources to an individual for an infringement of his or her constitutional right,
which may result in less available resources for the community in general and may not
necessarily answer the dire problem of continued infringement of constitutional rights
by the State.  The provision of monetary damages may in fact merely result in
squandering valuable resources with no guarantee that further infringements will not
occur as the administration is not compelled to ‘get its house in order’.545
The eighth opposing argument to the provision of monetary damages is that the State
may in fact be unable to pay the damages or may be unwilling to pay such damages,
leaving the applicant in a situation where he or she would be compelled to proceed
further against the defendant or respondent in order to vindicate his or her right.546
In Somyani v Minister of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and
Another547 Froneman J commenced his judgment by observing that there were forty-
one cases on the motion court roll in which the failure of officials of the Department
544 Refer to Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
545 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); 1997 7 BCLR 851.
546 Refer to 7.1.5. below for a further discussion on proceeding against the State.
547 SECLD case 1144/01 unreported judgment undated.
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of Welfare to do their work was the main issue.  While most, he said, ‘had to do with
the lack of giving proper attention to the consideration of social grants’, three of the
cases had ‘proceeded to the point where the respondents were called upon to show
cause why they should not be committed to prison for contempt of court because of
their failure to give heed to court orders’.  Of these, agreements had been reached on
how to proceed in two, but in Somyani’s case548 no agreement had been reached.
Froneman J described the case as not being an isolated incident of maladministration,
stating that other courts had commented ‘on the provincial administration’s tardiness
in complying with its constitutional and legislative duties’.  Froneman J held that if
the State chose to flout the rule of law by disobeying court orders, ‘there is not much
that the courts can do about it, except to continue to act in terms of the Constitution.
But those who disregard court orders must then know that they are destroying the
constitutional democracy that enables them to govern’.549
Froneman J commented again on the failure of the respondent to obey an order in
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza.550 In this case
Froneman J had earlier ordered the respondents to reinstate the disability grants of
three applicants with effect from the date of cancellation, to pay them within two
weeks and to pay interest.  They had complied with most of the order, but refused to
pay interest of about R250.00.  Shortly before Froneman J was to deal with the issue,
the respondents’ counsel and their attorney paid the interest from their own pockets,
thus saving their clients from exposure to committal for contempt of court.  Froneman
J stated that obedience to court orders is ‘fundamental to any constitutional
democracy of the kind we aspire to’.551
The cases that have dealt with the failure of officials to comply with court orders, and
those that contain adverse comments on the inefficiency of those who are required to
administer the social assistance system, raise two sets of opposing issues.  The failure
to comply with court orders raises squarely the responsibility of the judiciary to
ensure that the Constitution is not relegated to the status of an interesting but useless
548 Supra.
549 SECLD case 1144/01 unreported judgment undated at para 3, 20, and 26.  Plasket, ‘Administrative
Justice and Social Assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494 520.
550 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA).
551 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) at paragraphs 2, and 10.
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manifesto of aspirations separated from reality.  The most immediate challenges set
before the judiciary by the cases discussed, and their like in the future, lie, first in the
development of appropriate remedies that will ensure that the rights of individuals are,
in fact respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled; and secondly, in displaying the
necessary courage to strike effectively at constitutional infringements, even if that
may involve crossing swords with the executive from time to time.  Nothing less
should be expected of courts empowered by the Constitution, they are, after all, meant
to act as “buttresses between the executive and its subjects”.552
In Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Gauteng and
Another553 the applicant sought a declaratory order that section 3 of the State Liability
Act554 is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  It was
held that section 3 of the State Liability Act555 was incompatible with sections 34, 165
(5) and 195 (1) (f) of the Constitution.  Section 3 of the Act was unconstitutional in
placing the State and its officials above the law and beyond the very orders which
should bind it or hold it accountable.  The blanket ban contained in section 3 of the
Act constituted a material limitation of the right of access to the courts and the
consequent right to have the effects of such successful access implemented.  The court
accordingly issued the declarator sought.
The judgment by Davis J was prompted by the dire situation of Nellmapius resident
Dingaan Nyathi, who was embroiled in a legal battle with the Gauteng Member of the
Executive Council of Health.  Nyathi was claiming R1.4 million in damages after a
central venous line was incorrectly inserted into his artery when he was admitted to
the Pretoria Academic Hospital in August 2002 with burn wounds after a burning
paraffin stove was thrown at him.  Nyathi, who suffered burns to his thorax, abdomen,
both forearms and legs, was admitted to the hospital for treatment, where a central
venous line was incorrectly inserted.  He was transferred to the Kalafong Hospital
552 Plasket, ‘Administrative Justice and Social Assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494 523.
553 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC).
554 Section 3 of Act 20 of 1957 states:  “No execution, attachment or like process shall be issued against
the defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings or against any property of the State, but
the amount, if any, which may be required to satisfy any judgment or order given or made against the
nominal defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings may be paid out of the National
Revenue Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund, as the case may be.
555 Ibid.
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where there was a failure to timeously diagnose the incorrect insertion of the central
venous line.  As a result of both the incorrect insertion of the central venous line and
the subsequent omission by the medical personnel at the two hospitals, he suffered a
stroke and became paralyzed on the left side of his body.  The Member of the
Executive Council initially denied liability, but later conceded the merits of the case.
The court initially ordered that the Member of the Executive Council make an interim
payment of R317 000 to Nyathi so that he could pay his medical and other expenses.
In spite of promises to pay, no money was forthcoming.  The State attorney, shortly
before the court proceedings, again promised to pay, but failed on this promise.
Despite being notified about the application, the State failed to be at court to defend
the matter.  Davis J stated in his judgment that the State had a “moral obligation”
regarding public administration.  The learned judge stated in this case the State failed
in aiding the applicant to prepare for the second leg of his court action.  It had thus
prejudiced his rights to access the courts as enshrined in the Constitution.  The
Constitution also stipulated that court orders bind people and organs of state.  “It is
thus clear that the State Liability Act556 is inconsistent with the Constitution,” Davis J
said.  Davis J stated that the State disregarded a court order and deserved a punitive
costs order against it, which he awarded.557
On the 2nd of June 2008 the Constitutional Court confirmed that section 3558 of the
State Liability Act559 is inconsistent with the Constitution.  The majority of the
Constitutional Court found that the section unjustifiably limits the right to equal
protection of the law and is inconsistent with the Constitutional protection of dignity
and the right of access to Courts.  It also violated the principles of judicial authority
and the principle that public administration be held accountable.  The Court
suspended the order for twelve months to allow Parliament to pass legislation to
provide an effective means of enforcement of money judgments against the State.560
556 Ibid.
557 Case CCT 19/07 [2008] ZACC 8 para 7 - 10.  Media Summary, Nyathi v MEC, Department of
Health, Gauteng & another [2007] JOL 19612 (T), [dated: 30 March 2007], page 1.
558 Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng & another [2008]
ZACC 8 (CCT19/07) para 53 – 60, and 79.  Section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 prohibits
execution against, or attachment of State property to satisfy judgments debts of the State.
559 Act 20 of 1957.
560 The Court was also critical of the fact that the State had not settled approximately 200 judgment
debts outstanding and ordered the State to provide details of all outstanding judgment debts and a plan
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In a dissenting judgment, Langa CJ and Mpati AJ concurring, Nkabinde J held that
section 3 of the Act561 does not violate the right of access to courts.  Regarding the
equality challenge, she concluded that the differentiation in section 3 of the Act562 is
rationally related to the important governmental purpose of preventing disruption of
public service and thus that section 9 (1) of the Constitution was not infringed.  She
found that, although the applicant contended that there was nothing he could lawfully
do to enforce compliance with the judgment debt, the common law remedy of
mandamus563 was available to him.  While Nkabinde J stressed that the non-
compliance by state officials with court orders is unacceptable and cannot be
tolerated, she commented that such non-compliance cannot be said to have had the
effect that the impugned section rendered them immune from complying with their
constitutional injunctions.  She said that the problem was due to the public
administration’s inefficiency and mismanagement which could not be resolved by
striking down the provision.  Accordingly, she would have refused to confirm the
declaration of constitutional invalidity but would support the further relief suggested
by Madala J.564
In the end result, the following order was handed down by Madala J:
a) the order of constitutional invalidity made by the Pretoria High Court was
confirmed in the following terms:
Section 3 of the Act565 is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution to
the extent that it does not allow for execution or attachment against the State
and that it does not provide for an express procedure for the satisfaction of
judgment debts.
for speedy settlement thereof. Media Summary, Nyathi v MEC, Department of Health, Gauteng &
another [2007] JOL 19612 (T), [dated: 30 March 2007], page 1.
561 Act 20 of 1957.
562 Ibid.
563 A mandatory interdict is where one seeks to force an administrator to perform a statutory duty or to
cure a state of affairs brought about by illegal actions.  The remedy of mandamus has the capacity to be
effective where there is a breach by a public official of a duty that is imposed by a statute or the
Constitution.  In most cases that is sufficient without an additional remedy of damages.  The courts
have also introduced the use of structural interdicts – compelling the violator to perform in a structured
manner and to report intermittently to an appointed authority.  This remedy is more difficult to enforce
than the prohibitory interdict.
564 Case CCT 19/07 [2008] ZACC 8 para 117 – 122 and 152.
565 Act 20 of 1957.
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b) the declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of twelve months to
allow Parliament to pass legislation that provides for the effective enforcement
of court orders.566
Opposing argument number nine poses the question ‘from where will the monetary
damages be financed?’  The logical answer would be from the tax payer’s money, in
order to pay the damages the necessity may arise for the increase of tax resulting in
the poor being further deprived.
In light of the nine opposing arguments outlined above, it is evident that there are
numerous arguments opposing the granting of monetary damages.  Bearing this in
mind, it would be sensible to look to other delictual remedies which are currently
available before utilizing the monetary damages remedy, bearing in mind the time
constraints on proceeding against the State.567
The public law action for constitutional damages has the following objectives in
addition to the objective of compensation of the victim.  Firstly, the vindication of the
fundamental right itself so as to promote the values of an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality and respect for human rights.  Secondly, the deterrence
and prevention of future infringements of fundamental rights by the legislative and
executive organs of state at all levels of government and finally, the punishment of
those organs of state whose officials have infringed fundamental rights in a
particularly erroneous fashion.568
566 Case CCT 19/07 [2008] ZACC 8 para 91.
567 In Madinda v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 4 SA 312 (SCA) Madinda alleged that she was
unlawfully arrested, detained and assaulted by unidentified members of the South African Police
Service on 11 September 2004.  Section 3(2)(a) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain
Organs of State Act, 2002 required that a notice be sent to the National Commissioner of Madinda’s
intention to sue the State by 11 March 2005. The notice was only sent on the 19th of August 2005.
The notice was rejected as not complying with the Act.  Madinda then sought condonation of her
failure to have served the notice timeously.
The phrase “if the court is satisfied” in section 3(4)(b) of the Act does not require proof on a balance of
probabilities, but rather the overall impression made on a court which brings a fair mind to the facts set
up by the parties.  “Good cause” means that all the factors must be considered which bear on the proper
administration of justice.  These factors include the prospects of success in the proposed litigation, the
reasons for the delay, the sufficiency of the explanation offered, the bona fides of the applicant, any
contribution by other persons to the delay, and the applicant’s own responsibility for the delay.  The
court applied these factors to the specific facts of the case and granted condonation.
568 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 190.
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In light of Fose’s case569, it is submitted that the following is the position in respect of
damages in constitutional cases.  In cases where the violation of constitutional rights
entails the commission of a delict against the victim, a claim for delictual damages
will be available.  A claim for damages in addition to those available under the law of
delict (delictual claim) does not automatically flow from a breach of constitutional
rights.  Such constitutional damages will have to be an appropriate remedy.  As with
all other constitutional remedies, an appropriate remedy is one suitable to vindicate
the constitutional right infringed and deter future violations.  It appears from Fose’s
case570 that the court is unlikely to award punitive damages for the violation of
fundamental rights.  Ackerman J stated, for the majority, that ‘an appropriate remedy
must mean an effective remedy’.  He added that in a country where571 so few have the
means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential that on those occasions
when the legal process does establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has
occurred, it be effectively vindicated.
The aforementioned statements are overshadowed by the negative attitude toward
punitive damages that permeates the rest of the majority opinion.  Even in
circumstances where delictual damages are not available, constitutional damages will
not necessarily be awarded for a violation of human rights.572
Even the most ardent supporters of constitutional remedies draw attention to
inconsistent and unsatisfactory features of a constitutional damages remedy aimed at
punishment or deterrence. It has been suggested that to give punitive damages the
primary focus runs counter to the Anglo-Canadian tradition, which favours calculated
compensatory damages.  The deterrent effect of any damage award is difficult to
assess, since the empirical evidence of the deterrent impact is only evident by its
absence.573 Where punitive damages are awarded against the State it is almost
inevitable that the costs involved will be shifted to the public at large.574
569 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
570 Supra.
571Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); 1997 7 BCLR 851 para 72, 69 and 71.
De Waal et al Loc cit note 568.
572 De Waal et al Op cit note 568 at 191. Supra Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
573 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 169.
574 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 65.
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Nothing has been produced or referred to within Fose’s case or elsewhere which tends
to lead to the conclusion that punitive damages against the State will serve as a
significant deterrent against individual or general repetitions of the infringements.575
Nothing in South Africa’s recent history, where substantial awards for death and
brutality in detention were awarded or agreed to, suggests that this had any
preventative effect.  Further, to make nominal punitive awards will, if anything,
trivialize the right involved and hence for awards to have any conceivable deterrent
effect against the State they will have to be very substantial and, the more substantial
they are the greater the anomaly that a single plaintiff receives a windfall of such a
magnitude.576 While punitive awards may lead to systematic change, the process
might well be a slow one requiring a substantial number of such awards before change
is induced, which the State is reluctant to institute of its own accord; equitable relief
on the other hand could achieve such change far more speedily and cheaply.577
6.4. CONCLUSION
This Chapter has explored the five arguments in favour of monetary damages for
breach of a constitutional right as well as the nine arguments opposing the provision
of monetary damages for breach of a constitutional right.
While officials of the Department of Welfare in the Eastern Cape are not the only
officials who are ignoring court orders, they appear to lead the way in ignoring or
failing to comply with court orders.  This disturbing state of affairs has been
commented on by various judges in the province and has been explored in depth in
Chapter two above.  The extent of the problem is illustrated by the fact that in one
matter in the Eastern Cape Division orders to commit the Member of the Executive
Council for Welfare, her Permanent Secretary, her legal advisor and one other official
were sought in respect of non-compliance with 43 orders.578 In the South Eastern
Cape Local Division, orders have been granted to direct the political or administrative
575 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); 1997 7 BCLR 851 para 58, 60, 68, and 74.
576 Ibid.
577 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); 1997 7 BCLR 851para 58, 60, 68, and 74.
578 Booi v Jajula; Mnto v Jajula ECD cases 431/99 and 433/99 unreported judgment undated.  These
matters were settled when the respondents eventually purged their contempt.
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heads of the Departments of Welfare to show cause why they should not be
committed for contempt in 69 matters between April 2001 and 20 February 2002.579
Usually, committal for contempt of court is not a competent remedy for the failure or
refusal of a party to comply with an order for the payment of money.  In such cases
the aggrieved party’s remedy is to execute against the debtors property.  Committal
for contempt of court is a competent remedy when the order that has not been obeyed
is for the doing of an act or the prohibition of the doing of an act.580
From this Chapter it is evident that although there are positive arguments to the
proposition of granting constitutional damages, there are equally as many negative
arguments opposing the granting of such damages.  In this regard, it is submitted that
it is useful to consider the following elements when determining which appropriate,
effective, just and equitable remedy to award:
a) the nature and importance of the right in issue,
b) the alternative remedies available, and
c) the consequences of the breach for the claimant.
Monetary damages in the form of delictual common law damages are available for the
breach of a constitutional right provided the infringement complies with all the
requirements of a delictual remedy and is not granted in addition to another remedy.
However, as to whether such a remedy is appropriate, just, equitable and effective will
only be determined by considering points a) to c) above in each circumstance.
579 Plasket, ‘Administrative Justice and Social Assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494 517 - 518.
580 Id at 518.
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THE CONCEPT OF REMEDIES IN GENERAL AND ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIES TO MONETARY DAMAGES
This Chapter will firstly discuss the concept of remedies in general before providing
an overview of possible rational alternative remedies to monetary damages for
constitutional breaches and will examine the possible consequences of such
alternatives.
7.1. THE CONCEPT OF REMEDIES IN GENERAL
7.1.1. DIRECT AND INDIRECT APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
We commence this Section with a brief recapping of the direct and indirect
application of the Bill of Rights as more fully discussed in Section 4.2.1.1 above.
The ‘indirect application’ of the Bill of Rights entails the resolving of a dispute by
interpreting a statute or developing the common law so as to promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.581 When the Bill of Rights is applied
directly, the question is whether there is any inconsistency between the Bill of Rights
and the law or conduct which governs the issue in question.  If there is inconsistency
between the Bill of Rights and the law or conduct, the law or conduct unjustifiably
violates the Bill of Rights and a ‘constitutional remedy’ must be given to the
applicant.  Section 38 of the Constitution governs remedies in cases of direct
application of the Bill of Rights and it does so in a general sense.582
From the outset it is imperative to emphasize the consequences of the principle583 that,
wherever possible, constitutional issues should be avoided.  A consequence of the
principle is that ordinary (non-constitutional) legal remedies must be exhausted before
constitutional relief may be sought.  This means that the indirect application of the
Bill of Rights must be considered before direct application is considered in any given
circumstance.  This further explains why constitutional arguments usually feature
581 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 4th edition (2001) 167.
582Ibid.
583 As noted above in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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little in areas where the principles of common law are well developed and flexible, as
for example, in most areas of private law.584 If development of the law is necessary,
the indirect application of the Bill of Rights would usually be the appropriate
mechanism to ensure that the law gives proper effect to the values contained in the
Bill of Rights.  Direct application of the Constitution is more significant where the
common law is underdeveloped, or unmistakably unconstitutional.585
Although the principle of avoidance of constitutional issues favours indirect over
direct application, it should be borne in mind that the aim of indirect application
differs from direct application.  The purpose of indirect application is to give effect to
the values of the Bill of Rights through the interpretation of legislation or the
development of the common law in a manner that gives effect to the rights protected
and enshrined in the Bill of Rights.  Indirect application is thus an attempt to enforce
the Bill of Rights through the common law and by way of ordinary legal remedies.  It
is apparent that ordinary legal remedies may not always be appropriate to enforce the
Bill of Rights.586
7.1.2. AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES
The availability of constitutional remedies is firstly a matter of jurisdiction.  The
Constitution limits the subject-matter competence and the remedial competence of
some courts.  For example, not all courts are competent to grant the remedies listed in
section 172 of the Constitution.  Generally speaking, the Magistrate’s courts and other
statutory courts have limited jurisdiction to apply the Bill of Rights directly and have
limited jurisdiction to grant constitutional remedies.587
584 De Waal et al Op cit note 581 at 168.
585 Ibid, such as parts of the pre-1994 law of criminal procedure.
586 Ibid.
587 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 4th edition (2001) 196.  Sections 167(3),
168(3), 169, 172 and 173 of the 1996 Constitution referred to Supra in footnote 248.
Section 170 of the 1996 Constitution:
“Magistrates’ Courts and all other courts may decide any matter determined by an Act of Parliament,
but a court of a status lower than a High Court may not enquire into or rule on the constitutionality of
any legislation or any conduct of the President.”
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In Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape588, Kriegler J stated, “Our flexibility
in providing remedies may affect our understanding of the right”.589 This statement
means that, because South African courts have a wide discretion to fashion an
appropriate constitutional remedy, they are less likely to be deterred from finding a
violation of the right.  Courts would be more hesitant to find a violation of a right in
situations where there is no appropriate remedy for the violation, or where the
Constitution dictates an inappropriate remedy for the violation of a fundamental right.
7.1.3. STAGES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS LITIGATION
Kriegler J’s statement in the Sanderson case590 discussed under Section 7.1.2. above
further indicates that similar considerations are sometimes taken into account at
various stages of fundamental rights litigation, in other words the appropriateness of
the remedy.
The following are the stages of fundamental rights litigation:
1. Firstly, ‘application’ is about whether and how the rights in the Bill of Rights
apply in legal disputes591
2. Secondly, ‘interpreting’ or defining the rights in the Bill of Rights is the task
of describing what the rights mean in an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, freedom and equality, and
3. Thirdly, limiting rights is determining which deviations from the standards set
by the Bill of Rights for law and conduct are justified in the circumstances,
and
4. Lastly, ‘remedies’ are about what can be done if an unjustifiable violation of
rights has occurred.592
588 1998 2 SA 38 (CC).
589 Supra para 27.
590 Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 2 SA 38 (CC).
591 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 4th edition (2001) 196.
592 Id at 170.
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As Kriegler J again stated in Fose’s case593, when the courts award a remedy in
constitutional cases, they ‘attempt to synchronize the real world with the ideal
construct of the constitutional world created in the image of [the supremacy
clause]’.594 The 1996 Constitution is premised on the principles of constitutional
supremacy and justiciability, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. Ubi ius ibi remedium595 – poses the
question, “what remedies are there for a breach of the supreme law, or a failure to
fulfill the obligations imposed by it?”596
Firstly, a government that disobeys the Constitution may be exposed to political
sanctions – it may suffer a loss of popularity and may ultimately be voted out of
office.  A justiciable Constitution provides an additional and more immediate legal
sanction:  the government may be taken to court.  It may be prohibited from
undertaking the unconstitutional conduct or mandated to correct a failure to carry out
constitutional obligations.  A law that breaches the Constitution can be declared
invalid and unenforceable.597
An allegation of inconsistency between law or conduct and the Constitution provides
the cause of action in all constitutional cases.  Without such an allegation, there is no
constitutional issue that arises in the case.  The courts resolve disputes between the
parties before it and award constitutional remedies.  While the cause of action is
always found in the violation of a provision of the Constitution, constitutional
remedies may be found in the Constitution itself, in other legislation, statutes, or the
common law.  When the target of the remedy is private or state conduct, the source of
the remedy will often be found in the common law.  When legislation is challenged,
on the other hand, the Constitution itself usually provides the most suitable
remedies.598 Despite their disparate sources, there are only four major types of
constitutional remedies.  These are, firstly, a declaration of invalidity, secondly, a
prohibitory interdict, thirdly, a mandatory interdict and fourthly, an award of
593 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
594 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); 1997 7 BCLR 851 para 94.  De Waal et
al Op cit note 591 at 171.
595 Literally meaning:  ‘where there is a right there must be a remedy’.
596 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 286.
597 Ibid.
598Ibid.
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damages.  Of the four, a declaration of invalidity is unusual in the sense that it is not a
discretionary remedy.  The consequence of constitutional supremacy is that law or
conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid.  Section 172(1) of the
Constitution provides that when deciding a constitutional matter a court must declare
that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the
extent of its inconsistency.599
While it is mandatory, the declaration of invalidity is not the only remedy that a court
may give.  Section 172 of the Constitution goes on to provide that, in addition to the
mandatory declaration of invalidity, a court ‘may make any order that is just and
equitable’.600 In addition thereto, section 38 of the Constitution provides that a court
may award ‘appropriate relief’ for a violation of the Bill of Rights.601 This is because,
to correct inconsistencies between law or conduct and the Constitution, a declaration
of invalidity may not be enough, or may even be inappropriate.  It is often also
necessary to control the effects of invalidity.  Occasionally, it may be necessary to add
to the effects of invalidity and on other occasions to subtract from them.  An interdict
as well as damages may be awarded in addition to a declaration of invalidity, and the
effect or impact of a declaration of invalidity may be controlled in a number of
ways.602
It is imperative to explore the recent advances and judgments handed down that affect
the possible remedies available to a litigant for the infringement of their constitutional
599 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 287.
600 The 1996 Constitution.
601 Ibid.
602 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 287.
Supremacy of the 1996 Constitution means that laws or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution are
invalid and that the courts must declare them to be so.  But constitutional supremacy does not require
the invalidation of provisions in a statute that are constitutional and valid if they can be severed from
the unconstitutional and invalid provisions.  Nor does it require immediate invalidation if the resulting
situation would be more unconstitutional than the existing one.  This is why the courts are granted
powers ‘to regulate the impact of a declaration of invalidity.’  This is achieved by:  severing the
unconstitutional provisions in legislation from the constitutional ones; by reading in words into
legislation; by controlling the retrospective effects of a declaration of invalidity and by temporarily
suspending a declaration of validity.  Section 172 of the 1996 Constitution states that:
“(1)  When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including –
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.”
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rights.  Therefore, under Sections 7.1.4. and 7.1.5. below we explore the decision of
Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng,
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development with the Centre for Constitutional
Rights603 relating to the declaration of invalidity of section 3 of the State Liability
Act604 and the procedure to follow when proceeding against the State.
7.1.4. NYATHI v MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, GAUTENG, MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT WITH THE CENTRE
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS605
Madala J for the Constitutional Court states that Davis AJ sitting in the Pretoria High
Court made the following order in favour of the applicant on the 30th of March 2007:
1. The following portion of section 3 of the State Liability Act606 is declared
inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid:  “No execution,
attachment or like process shall be issued against a defendant or a respondent
in any such action or proceedings or against the property of the State... [But
the amount, if any, which may be required to satisfy any judgment or order
given or made against the nominal defendant or respondent in any such action
or proceedings may be paid out of the National Revenue Fund or a Provincial
Revenue Fund as the case may be].”
2. The first respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application on the scale
as between attorney and client, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.607
In terms of section 172(2) (a) of the Constitution, an order of constitutional invalidity
in the High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal has no force or effect unless it has
603 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC).
604 Act 20 of 1957.
605 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8.
606 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 1.  Act 20 of
1957.
607 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 1.
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been confirmed by the Constitutional Court and therefore the confirmation of the
abovementioned order was sought by the applicant in the Constitutional Court.608
At the time the application was made, the applicant was permanently disabled and
unemployed.  The applicant died on the 4th of July 2007, before the matter was heard
on an urgent basis in the Constitutional Court.609
7.1.4.1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts giving rise to the application and judgment of the Constitutional Court are
set out above at pages 125 to 128.
The failure of the applicable state department to comply with the court order
compelled the applicant to lodge an application before the High Court on the 21st of
February 2007.  The application was in compliance with the provisions of Uniform
Rule 10A of the High Court610, in which the applicant joined the Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development.  An order was sought in the following terms:
1. (It) is declared that section 3 of the State Liability Act611 is inconsistent
with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
2. First respondent is ordered to comply with the court order dated the 22nd of
November 2006 within three days of the order, failing which the applicant
may approach this Court on these same documents, amplified where
necessary, for an order declaring the first respondent to pay in contempt of
court an order committing the first respondent to jail for a period of ninety
days.
608 Supra para 2.
609 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 4.
610 Rule 10A of the Uniform Rules of Court state “if in any proceedings before the court, the
constitutional validity of a law is challenged, the party challenging the validity of the law shall join the
provincial or national executive authorities responsible for the administration of the law and the
proceedings.”
611 Act 20 of 1957.
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3. Costs of suit on a scale as between attorney and own client.612
The High Court stated that as the judgment for interim payment in favour of the
applicant was one sounding in money, the appropriate remedy would have been to
levy execution and not proceed with contempt proceedings.  The court pointed out
that this was precluded by section 3 of the Act.613 Madala J for the Constitutional
Court added that the section would perhaps only apply for declaration of unlawfulness
or a finding of contempt but with no real further enforceability, such as committal.
Madala J considered the Crown Liabilities Act614, the predecessor of the State
Liability Act615, and also considered the relevant case law.  He found the case law to
be equally applicable to the Act616 and held that both pieces of legislation merely
placed a moral obligation on the State to satisfy judgment debts.617
The High Court found that section 34, 165(5) and 195(1) (F) of the Constitution had
been violated.  It observed that the blanket ban on State liability in section 3 of the
Act618 constitutes a material limitation of the right to access to courts and the
consequent right to have the effects of successful access implemented.619
Madala J notes that Davis J relied on the reasoning of Froneman J in Kate’s620 case,
namely, that section 3 of the State Liability Act621 forbids orders ensuring compliance
of the State with court orders, effectively this ensures that this section622 places the
State above the law insofar as the binding nature of court orders are concerned.  Such
a reading would make section 3623 unconstitutional and a clear violation of section
165(5) of the Constitution. 624
612 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 19.
613 Act 20 of 1957.
614 Act 1 of 1910. 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para
16, 23 and 107.
615 Act 20 of 1957.
616 Ibid.
617 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 16, 23 and 107.
618 Ibid.
619 Nyathi v MEC for the Department of Health, Gauteng and Another, 26014/2005 TPD, 20 March
2007 (unreported), [2007] JOL 19612 (T) para 13 and 19. 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC;
Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 page 11.
620 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
621 Act 20 of 1957.
622 Section 3 of Act 20 of 1957.
623 Ibid.
624 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 24.
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As the order of the High Court declared invalid a provision of an Act of parliament
the applicant approached the Constitutional Court for confirmation of that order.  The
applicant’s main submission was that section 3 of Act 20 of 1957 was
unconstitutional because it prevented the attachment of assets of the State despite a
court order and therefore should be struck down as being invalid.  The applicant also
submitted that it was not appropriate or effective to enforce a contempt order against a
nominal defendant.  It was asserted that execution is the most appropriate and
effective remedy.  In terms of the attachment of assets of the State, the applicants
submitted that concerns about the attachment of essential assets of the State would be
allayed by the fact that there would be mechanisms put in place to ensure that
essential assets are not attached.625
7.1.4.2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S FINDINGS
The first respondent submitted in their defence that section 3626 did not violate the
constitutional principle and that orders and decisions of court bind all persons
including organs of state.  The section only provided that the normal means of
execution were not applicable to cases where the provincial or the national
government was a judgment creditor.  They [the respondents] submitted further that it
would be highly prejudicial to the pubic interest should the assets of the State be
attached or sold in execution of a judgment debt.  The respondents further submitted
that section 3627 had to be read together with the Public Finance Management Act (as
amended)628, which was designed to regulate financial management in the national
and provincial government together with treasury instructions, which represented an
important statutory recognition of the need for the national and provincial
governments to comply with court orders promptly.  They submitted that section 3629
expressly authorized payment of a judgment debt sounding in money out of the
national funds, and further, that in any event, there were other remedies available to
625 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 25.
626 Act 20 of 1957.
627 Ibid.
628 Act 1 of 1999.
629 Act 20 of 1957.
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an aggrieved applicant such as monetary orders, committal for contempt of court and
a claim for damages.  They further argued that in the event of non-compliance of a
court order by an organ of state such non-compliance could be reported to the Auditor
General or the Public Protector who had powers to investigate complaints regarding
any alleged mal-administration or improper conduct or undue influence by persons
performing a public function.630 The Constitutional Court’s finding is indicated above
under 7.1.4.1. and judgment was ordered after consideration of the respondent’s
argument which is outlined here.631
Madala J notes that in De Lange v Smuts NO & others632, Ackerman J stated the
following concerning the obligation of the State to assist persons to enforce civil
claims against debtors:
“In a constitutional democratic state, which ours now certainly is, and under the rule of law (to
the extent that this principle is not entirely subsumed under the concept of the constitutional
state) citizens as well as non-citizens are entitled to rely upon the State for the protection and
enforcement of their rights.  The State therefore assumes the obligation of assisting such
persons to enforce their rights, including the enforcement of their civil claims against
debtors.”633
The courts have referred to the obligations of the State to pay its debt as a moral
obligation and one which should, as a consequence of being elected to power, be
exercised in the interests of maintaining confidence in its rule.  This reliance on the
moral obligation of the State to pay its debts is no longer acceptable, as it has proven
to be unproductive and has revealed the State's inability or refusal to abide by its own
moral standards.  Hence, we need legislative measures that will provide an effective
way in which judgment orders may be satisfied, and mechanisms that will inform the
litigants in detail on the procedures that they will need to follow regarding payment of
court orders against the State.  It has become necessary for this court to oversee its
process of compliance with court orders and to ensure ultimately that compliance is
630 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 page 15.
631 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC; Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 para 28 – 30.
632 [1998] ZACC 6; 1998 3 SA 785 (CC); 1998 7 BCLR 779 (CC) para 31.
633 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 at para 43.
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both lasting and effective.  The legislator is mandated to ensure the impartiality and
efficiency of the courts and their accessibility via legislative measures.”634
It is apparent from the facts and history of this case that the legislator and executive
have not taken measures, legislative or otherwise to ensure that orders of the court are
obeyed.  What is required in this matter is for the State to take heed of the orders
made by the Constitutional Court and change the manner in which it deals with the
satisfaction of judgment debts.  This is in line with the constitutional duty placed on
it.
7.1.5. PROCEEDING AGAINST THE STATE
When contemplating proceeding legally against the State one must take cognisance of
certain legislation which is specifically applicable to proceedings against the State and
which has of late come under review and amendment
Section 11(d) of the Prescription Act635 provides the periods of prescription of debts,
stating specifically that save where an Act of parliament provides otherwise, the debt
shall prescribe within three years.  In terms of section 12(1) of the Prescription Act636,
prescription begins to run as soon as the debt is due, but this is subject to the other
provisions of section 12637, which deal, inter alia, with the situation in which the
creditor has no knowledge of the identity of the debtor or of the facts from which the
debt arose.  Prior to the coming into operation of the interim Constitution, the running
of prescription was regulated by a range of other statutory provisions, most of which
634 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC); Case CCT 19/07[2008] ZACC 8 page 39 para 83 and
84. Minister of Finance v Barberton Municipal Council 1914 AD 335 at 353-355.
635 Act 68 of 1969.
636 Ibid.
637 Prescription Act 68 of 1969.   Section 12 (2) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 states that:  “If the
debtor willfully prevents the creditor from coming to know of the existence of the debt, prescription
shall not commence to run until the creditor becomes aware of the existence of the debt.”  (3) “A debt
shall not be deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the
facts from which the debt arises: Provided that a creditor shall be deemed to have such knowledge if he
could have acquired it by exercising reasonable care.”  (4) “Prescription shall not commence to run in
respect of a debt based on the commission of an alleged sexual offence as contemplated in sections 3,
4, 17, 18 (2), 20 (1), 23, 24 (2), 26 (1) and 71 (1) or (2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, during the time in which the creditor is unable to institute
proceedings because of his or her mental or psychological condition.”
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provided shorter prescriptive or limitation periods for the institution of legal action to
enforce a debt, particularly one alleged to exist against the State, and for the giving of
notice of the claim as an essential pre-requisite to the initiation of legal
proceedings.638
Typical of a number of those provisions was section 113(1) of the Defence Act639,
which provided that no civil action would be capable of being instituted against the
State or any person or in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in pursuance
of  that Act640 unless a period of six months had elapsed since the date on which the
cause of action arose, and that notice in writing of any such civil action and of the
cause of it had been given to the defendant at least one month before the
commencement of such action.  The question arose641 whether that provision, and
others like it, were unconstitutional in the light of section 22 of the interim
Constitution, which provided that every person had the right to have justiciable
disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another independent and
impartial forum.  The corresponding provision in the Constitution is section 34, which
states that everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or where appropriate,
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.
Turning to consider the constitutionality of section 113(1) of the Defence Act642, the
Constitutional Court, in Mohlomi v Minister of Defence643, remarked that the disparity
between section 113(1)644 and the comparable provision of the Prescription Act645 had
to be viewed against the background depicted by the state of affairs prevailing in
South Africa, a land where poverty and illiteracy abounded and differences of culture
638 For example section 113(1) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 and sections 32(1) and 57 of the South
African Police Service Act 68 of 1995.
639 Act 44 of 1957.
640 Ibid.
641 Qokose v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State 1994 2 SA 198 (Ck); Mbuyisa v Minister of Police,
Transkei 1995 2 SA 362 (Tk), 366C; Zantsi v Chairman, Council of State, Ciskei 1995 2 SA 534 (Ck),
566E.
642 Act 68 of 1969.
643 1997 1 SA 124 (CC), 1996 12 BCLR 1559.
644 Act 68 of 1969.
645 Ibid.
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and language were prominent.  Section 113(1)646 had the effect that many of the
claimants were not afforded an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial re-dress
for wrongs allegedly done to them.  The claimants were thus left with too short a time
within which to give the requisite notices in the first place and to sue in the second
place.  Their rights in terms of section 22 of the interim Constitution were thus
infringed.
The question which then arose was whether section 113(1)647 could be saved by the
limitation clause of the Constitution.648 That depended, in the first place, on its
passing the test of reasonableness and justifiability that is set out in the limitation
clause.649 The competing interests and values that were, respectively, impaired and
promoted had to be weighed against one another for an appraisal of their
proportionality.  When section 113(1)650 was compared to section 57(1) of the South
African Police Service Act651, which at the time provided for a period of twelve
calendar months after the date on which the claimant became aware of the alleged act
or omission on which a claim against the police was based, or after the date on which
the claimant might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of that act
or omission, it was immediately apparent that the time allowed by the latter provision
for the start of any action was twice as long as that fixed by section 113(1).652
Furthermore, prescription began to run, in terms of section 57653, not from the date on
which the cause of action arose, but from the date when both the conduct in question
and the identity of its perpetrator became or should reasonably have become known to
the claimant.  Section 57(5)654 allowed a court of law to dispense with the
requirements contained in section 57(1)655 where the interests of justice so required.
For this reason also, section 57656 was much less stringent and detrimental to the
646 Ibid.
647 Ibid.
648 Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.
649 Ibid.
650 Act 68 of 1969.
651 Act 68 of 1995.
652 Act 68 of 1969.
653 Act 68 of 1995.
654 Ibid.
655 Ibid.
656 Ibid.
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interests of claimants than section 113(1).657 Therefore, section 113(1)658 fell by the
wayside, being declared inconsistent with section 22 of the interim Constitution and
invalid for that reason.659
After the final Constitution had come into operation, the Constitutional Court in
Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council:  Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development intervening (Womans Legal Centre as amicus curiae)660
also struck down section 2(1)(a) of the Limitation of Legal Proceedings Act661, which
had required a person instituting a civil claim against a provincial or local authority to
give notice of the claim within ninety (90) days of the date upon which the claim
arose.  Somyalo AJ, writing for the court, held that that provision662 indeed
constituted a material limitation of an individual’s right of access to a court of law
under section 34 of the Constitution.  On an application of the criteria set out in the
limitation clause663 of the Constitution, the protection of the rights created by section
34664 without the restriction created by section 2(1) (a) of the Limitation of Legal
Proceedings Act665 outweighed the governmental interest that section 2(1) (a)666
sought to protect.  An order made by the High Court declaring section 2(1) (a)667
constitutionally invalid was accordingly confirmed; thereby resulting in parliament
seeking to remedy the legislation by enacting the Institution of Legal Proceedings
against Certain Organs of State Act668, which came into force on the 28th of
November 2002.  This Act669 seeks to introduce uniformity by, regulating actions for
damages against the national, provincial and local levels of government, as well as
other statutory institutions and functionaries defined in section 1(1) of the Act.670
657 Act 68 of 1969.
658 Ibid.
659 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC) para 12.
660 2001 4 SA 491 (CC), 2001 8 BCLR 765.
661 Act 94 of 1970.
662 Section 2(1) (a) of the Limitation of Legal Proceedings Act 94 of 1970.
663 Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.
664 Of the 1996 Constitution.
665 Act 94 of 1970.
666 Ibid.
667 Ibid.
668 Act 40 of 2002.
669 Ibid.
670 Ibid.
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We turn now to explore the general remedies available to a litigant for the
infringement of his or her constitutional right.
7.2. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES TO MONETARY DAMAGES
7.2.1. DECLARATORY ORDERS
The first remedy we explore that is available to a litigant is that of the declaratory
order.
Before the enactment of the 1993 Constitution, declaratory orders were often granted
as supervisory remedies, in circumstances similar to where a court reviews a decision
and sets it aside. Consequential relief was also often granted in these instances.671
The Constitution distinguishes between a declaration of rights and a declaration of
invalidity.  Whereas a declaration of rights may be issued only in so far as it is alleged
that the rights in the Bill of Rights are infringed or threatened, declarations of
invalidity must672 be declared in all instances where a court finds that law or conduct
is inconsistent with the Constitution.  A court will however refuse to hear an academic
or hypothetical inconsistency where a declaration of invalidity ‘can produce no
concrete or tangible result . . . beyond the bare declaration’.673 The declaratory order
provided for in the Constitution has been said to be a unique remedy.  In determining
whether or not an issue is academic, the court must consider whether the issue is one
which is necessary in terms of public interest to be resolved.
The Constitution itself provides very little guidance on constitutional remedies.
Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution simply requires a court deciding a constitutional
matter to make an order, which is ‘just and equitable’ and contains some provisions
which allow a court to control the effects of a declaration of invalidity.674 As far as a
violation of the Bill of Rights is concerned, section 38 of the Constitution refers
671 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 338.
672 Id at 339.
673 De Ville Op cit note 671 at 340.
674 Referred to at footnote 256 of this dissertation.
148
simply to ‘appropriate relief’ and, with the exception of a declaration of rights, does
not describe the specific types of relief available for the infringement or threat to a
right in the Bill of Rights.675 According to the Constitutional Court in Fose v Minister
of Safety and Security676, ‘[i]t is left to the courts to decide what would be appropriate
relief in any particular case’.677 This means that the Constitution permits a flexible
approach to the provision of remedies.678
However flexible the approach may be, it stands to reason that the nature of a judicial
remedy should be determined by its purpose in order to fulfill the reason for its
existence and thereby subsisting as an ‘effective remedy’.  A remedy cannot be said to
be effective if it does not fulfill the purpose for which it exists, which in general
would be to remedy the defect or the unjust conduct or result.  According to the
Constitutional Court679, the purpose of constitutional remedies is to vindicate the
Constitution and deter future infringements.  Deterrence speaks for itself, but what is
meant by vindication?  In subsequent cases680 the Constitutional Court has
emphasized the need for effective remedies.  Not only must the court’s order afford
effective relief to the successful claimants, but to all similarly situated people.  The
remedy must operate generally to eradicate inconsistencies between law or conduct
and the Constitution.681 In principle, constitutional remedies are forward-looking,
community-orientated and structural as opposed to backward looking, individualistic
and corrective or retributive.682
The deterrent effect of some remedies, such as constitutional damages, may differ
considerably depending on whether the violator of the Constitution is public or private
body or person.  As in Fose’s case683 Didcott J stated that the factors which militate
against awards of punitive or constitutional damages against the State, do not
necessarily apply to private persons.  In the case of private violators, the award would
675 Ibid.
676 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
677Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 287. Fose v
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19, 96, and 98 – 99.
678 Id at 288.
679 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 96.
680 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) para
65.
681 Supra.
682 Currie, and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 287.
683 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
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not be paid out of public treasury and the deterrent effect of the remedy would be
appreciably enhanced.684 Closely related to the identity of the violator, the nature of
the violation must be considered.  Systematic violations of fundamental rights – as
opposed to isolated violations – call for structural remedies, with appropriate
institutions to supervise their implementation.685
The need for an effective remedy that achieves its purpose must be counterbalanced
by the deference that a court owes to the other branches of government.  This
deference flows from the doctrine of separation of powers.  Apart from budgetary
implications, which loom large at the remedial stage of analysis, there are questions of
timing and of resistance or evasion.686
A declaration of rights is an essential remedial and corrective remedy, it can promote
a non-coercive dialogue between the courts and the Executive, but only if
governments and officials comply with them voluntarily, promptly and in good
faith.687 A court, in granting a declaration of rights, would simply declare whether the
right or duty exists and or what the scope of the duty is.  Under the common law it
was necessary for an actual infringement of rights to have taken place before the order
could be granted.  A declaratory order could also only be granted where consequential
relief could be claimed upon the determination by the court of the right concerned.688
The conduct of the administration that was complained of in Kate’s case689 was
constitutionally unlawful.  The High Court had all but exhausted its dictionary of
epithets in its attempts to make that point known; therefore there would have been no
purpose for another pronouncement to the same effect.690 A public functionary who
fails to fulfill an obligation that is imposed upon him or her by law is open to
proceedings for a mandamus compelling him or her to do so.  That remedy is against
a functionary upon whom the statute imposes the obligation, and not against the
provincial government itself.  A public official who ignores a court order is liable to
684 Currie et al Loc cit note 682.
685 Ibid.
686 Currie, and De Waal Op cit note 682 at 289.
687 Kate v Member of executive Council of Welfare 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Welfare Department v Kate
2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 28.
688 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 348.
689 2006 SCA 46 (RSA) para 28.
690 Supra at para 29.
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be committed for contempt in accordance with ordinary principles of law.691 The
remedy of mandamus has the capacity to be effective where there is a breach by a
public official of a duty that is imposed by a statute or the Constitution.  In most cases
that is sufficient without the additional remedy of damages.  There are two
considerations that militate against confining Kate to that preventative remedy; firstly
it would be unrealistic to expect the remedy to be effective in her hands.  Secondly,
the problem that was faced by Kate is prevalent in the Eastern Cape692 and the
possibility of even more litigation is undesirable.  Hence, in briefly analyzing Kate’s
case693 and the possible appropriate remedies, it is clear that the only appropriate
remedy in the circumstances was to award constitutional damages to recompense Kate
for the breach of her right.
7.2.2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REMEDIES
It must be noted for the purpose of completeness that there are alternatives to the
constitutional law remedies discussed above, which can be found in administrative
law in that PAJA expanded upon the available constitutional remedies albeit still
being based on the Constitution.
These remedies include the exclusion of evidence, severance, and reading-in.  Section
8 of the PAJA694 makes provision for a wide range of remedies to be granted in
review proceedings upon a finding that a ground of review is present.  In addition to
the numerous remedies mentioned above, a complainant may seek a cost order against
the violator.  This is an expressed form of a general power to ‘grant any order that is
just and equitable’ followed by a list of more specific orders, corresponding to a large
extent with the courts’ powers under the common law.695 Although the common law
administrative action remains relevant and will often be suitable, one should be
careful not to simply apply remedies in section 8 of PAJA with those that existed
691 Supra at para 31.
692 Jayiya v Member of Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA);
Mahambehlala v Member of Executive Council of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR
327 (SE); Mbanga v Member of Executive Council of Welfare Eastern Cape 2001 JDR 328;
693 Supra.
694 Act 3 of 2000.
695 Under the common law the granting of a remedy is a discretionary power of the court.
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under the common law.  The remedies found in section 8 of PAJA may firstly have to
be developed by the courts as contemplated in section 39(2) of the Constitution.
Secondly, the broad language in section 8(1) of PAJA clearly indicates that new
remedies may be fashioned by the courts.  The approach of the Constitutional Court to
the granting of remedies in the case of violations of fundamental rights is therefore
highly relevant in providing the nature of the remedies provided for in section 8 of
PAJA.  In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security696 Kriegler J pointed out that the
object of remedies under section 7(4) (a) of the 1993 Constitution (the predecessor to
section 38697) ‘differs from the object of remedies provided at common law’.  The
harm caused by violating the Constitution, he said, is harm to the society as a whole,
even where the direct implications of the violation are directed towards an individual.
The rights violator not only harms the particular person, but impedes the fuller vision
of our constitutional promise.  The remedies granted under the Constitution,
according to Kriegler J, have the primary aim to vindicate the Constitution and to
deter future infringements – the general power granted under section 8 of PAJA gives
expression to section 38 of the Constitution, it allows a court, in the event of the
infringement of a fundamental right, to ‘grant suitable relief’ and section 172(1) (b)698
to ‘make any order that is just and equitable’ although the remedies provided by
PAJA and the Constitution are not separate remedies.
In Fose v the Minister of Safety and Security699 Kriegler J gave the following
interpretation to ‘appropriate relief’, stating that when something is appropriate it is
‘specially fitted or suitable’.  Suitability in this context is ensured by the extent to
which a particular form of relief vindicates the Constitution and deters against further
violations of rights enshrined in chapter 3.700 In pursuing this enquiry or considering
the nature of the infringement and the probable impact of a particular remedy, the
facts surrounding a violation of rights will determine what form of remedy is
appropriate.701 The same commitment to flexibility in the granting of remedies is
evident in the remarks of Ackermann J in Fose’s case702 regarding the nature of
696 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
697 The 1996 Constitution.
698 Ibid.
699 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC); 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 97.
700 Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution.
701 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 325.
702 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
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appropriate relief.  He pointed out that appropriate relief will in essence be relief that
is required to protect and enforce the Constitution.  Depending on the circumstances
of each particular case the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a
mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined
in the Constitution703 are protected and enforced.  If it is necessary to do so, the courts
may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of
these imperative rights.  It would appear that the Constitutional Court has been very
inventive in devising an effective remedy where legislation which authorizes
administrative action was declared invalid.  Such a declaration (especially where it is
suspended) is usually combined with an order relating to administrative action to be
taken in terms of the legislation in future.  In this regard the court often issues a
mandamus (directing the way in which action is to be taken in future) and or a
prohibitory interdict.  In devising its order the court has adopted the approach that the
remedy devised must be to the benefit not only of the successful litigant, but also of
similarly-situated people.704 When the validity of administrative action itself has been
successfully challenged under the administrative-justice clause, the existing common
law remedies have mostly proved adequate.  Several remedies have been developed
whereas some existing remedies such as declarations of invalidity have gained in
importance.705
The courts have also been willing to grant structural interdicts.706 The Constitutional
Court has, with reference to the supremacy clause in the Constitution adopted the
approach that law or conduct which are in conflict with the Constitution are invalid.
In Ferreira v Levin No and Others707 Ackermann J proclaimed with reference to
section 4(1) and section 98(6) (declarations of invalidity) of the 1993 Constitution that
‘[t]he Court’s order does not invalidate the law, but the Constitution declares it
invalid’.  He was also of the opinion that ‘a law which is inconsistent with the
Constitution ceases to be of effect’.708
703 Ibid.
704 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 326.
705 Ibid, such as structural interdicts and monetary damages.
706 Ibid.
707 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC); 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 27.
708 De Ville Op cit note 704 at 829.
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The Constitutional Court has applied the principle that when a court declares
administrative or executive action to be invalid it is not the declaration itself that
renders the conduct unconstitutional as the declaration is merely descriptive of a pre-
existing state of affairs in the administrative-law context.709 In President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v South Africa Rugby Football Union and
Others710 the court held that there was insufficient proof for the allegation that the
President had abdicated or delegated his powers of appointing a commission of
enquiry and of making the provisions of the Commissions Act711 applicable to the
commission of enquiry so appointed, to the Minister of Sport.  The court furthermore
held, that even should he have done so, such an abdication or delegation of powers
(before the actual exercise of the power)712 would have been invalid (as the President
had to exercise this power himself in terms of the Constitution), and therefore a
nullity.  In other words the delegation of powers would have had no legal effect and
could be revoked at any time.  The judgment raises, but does not clearly answer, the
question whether an administrator may always revoke an invalid decision.  The
statements of principle expressed above would seem to support such a contention,
seeing that such an exercise of power would be invalid and thus have no legal effect.
Such an approach would conflict with other important principles.713
The above statements of principle by the Constitutional Court are deeply
problematical.  On a political-ethical level, it can be said to speak of a ‘denial of
judicial choice and responsibility’714.  In other words, it creates the impression that
invalidity is there for everyone to see without the need for interpretation or court
intervention.  Rather, invalidity is brought about after interpretation and a
consideration of issues such as standing, ripeness, mootness and jurisdiction by a
court’s authoritative announcement.  As a matter of principle, these statements are
juxtaposition with the approach of the Constitutional Court with respect to the
granting of remedies, specifically in limiting orders of retrospectivity where
legislation is found to be unconstitutional (such orders are, as a rule, made prospective
only, however this would not assistant a litigant who would have to look backwards in
709 Id at 330.
710 1999 10 BCLR 1059 (CC); 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 42 – 45.
711 Act 8 of 1947.
712 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 829.
713 Ibid.
714 Ibid.
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order to quantify his or her damages).715 Surely if invalidity follows irrespective of a
court judgment, the court would have been more willing to issue retrospective orders
of invalidity.  Instead, the courts have been taking account of a variety of contextual
considerations in deciding on a proper remedy under the circumstances.716
It should be noted that the PAJA717 was recently amended to introduce a new liability
provision, being that of section 10A, which states that a person exercising a power or
performing a duty under the Act or its rules is indemnified from any criminal or civil
liability if done in good faith.718
7.2.3. INTERDICTS
The further remedy of interdicts deserves exploration.  Since interdicts are always
directed at future events, they fit the mould for constitutional remedies, which are to
be forward looking as opposed to awards of monetary compensation which are
historically backward looking.  Interdicts are of either a prohibitory or a mandatory
nature.
A prohibitory interdict is where one seeks to prevent the continued or threatened
performance of an illegal action interfering with one’s rights.  A mandatory interdict
(otherwise known as a mandamus) is where one seeks to force an administrator to
perform a statutory duty or to cure a state of affairs brought about by illegal actions.
The distinction is not of much practical value as the requirements for both interdicts
are the same.  In exercising its discretion whether or not to grant a mandamus a court
must take account of the fact that this remedy is more difficult to enforce than a
prohibitory interdict.  Mandatory and prohibitory interdicts can be either interim or
final in nature.719 On closer examination it is noted that each is directed at preventing
a person from acting wrongfully.  The interdict thus has a preventative function.
Since the interdict is directed at the prevention of a wrongful act, and not at
715 Ibid.
716 Ibid.
717 Act 3 of 2000.
718 Dendy, M, Prescription and Limitation Periods (2009). De Rebus, April 2009, 47 – 48.
719 De Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, revised 1st edition (2005) 363.
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retribution for wrongfulness already committed, there is no reason why fault on the
part of the wrongdoer should be a requirement for the granting of an interdict.  Fault
is correctly not stated as a requirement in this regard in either our common law or case
law.720
The Constitutional Court has expressed enthusiasm for the interdict as a constitutional
remedy on several occasions.  An example of such an occasion is in City Council of
Pretoria v Walker.721 The Court found that the selective institution of legal
proceedings for recovery of rates arrears by the City Council of Pretoria amounted to
a breach of the respondent’s constitutional right against unfair discrimination.  The
court nevertheless did not consider an order for absolution from the instance to be
‘appropriate relief’ in the circumstances but rather recommended a declaration of
rights or a mandamus in order to vindicate the breach of the right to equality.722 The
High Courts seem to apply the usual procedures and rules723 pertaining to the granting
of interim interdicts, and final interdicts in the constitutional context.  These
requirements should not be permitted to undermine the flexible approach to
constitutional relief sanctioned by the Constitution.  In any event, they were not
referred to by the Constitutional Court in August v Electoral Commission724 when it
directed the Electoral Commission to make the necessary arrangements to enable
prisoners to vote.  Instead it used the so-called structural interdict, which directs the
violator to rectify the breach of fundamental rights under court supervision.725
7.2.4. COMMON LAW DELICTUAL REMEDIES
After outlining the available remedies within the constitutional law and administrative
law arenas and further determining that the Constitutional Court is accustomed to
applying common law remedies to the Constitution, we turn in point to the common
720 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 254 – 255.
721 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) para 96.
722 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) para 96. Currie and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law
Volume 1 (2001) 298.
723 The courts ascertain that there is a clear right, no alternative relief, and the balance of convenience
etc.
724 1999 3 SA 1 (CC).
725 See also the use of structural interdict in Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 3 BCLR
342 (W).  Currie and De Waal Loc cit note 722.
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law delictual remedies, which have been detailed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation,
where it is established that the South African law of delict rests on three pillars:  the
actio legis Aquiliae, the actio inuriarum and the action for pain and suffering.
Notwithstanding the fact that the actio legis Aquiliae, the actio iniuriarum and the
action for pain and suffering are based on general delictual principles and, as such,
cover almost the whole area of delictual liability, there are still a few other actions
which originated in Roman-Dutch law and are applicable to specific situations.  These
actions are, on the one hand, those that are based on liability without fault, inter alia,
the actions for damage caused by animals (the actio de pauperie, the actio de pastu
and the actio de feris), those for damage caused by objects poured or thrown out of or
falling from a building (the actio de effuses vel deiectis and the actio positi vel
suspensi), the action for damage caused by the loss of a stolen thing (the condictio
furtiva); and those for damage caused by owners of neighbouring property.726
The delictual actions are directed at compensation for patrimonial damage or
impairment of personality.  The same action may in principle give rise to several -
different or alternative remedies. An act from which various claims arise, each of
which places a distinctive action at the plaintiff’s disposal, gives rise to different
remedies.727 The actio legis Aquiliae, the actio iniuriarum and the action for pain and
suffering concur in the following ways:
The actio legis Aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum concur in circumstances where an
iniuria also causes patrimonial damage, such as an assault which brings about hospital
and medical expenses, or a doctor or an attorney losing patients or clients as a result
of defamation.  In principle the plaintiff must then institute the actio iniuriarum for
satisfaction and the Aquilian action for patrimonial damages.728
The concurrence of the actio legis Aquiliae and the action for pain and suffering takes
place where a culpable infringement of physical-mental integrity causes patrimonial
damage, such as bodily injuries, which bring about medical expenses. Obviously this
726 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 253.
727 Id at 236 - 237.
728 Neethling et al Op cit note 726 at 256.
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type of concurrence is the one most often encountered in practice.  The plaintiff must
then claim damages for patrimonial loss under the Aquilian action and damages under
the action for pain and suffering.729
Lastly, attention must be given to the concurrence of the actio iniuriarum and the
action for pain and suffering.  According to Van der Merwe and Olivier however,
these two actions (the actio iniuriarum and the action for pain and suffering) cannot
concur.  They argue that in the case of assault the action for pain and suffering loses
its meaning and is replaced by the actio iniuriarum with which full compensation may
be claimed.  This view cannot be accepted.  Since the object or function of the actio
iniuriarum (satisfaction) differs from that of the action for pain and suffering
(compensation), the actions cannot be treated similarly with regards to assault.  Both
actions are thus in principle available for a wrongful and intentional infringement of
physical-mental integrity.  This view is by implication also apparent from the case
law730 where in principle a distinction is made between satisfaction for contumelia
(iniuria) and compensation for physical pain and suffering.731
In Fose’s case732, the court observed that the South African law of delict is flexible
and will, in most cases, be broad enough to provide relief in the form of damages
where this would be ‘appropriate’ for a breach of constitutional rights.  In cases where
forward-looking remedies do not make sense, damages may well be the only
appropriate remedy.733
7.3. CONCLUSION
Chapter 7 commenced with a discussion of the concept of remedies in general under
the headings of Direct and Indirect Application of the Bill of Rights, Availability of
729 Ibid.
730 For example Radebe v Hough 1949 1 SA 380 (A) 384 – 385; Magqabi v Mafundityala 1979 4 SA
106 (E) 110; and N v T 1994 1 SA 862 (C) 854 – 865.
731 Neethling et al, Law of Delict, 6th edition (2010) 238 – 239.  Van der Merwe and Olivier, Die
Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1989) 465.
732 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
732 Currie and De Waal, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 298.  Refer
to Annexure C of this dissertation to view alternative remedies in tabular format.
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Remedies, Stages of Fundamental Rights Litigation, Nyathi v Member of the
Executive Council for Department of Health, Gauteng734 and Proceeding against the
State.
Thereafter, Chapter 7 in the broad sense has ascertained that there are the following
alternate remedies available to an applicant:
 declaratory orders,
 administrative law remedies,
 interdicts, and
 common law delictual remedies.
The writer is leaning towards favouring this last remedy as the best alternative to the
dilemma raised in this thesis, namely being the provision of damages for the breach of
a constitutional right, in particular the social assistance right, as the common law is
open to development and is flexible - allowing for changing circumstances.
Chapter 7 also identified that proceedings against the State require a litigant to be
aware that the procedure to be followed is not the same procedure that one utilizes
when proceeding against another individual.  The fundamental difference when
proceeding against the State is to be aware of the Institution of Legal Proceedings
Against Certain Organs of State Act735, which outlines the process to be followed.
The Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act736 provides
that a notice must be issued to the State within the required time frame containing the
details of the claim before proceeding further with the necessary litigation.  The
relevant stages of litigation are outlined under Section 7.1.3 above.
734 2008 (5) SA 94 (CC).
735 Act 40 of 2002.
736 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 8
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CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter will attempt to predict the future of constitutional damages in South
Africa by summarizing the historical and chronological development of constitutional
damages in South Africa.  This Chapter will thereafter briefly conclude by
summarizing the findings of Chapters two to seven of this dissertation.
This dissertation commenced with the introduction of the topic of this dissertation and
the dominant fields of research related thereto, being delict and constitutional
damages.  The context and issues pertaining to this dissertation relate to the concept
of constitutional rights and damages in the South African with special emphasis on
social security.  The purpose and focus of this dissertation was to explore the past and
present state of the law relating to constitutional damages, arguments in favour of and
opposing the awarding of constitutional damages were therefore discussed with the
view to providing recommendations on the way forward in this area of the law.
This dissertation has therefore served the purpose of reviewing, analyzing and
amalgamating relevant literature and specifically case law in the field of constitutional
damages, and thereby providing a relevant and succinct synopsis of the topic.
The ultimate research question of this dissertation was “Are monetary damages for the
breach of a fundamental right a just and equitable remedy in a constitutional state?”
The answer to this question is complex and inter related with a number of governing
factors, which are discussed below.  However, the simplistic answer to this question is
in the affirmative provided the right circumstances are present for the provision of
monetary damages and provided same does not cause a duplication of remedies
The methodology utilized within this dissertation in order to arrive at the above
conclusion was that of review methodology. Comparative and historical research was
undertaken in that case law ratios within South Africa’s history were compared and
analyzed in order to determine the distinction between delictual and constitutional
damages as well as the present amalgamation thereof
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8.1. THE POSITION THUS FAR
8.1.1. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
The cases examined here and elsewhere in this dissertation737 represent a body of case
law that has provided increasingly detailed interpretations of the provisions of the
Social Assistance Act738, its regulations and related legislation within the context of
the Constitution.  They have focused especially on the lack of commitment to social
justice, the request of fundamental rights and requirements that every exercise of
public power must be capable of objective justification.  In this sense, these cases
have contributed both to the development of the new administrative law based on
section 33 of the Constitution and the PAJA739, as well as to the development of a
social assistance law.  The principle embedded in these cases is that people in need of
social assistance are human beings to whose needs a response must be found, rather
than as objects who are probably the causes of their own misfortune.740
It may be appropriate to quote the words of Brennan J in Goldberg v Kelly741, even
though these words were expressed in a constitutional context that, unlike its South
African counterpart, does not expressly protect human dignity:
“… from its founding the nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well
being of all persons within its borders.  We have come to recognize that forces not within the
control of the poor contributed to their poverty.  This perception, against the background of
our traditions, has significantly influenced development of the contemporary public system.
Whilst they, by meeting the basic needs of the sub-systems, can help bring within the reach of
the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the
737 Supra in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, particularly referring to Somyani v MEC for Welfare, Eastern
Cape, and Another SECLD case 1144/01 unreported judgment undated, Permanent Secretary,
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA), Njongi v MEC, Department of
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 4 SA 237 (CC), Mbanga v Member of Executive Council of Welfare
Eastern Cape 2001 JDR 328, Mahambehlala v Member of Executive Council of Welfare, Eastern Cape
2002 1 SA 342; 2001 JDR 327 (SE), and Kate v Member of Executive Council of Welfare 2005 1 SA
141 SECLD; Welfare Department v Kate 2006 SCA 46 (RSA).
738 Act 59 of 1992; Act 13 of 2004.
739 Act 3 of 2000.
740 Dendy, ‘Administrators, Justice and Social Assistance’ (2008) SALJ 524.
741 397 US 254 1970.
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life of the community.  Public assistance then, is not mere charity but a means to ‘promote the
general welfare, and to secure blessings of liberty to ourselves and our prosperity’.”742
From the preceding quotation from Brennan J, it is clear that social grants in South
Africa should be seen as not merely a means of charity, but rather, as an essential
means of promoting liberty and thereby balancing the scales of equality amongst all
citizens.  The right to social assistance therefore requires protection for those who are
entitled to the right and the assurance that such right will not be infringed.
The enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa743 ushered in not
only a political era of a democratic government based upon universal adult franchise
but also a new legal era of justification and accountability as opposed to mere
authority.  The primary reason for the latter change was the introduction into our legal
system of a Bill of Rights, incorporated as Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution and
Chapter 2 of the final Constitution.744
What has not always been appreciated especially at first is that the interim and final
Constitutions have affected profoundly not only constitutional law in South Africa,
but every other branch of law as well, including the law of delict, as is evident from
this dissertation.  Our post-apartheid Constitution is omnipresent and does not allow
our courts or the legal representatives who appear in them to continue in the same
manner as they had prior to the enactment of the Constitution.  Those constitutions
have influenced, and the final Constitution continues to impact on, the development of
our substantive law, not only in the sphere of public law but also amongst others in
the fields of private law745, and our procedural law,746 which are of particular
relevance to this dissertation.
742 Supra at para 261 – 263 and 272.
743 Act 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution) and the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa (the final Constitution).
744 The late Mureinik in his leading article “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights”
(1994) 10 SAJHR 31 famously described the interim Constitution, with reference to the epilogue to it,
as “a bridge way from a culture of authority ... to a culture of justification, a culture in which every
exercise of power is expected to be justified”.  Dendy, ‘Administrators, Justice and Social Assistance’
(2008) SALJ 524.  The textual statements were analyzed in Chapter 4 Supra.
745 For example the application and evolution of the law of delict, the law of contract, property law,
family law and the law of succession.
746 Dendy, ‘Administrators, Justice and Social Assistance’ (2008) SALJ 524.
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It is evident from various provisions of the Constitution747 that the Constitution will
override any legal rules or principles which are in conflict with it.  This is so whether
those rules or principles are of statutory or common law origin, and whatever the
branch of law to which they relate, for the following reasons:
1. The notion of supremacy of the Constitution would be meaningless if laws
inconsistent with the Constitution were to continue to be valid.  Areas of
law cannot, as it were, be shielded from the influence of the Constitution
and applied as though not subject to constitutional audit.  In summary,
constitutional supremacy entails the influence of the Constitution on all
law, including the common law (delict in this case) and not merely some
of it;
2. The clauses of the Constitution that deal with constitutional supremacy are
not restricted in their operation to certain fields of law or to the legal
relationships between the State and its citizens only.  The clauses likewise
apply to relationships between subjects of the State, whether those subjects
are human beings or juristic persons (referring to the horizontal and
vertical application of the Bill of Rights as outlined in Chapter 4 above);
and
3. Section 39(2)748 of the Constitution makes it clear that the Bill of Rights
and, indeed, the constitutional norms underpinning it, apply to all legal
relationships whatever the branch of law that regulates them.
8.1.2.  DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW
Even where the impact of the Bill of Rights is felt only through the influence of the
Bill of Rights on common laws or other statutory law, the existing principles or rules
of ordinary law must still be interpreted or developed with reference to the values
contained in the Bill of Rights.  In the application of statutory law, the courts must
attempt to interpret in conformity with the Bill of Rights before considering striking
747 Section 7, 8, 39 and 36 of the 1996 Constitution, as discussed in Chapter 1 above.
748 Cited above at footnote 263.
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that legislation down on the ground that it is in conflict with the Bill of Rights and
where it cannot be saved from invalidation by the limitation clause.749
In relation to the common law the courts must develop the common law in conformity
with the Bill of Rights as opposed to assessing whether the common law is in conflict
with the Bill of Rights.  Examples of the indirect influence of the Constitution upon
the common law are provided by cases in which the element of wrongfulness in the
Aquilian action of the law of delict has been held to depend on the norms and values
of our society as embodied in the Constitution.750
8.1.3.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
As already mentioned in this dissertation751, an action in contract or delict is likely to
be a more appropriate remedy than judicial review where an aggrieved person wants
to recoup financial loss sustained as a result of wrongful administrative action.
Nevertheless, the PAJA752 recognizes that an award of damages may sometimes be
justified in proceedings for judicial review for instance where an administrator has
acted dishonestly. The Constitution, in turn, gives scope for the award of
constitutional damages for the infringement of fundamental rights.753 Apart from
compensating the victim, such awards may be useful in promoting respect for human
rights, deterring future violations of rights and punishing public officials for their
blatant disregard of rights.754 The Constitutional Court has so far adopted a cautious
approach to such awards.755
749 Section 36(1) and Section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution.  Dendy, ‘Administrators, Justice and
Social Assistance’ (2008) SALJ 524.
750Dendy, ‘In Light of the Constitution Part 1:  the Supremacy of the Constitution’ (2009). De Rebus,
January / February 2009, Law Society of South Africa 60.
751 Supra in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
752 Act 3 of 2000.  Section 8 (1) (c) (ii) (bb)752, which is coupled with the remedy of setting aside, states
that ‘in exceptional cases’ the court may direct ‘the administrator or any other party to the proceedings
to pay compensation’.
753 Section 38 (Section 7(4) (a) in the interim Constitution) of the Constitution refers broadly to
“appropriate relief”, which could include an award of damages established in Chapter 5 of this
dissertation and below in Section 8.1.4.
754 These were objectives suggested by the plaintiff in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3)
SA 786 (CC) para 17.
755 Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA). Fose v Minister of Safety
and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 17.
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In Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board756 the Supreme Court of Appeal
demonstrated similar caution when it was asked to award a plaintiff damages arising
out of the breach of his administrative justice rights.757 Cameron JA, however,
rejected the claim, observing that there were “powerful reasons of policy” against it in
this case.758 One reason against the granting of damages was that an alternative and
even more effective remedy had been available to the plaintiff in delict.  Another
reason was that the plaintiff was really claiming a windfall, albeit one that had a
constitutional dimension.  The third reason against the granting of damages was that
in order to have a reformative effect on the conduct of public officials, an award of
constitutional damages would have to be a large one – and, as Ackermann J stated in
Fose’s case759, “the more substantial they are, the greater the anomaly that a single
plaintiff receives a windfall of such a magnitude”, especially in a country with such
limited resources.760
Judicial review, whether common law or under the Act761, is generally an
inappropriate remedy for an individual who has suffered loss as a result of
administrative action.  It is designed primarily for the setting aside of unlawful action
rather than for compensating people who have been affected adversely by that
action.762 A superior remedy will usually lie in the law of delict, which is designed to
compensate people by way of damages763 for harm caused by the wrongful and
culpable acts and omissions of others, or alternatively in the law of contract.764 In
general, delictual liability will not be imposed for a breach of administrative law
756 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA) para 31 as discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
757 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 17.  In this case the plaintiff (now the appellant) alleged that a tender had
been awarded illegally, and claimed as damages the profit it asserted it would have made if it had been
awarded the tender.  The plaintiff argued that such an award would also have the beneficial effect of
inhibiting mal-administration.
758 Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA) para 42.
759 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 786 (CC) para71.
760 Supra.  Currie (editor), and Hoexter with Lyster, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law
Volume 2 (2002) 294 - 295.  Dendy, ‘In Light of the Constitution Part 1:  the Supremacy of the
Constitution’ (2009). De Rebus, January / February 2009, Law Society of South Africa 61.
761 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
762 Ibid. While the Act does envisage orders for compensation, these are confined to “exceptional”
cases.
763 The Constitutional Court provided a general description of the nature and purpose of patrimonial
and non-patrimonial damages in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) para 36 –
41.
764 However, because the court will inevitably be drawn into a consideration of the statutory powers of
the administrator and the legality of their exercise, suing an administrative body in delict or contract
amounts in essence to an indirect way of obtaining a review of its decisions.
166
“unless convincing policy considerations point in another direction”, and it cannot be
assumed that the breach of administrative law duties will necessarily translate into
private law duties giving rise to delictual claims.765
A further basis for an award of damages, as discussed supra in this dissertation, is to
be found in section 38 of the Constitution which enables the court to grant
‘appropriate relief’766 for the infringement of fundamental rights and thus gives scope
for the award of various sorts of damages.  These include compensatory (delictual)
damages, which aim to compensate the victim for harm done or loss sustained767,
constitutional damages, where the aim is generally to promote respect for human
rights and deter future violations of rights, and punitive or exemplary damages, where
the aim is essentially to punish public officials for their blatant disregard of rights.768
8.1.4. DAMAGES IN DELICT FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENTRENCHED RIGHTS
Section 38 of the Constitution provides that anyone listed in that section, including
anyone acting in their own interest, has the right to approach a competent court
765 Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 466 – 467.
766 What makes relief appropriate was explained by Ngcobo J in Hoffmann v South African Airways
2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45:  “… the determination of appropriate relief … calls for the balancing of the
various interests that might be affected by the remedy.  The balancing process must at least be guided
by the objective, first, to address the wrong occasioned by the infringement of the constitutional right;
second, to deter future violations;  third, to make an order that can be complied with; and fourth, of
fairness to all those who might be effected by the relief.  Invariably, the nature of the right infringed
and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in the particular
case.”
767 In Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 SA 230 (CC), per Moseneke DCJ para 37, the
Constitutional Court described the primary purpose of damages as being “to place, to the fullest
possible extent, the injured party in the same position in which she or he would have been in, but for
the wrongful conduct”.  Patrimonial special damages, for example past and future medical expenses,
loss of income, loss of earning capacity and loss of support, aim to redress the actual or probable
reduction of a persons patrimony as a result of the delict or breach of contract. The aforementioned
damages are ordinarily calculable in money.  Non-patrimonial or general damages are utilized to
redress the deterioration of highly personal legal interests that attach to the body and personality of the
claimant and may cover aspects of bodily integrity (such as pain and suffering), dignity and mental
integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, privacy, feeling and identity.  Although it may be difficult to
calculate such damages in monetary terms, it is important to recognize that a claim for non-patrimonial
damages ultimately assumes the form of a monetary award.
768 Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 467.
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alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the
court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.
The query raised in Chapter 1 of this dissertation is, ‘does appropriate relief include
an award of delictual damages?’ or a question related thereto ‘is an award of
monetary damages an appropriate remedy?’ And, if not, ‘can our law be developed so
as to provide such a remedy, bearing in mind the injunction contained in section 39(2)
of the Constitution that, when developing the common law, every court, tribunal or
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights?’
The first reported decision on the question as noted above in Chapter three of this
dissertation is Fose v Minister of Safety and Security769, in which Ackermann J for the
majority dismissed a claim for punitive damages for violations of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights in addition to compensatory damages.  It would be inappropriate,
it was held, to use scarce State resources to pay punitive constitutional damages to
plaintiffs who were already fully compensated for the injuries they incurred770 with no
real assurance that such payment would have any deterrent or preventive effect.771
The ratio decidendi of Fose’s case772 provides the principle that punitive damages
will not be paid to plaintiffs in addition to compensatory damages in cases of breaches
of constitutionally entrenched rights.773
In light of Fose’s case774, it is submitted that the following is the position and
therefore possible conclusion of this dissertation in respect of damages in
constitutional cases.  In cases where the violation of constitutional rights entails the
commission of a delict against the victim, a claim for delictual damages will be
available.  However, a claim for constitutional damages in addition to those available
under the law of delict does not automatically occur from a breach of constitutional
769 1997 3 SA 786 (CC), 1997 7 BCLR 851.
770 In Fose’s case Supra by means of police assault.
771 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 72.
772 Supra.
773 Dendy, ‘In Light of the Constitution – 2:  Damages in Delict for Violation of Constitutionally
Entrenched Rights’ (2009). De Rebus, March 2009, Law Society of South Africa 48.
774 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
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rights.775 To be entitled to constitutional damages the requirement of appropriateness
will have to be proven.  According to section 172 of the Constitution the remedy will
have to be just and equitable in the circumstances.  As with all other constitutional
remedies, an appropriate remedy is one suitable to vindicate the constitutional right
and deter future violations.  Ackerman J stated in Fose’s case776, for the majority, that
‘an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy’.  He added that in a country
where777 so few have the means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is
essential that on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an
infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated.  But
these statements are overshadowed by the negative attitude toward punitive damages
that permeates the rest of the majority opinion.  Even in circumstances where delictual
damages are not available, constitutional damages will not necessarily be awarded for
a violation of human rights.
The question whether compensatory damages could be claimed for violations of such
rights was raised obiter and Ackermann J opened the door to that possibility, on the
basis that the concept of appropriate relief referred to in section 38 of the
Constitution778 could include damage in delict.  Ackermann J said:
“Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the
Constitution.  Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a
declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to
ensure that the rights infringed of the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is
necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection
and enforcement of these all important rights.”779
On whether appropriate relief could take the form of an award of damages,
Ackermann J stated that:
775 In order to be entitled to claim a specific remedy under delict or constitutional delict, the
requirements for either, which are substantially different, must be met.  The requirements to be
satisfied to prove a delict are:  a wrongful, culpable act by a person that causes harm to another.  On the
other hand the requirements to be satisfied in order to prove a constitutional delict are as follows:  an
infringement or breach of an individual’s constitutional right, being a right framed within the 1996
Constitution, by another individual, juristic person or the State.
776 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69.
7771997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 4th
edition (2001) 190.
778 Prior to the final Constitution, Section 7(4) (a) of the interim Constitution.
779 Quoted with approval in Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the
Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) and Others 2005 3 SA 280 (CC), 2004 5 BCLR 445 para 74.
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“It seems to me that there is no reason in principle why appropriate relief should not include
an award of damages, where such an award is necessary to protect and enforce constitutionally
entrenched rights.  Such awards are made to compensate persons who have suffered loss as a
result of the breach of their statutory right if, on a proper construction of the statute in
question, it was the legislature’s intention that such damages should be payable, and it would
be strange if damages could not be claimed for, at least, loss occasioned by the breach of a
right vested in the claimant by the supreme law.  When it would be appropriate to do so, and
what the measure of damages should be, will depend on the circumstances of each case and
the particular right which has been infringed.”780
Emphasizing the duty of the Constitutional Court to ensure that effective relief is
granted for the infringement of any constitutionally entrenched right, Ackermann J
added:
“In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the Constitution
cannot properly be upheld or enhanced.  Particularly in a country where so few have the
means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential that on those occasions when
the legal process does establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be
effectively vindicated.  The courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are
obliged to forge new tools and shape innovative remedies [emphasis supplied], if needs be, to
achieve this goal.”781
It was unnecessary in Fose’s case782 for the Constitutional Court to decide whether or
what damages could be claimed for breach of a Constitutional right which did not
cause bodily injury or patrimonial loss to the plaintiff.  In a concurring judgment in
Fose’s case783, Kriegler J remarked that appropriate relief meant suitable relief, and
suitability was measured by the extent to which a particular form of relief vindicated
the Constitution and acted as a deterrent against future violations of it.  There is no
reason in principle why common law and statutory remedies could never be suitable
for that purpose.  Common law remedies, particularly delictual remedies, had been
designed to protect personality interests such as dignity, which are central to the Bill
of Rights.  Where harm arising from a rights violation was highly restricted, a
780 Supra para 75.
781 Supra.
782 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).
783 Supra.
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common law remedy might well be appropriate, effectively vindicating the
Constitution and deterring further violations of it.784
The next reported decision to consider the question of damages was the case of Rail
Commuters  Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metro-Rail and Others785,
where declaratory, mandatory and prohibitory relief rather than damages were
claimed, in the context of the question whether Transnet Limited and the South
African Rail Commuter Corporation Limited had a legal obligation to take reasonable
measures to provide for the security of rail commuters making use of the rail transport
services provided by those companies.  In the course of a unanimous judgment
granting declaratory relief recognizing such an obligation, O’ Regan J held expressly
that there will be circumstances where delictual relief is appropriate for the
infringement of constitutional rights.  Earlier, O’ Regan J had stated that private law
damages claimed will not always be the most appropriate method to enforce
constitutional rights, and that private law remedies tended to be retrospective in effect,
seeking to remedy loss caused rather than to prevent loss in the future.  But those
remarks should not be understood to suggest that delictual relief should not flow from
the infringement of constitutional rights in appropriate circumstances.786
A further decision of relevance was President of the Republic of South Africa and
another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and others, amicus curiae).787
There, after referring to paragraph 43 of the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal
in the matter788, Langa ACJ, for a unanimous bench, quoted with approval the
passages reproduced above from Fose’s case.789 He stated that appropriate relief
784 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 85, 93, 94 and 95.
785 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) 2005 4 BCLR 301, which was mentioned in Chapter 5 Supra.
786 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) 2005 4 BCLR 301 para 80 and 81. Dendy, ‘In Light of the Constitution – 2:
Damages in Delict for Violation of Constitutionally Entrenched Rights’ (2009). De Rebus, March
2009, Law Society of South Africa 48.
787 2005 5 SA 3 (CC), 2005 8 BCLR 786 para 20, 43, and 57 – 58.  The aforementioned case is
mentioned Supra at pages 5, 44, 88, 89, 91, 93, and 118.
788 Reported sub nom Modderfontein Squatters, greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery
(Pty) Limited (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, amicus curiae), where it was held that the only
appropriate relief in the circumstances of that case was constitutional damages, in other words damages
attributable to the breach of a constitutionally entrenched right.
789 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60 and 69.
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must necessarily be effective and remarked that constitutional damages could even be
available to Modderklip.790
In delict, an award of damages is the primary remedy, aimed at affording
compensation in respect of the legal right or interest infringed.  The purpose of a
constitutional remedy is to vindicate guaranteed rights and prevent or deter future
violations.
A clear distinction should be drawn between delictual and constitutional wrongs.
Conceptual difficulties will arise if one were to equate all infringements of
fundamental rights with an ordinary delict.
Courts developing the common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution must
guard against overzealous judicial reform, confining themselves to the incremental
changes necessary to keep the common law in step with the evolution of our society
and the ever changing nature of bonos mores.791
On scrutinizing Boruchowitz J’s comments in the case of Dendy v University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and Others792 the question is raised whether he may
possibly have been too restrictive in his expansion of the common law in not allowing
‘overzealous judicial reform’ and confining the courts to incremental changes.  As
noted above courts developing the common law must do so in order to keep in step
with the changing bonos mores of society, which may, in certain circumstances, not
change incrementally but rather rapidly, which may then call for a zealous reform of
the common law.
790 2005 5 SA 3 (CC), 2005 8 BCLR 786.  Modderklip was a company which had suffered loss arising
from the illegal occupation of its land by squatters, owing to the failure of the State to comply with the
constitutional obligations to bring a separate delictual action against the State.
791 The decision of Boruchowitz J in Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and
Others 2005 (5) SA 357 (W), [2005] 2 All SA 490, 2005 (9) BCLR 90 was upheld on appeal, in 2007 5
SA 382 (SCA), [2007] 3 ALL SA 1 and 2007 8 BCLR 910.  Dendy, ‘In Light of the Constitution – 2:
Damages in Delict for Violation of Constitutionally Entrenched Rights’ (2009). De Rebus, March
2009, Law Society of South Africa 48.  The argument in the aforementioned case was advanced that
deliberate violations of constitutionally entrenched rights constitute contemptuous or humiliating
treatment of the rights holder, justifying an award of damages under the actio injuriarum – a remedy
available for wrongful and intentional violations of personality rights.
792 2005 5 SA 357 (W), [2005] 2 All SA 490, 2005 (9) BCLR 90, which is mentioned previously on
pages 106, 154, 161 – 164 of this dissertation.
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8.2. THE WAY FORWARD
A question, although not the primary question of this dissertation, remains: “Should
litigants in subsequent cases attempt to obtain an award of damages in delict for
intentional violations of constitutionally entrenched rights, on the basis that such
violations constitute an actionable injuria to the dignity of the rights holder?”  It is
suggested that, in the light of the dicta of the Constitutional Court in the cases
surveyed above, and in spite of some of the remarks of Boruchowitz J in Dendy’s
case793, the quest to introduce such a remedy into our law should not be abandoned.
Attempts to introduce such new remedies into our law of delict have previously failed
on the first attempt794, but these decisions might well be departed from in the future
on different facts or indeed with different judges.  Indeed it has been show in this
dissertation that subsequent dicta, for example in Minister of the Executive Council,
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate795 and Nyathi v Minister of the Executive
Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng and Another796 have provided further
support for the view that common law remedies may constitute appropriate relief
under section 38 of the Constitution and hence the common law remedy of damages
through delict will be available for the infringement of a fundamental right.797
Therefore, those who support the notion that those who intentionally violate the
constitutionally entrenched rights of others ought to be saturated in damages for doing
so, even in the absence of physical harm or patrimonial loss, should persist that such a
principle will one day be introduced, or, as Boberg noted in his preface to the Law of
Delict, that “iconoclasm of today may be the law of tomorrow”.798
Even the most ardent supporters of constitutional remedies draw attention to
inconsistent and unsatisfactory features of a constitutional damages remedy aimed at
punishment or deterrence.  It has been suggested that to give punitive damages the
793 2005 5 SA 357 (W), [2005] 2 ALL SA 490.
794 Including the unsuccessful result in Dendy's case 2005 5 SA 357 (W), [2005] 2 ALL SA 490.
795 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA).
796 2008 5 SA 94 (CC), 2008 9 BCLR 865.
797 Dendy, ‘In Light of the Constitution – 2:  Damages in Delict for Violation of Constitutionally
Entrenched Rights’ (2009). De Rebus, March 2009, Law Society of South Africa 48.
798 Ibid. Boberg, PQR, The Law of Delict, Volume 1 (1984).
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primary focus runs counter to the Anglo-Canadian tradition, which favours calculated
compensatory damages.  The deterrent effect of any damage award is difficult to
assess, since the empirical evidence of the deterrent impact is only evident by its
absence.799 Where punitive damages are awarded against the State it is almost
inevitable that the costs involved will be shifted to the public at large.800
Nothing has been produced or referred to which tends to lead to the conclusion that
punitive damages against the State will serve as a significant deterrent or will have a
preventative effect against individual or general repetitions of the infringements.
Further, to make nominal punitive awards will, if anything, trivialize the right
involved and hence for awards to have any conceivable deterrent effect against the
State they will have to be very substantial and, the more substantial they are the
greater the anomaly that a single plaintiff receives a windfall of such a magnitude.801
While punitive awards may lead to systematic change, the process might well be a
slow one requiring a substantial number of such awards before change is induced,
which the State is reluctant to institute of its own accord; equitable relief on the other
hand could achieve such change far more speedily and cheaply.
So, in conclusion and in answer to the question posed in Chapter 1 “is an award of
monetary damages an appropriate remedy for breach of a constitutional right?”  It is
submitted that such an award is an appropriate remedy if, in the circumstances, it is, in
terms of section 172 of the Constitution, a just and equitable remedy for the
complainant.  There, however, remains a tension between delictual damages and
constitutional damages as highlighted throughout this dissertation.  Hence, the
question of appropriateness is dependent on whether the remedy is just and equitable,
whereas the question of justice and equitability is likewise dependant upon the
remedy being appropriate in the circumstances.  Therefore, it appears as though the
two concepts of appropriateness and justice and equitability are interrelated and hence
where one of the concepts is missing the remedy will not meet the requirements
necessary for the individual entitled to the remedy to obtain justice.  This interrelated
and co-dependent relationship may result in a ‘catch 22’ situation in that if the one
799 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edition (2001) 169.
800 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 65.
801 Supra para 71.
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concept cannot be fulfilled the other will not be met and as such the remedy will be
fruitless.
Monetary damages in the form of delictual common law damages are available for the
breach of a constitutional right provided the infringement complies with all the
requirements of a delictual remedy and is not granted in addition to another remedy.
Thus, the delictual remedy of monetary damages is available for a ‘constitutional
delict’ in that the common law is flexible and can adapt to the changing bonos mores
of society, thus a new mechanism for awarding damages, which is submitted as a
valid remedy to the problem posed in this dissertation.
The question as to “whether providing monetary damages for a breach of a
constitutional right is not merely throwing money at the problem?” seems to be
answered by the phrases ‘appropriateness’, ‘justice’, ‘equity’ and ‘effectiveness’.
Whereas it may appear to be throwing money at the problem, the providing of an
award of monetary damages for the breach of a constitutional right is the only
appropriate, just and equitable remedy in the circumstances canvassed and can be
effective in vindicating the victim’s rights and in deterring future violations of such
constitutional rights.
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ANNEXURE A:
SYNTHESIS OF KEY CASES DISCUSSED IN THIS DISSERTATION
Parties Citation (year) Outcome
Fose v Minister of Safety
and Security
1997 3 SA 786
(CC)
This was the first reported decision on the
question of punitive damages for a
constitutional breach.  Ackermann J dismissed
a claim for punitive damages for violations of
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights in addition to
compensatory damages.
Bacela v Member of the
Executive Council for
Welfare (Eastern Cape
Provincial Government)
1998 1 ALL SA
525 (E)
In this case the beneficiary was legally entitled
to back payment to the date of application in
terms of the applicable regulations, it was only
the ‘interest’ on the back payment that was
granted as a form of constitutional relief.
Soobramoney v Minister
of Health, KwaZulu
Natal
1998 1 SA 765
(CC)
The Constitutional Court refused to order the
State to provide expensive dialysis treatment to
keep a critically ill patient alive.
Dawood v Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (3)
SA 936 (CC)
2000 3 SA 936
(CC)
Held that when a statutory provision confers a
broad discretion upon officials it may inevitably
be read down to narrow the discretion, but a
court should be slow to do so if the result
would leave officials untrained in law with
discretionary power to limit fundamental rights
without legislative guidance.
Carmichele v Minister of
Safety and Security
2001 4 SA 938
(CC)
The Constitutional Court made it clear that the
Constitution governs the decisions of the
judiciary when it enforces and develops the
common law regulating private power.
Government of the 2001 1 SA 46 The court merely stated that the government’s
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Republic of South Africa
v Grootboom
(CC), 2000 11
BCLR 1169 (CC)
housing programme in the area of the Cape
Metropolitan Area fell short of complying with
its constitutional obligations.
Mahambehlala v Member
of Executive Council of
Welfare, Eastern Cape
2002 1 SA 342;
2001 JDR 0327
(SE)
Leach J held that the delay resulted in an
unlawful and unreasonable infringement of the
applicant’s fundamental right to just
administrative action as set out in section 33(1)
of the Constitution.  Leach J awarded damages
equivalent to interest for the period of delay,
this was done in order to place the applicant in
the position in which she would have been had
her constitutional right not been breached by
the tardy manner in which her application for a
social grant was processed.  A similar order
was granted on the same grounds in the case of
Mbanga 2001 JDR 328 (SE).
Jayiya v Member of
Executive Council for
Welfare, Eastern Cape
Provincial Government
2004 2 SA 611
(SCA)
This case criticized the courts becoming an
alternative forum for the processing of social
assistance grants.  This case held further that
State officials could not be held in contempt of
court for non payment of court orders.
Modderklip Boerdery
(Edms) Bpk v President
of the RSA
2005 5 SA 3 (CC) It was held that the only relief appropriate in
the circumstances of this case was
constitutional damages, i.e., damage
attributable to the breach of a constitutionally
entrenched right.  Langa ACJ stated for the
majority that the appropriate remedy must
necessarily be effective, and remarked that it
could even be open to Modderklip bringing a
separate delictual action against the State.
Dendy v University of
Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
2005 5 SA 357 (W) In this case the argument was advanced that
deliberate violations of constitutionally
entrenched rights constitute contemptuous or
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humiliating treatment of the rights holder, and
hence a violation of the latter’s dignity,
justifying an award of damages under the actio
injuriarum. In the end Boruchowitz J declined
to recognize the violations complained of as
actionable breaches.
Nyathi v MEC for the
Department of Health,
Gauteng and Another,
26014/2005 TPD,
20 March 2007
(unreported),
[2007] JOL 19612
(T)
It was declared that section 3 of the State
Liability Act, 20 of 1957, was inconsistent with
the 1996 Constitution.  Hence, an order of
execution can now be issued against the State.
Rail Commuters Action
Group v Transnet
Limited t/a Metro-Rail
2005 2 SA 359
(CC)
Declaratory, mandatory and prohibitory relief
(rather than damages) was claimed.  In the
unanimous judgment declaratory relief was
granted and confirmation that Transnet Ltd and
the South African Rail Commuter Corporation
Ltd has a legal obligation to take reasonable
measures to provide for the security of rail
commuters making use of rail transport services
provided by those companies was specified
Kate v Member of
executive Council of
Welfare 2005 (1) SA 141
SECLD; Welfare
Department v Kate
2006 SCA 46 RSA The Court ordered payment of the shortfall due
to Kate with interest on the accrual from the
16th of April 1996.
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ANNEXURE B
SOCIAL INSURANCE STATUTES AND THE CONTRIBUTORS
Most public social security schemes, particularly social insurance schemes that
depend on contributions, are regulated by legislation which provides for mechanisms
to ensure compliance802.
N
o
Statute governing the insurance scheme Who
contributes to
the scheme?
1. Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases
Act 130 of 1993
Employer
2. Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 Employee and
Employer
3. Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 Employee and
Employer
4. Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 Employee and
Employer
5. Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 Employer
6. Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of
1973
Employer
7. Mines, Health And Safety Act 29 of 1996 Employer
8. Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 Driver
9. Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 Insured
10. Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 Insured
802 Chapter 2 of this dissertation refers at page 35.
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ANNEXURE C
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES TO MONETARY DAMAGES
An allegation of inconsistency between law or conduct and the Constitution provides
the cause of action in all constitutional cases.  While the cause of action is always
found in the violation of a provision of the Constitution, constitutional remedies may
be found in the Constitution itself, in other legislation, statutes, or the common law.
When the target of the remedy is private or state conduct, the source of the remedy
will often be found in the common law.  When legislation is challenged, on the other
hand, the Constitution itself usually provides the most suitable remedies.
C1. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
No. Name of Remedy Brief Explanation
1. Political Sanctions The State is open to political sanctions for not
complying with the Constitution.  This would be
effected through the vote of the people.  This
remedy appears to one of the weaker remedies
available.
2. Declaration of Invalidity This remedy is not discretionary remedy, but
mandatory if the conduct or legislation is in
opposition to the Constitution and its principles.
An interdict as well as damages may therefore be
awarded in addition to a declaration of invalidity,
and the effect or impact of a declaration of
invalidity may be controlled in a number of ways.
Constitutional supremacy does not require the
invalidation of provisions in a statute that are
constitutional and valid if they can be severed from
the unconstitutional and invalid provisions.  Nor
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does it require immediate invalidation if the
resulting situation would be more unconstitutional
than the existing one.  This is why the courts are
granted powers in terms of section 172 of the
Constitution ‘to regulate the impact of a
declaration of invalidity.’ This is achieved by:
severing the unconstitutional provisions in
legislation from the constitutional ones; by reading
in words into legislation; by controlling the
retrospective effects of a declaration of invalidity
and by temporarily suspending a declaration of
validity, a court ‘may make any order that is just
and equitable’
3. Declaration of Rights A declaration of rights may be issued only in so far
as it is alleged that the rights in the Bill of Rights
are infringed or threatened, declarations of
invalidity must be declared in all instances where a
court finds that law or conduct is inconsistent with
the Constitution.  A declaration of rights is an
essential remedial and corrective remedy, it can
promote a non-coercive dialogue between the
courts and the State, but only if governments and
officials comply with them voluntarily, promptly
and in good faith.  A court, in granting a
declaration of rights, would simply declare whether
the right or duty exists and or what the scope of the
duty is.
4. Prohibitory Interdict:
Interim or Final
A prohibitory interdict is where one seeks to
prevent the continued or threatened performance of
an illegal action interfering with one’s rights.
5. Mandatory Interdict
(Mandamus: directing
the way in which action is
A mandatory interdict is where one seeks to force
an administrator to perform a statutory duty or to
cure a state of affairs brought about by illegal
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to be taken in future):
Interim or Final
actions.  The remedy of mandamus has the
capacity to be effective where there is a breach by
a public official of a duty that is imposed by a
statute or the Constitution.  In most cases that is
sufficient without an additional remedy of
damages.  The courts have also introduced the use
of structural interdicts – compelling the violator to
perform in a structured manner and to report
intermittently to an appointed authority.  This
remedy is difficult to enforce than the prohibitory
interdict.
C2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REMEDIES
There are various administrative law remedies provided in section 8 of the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 including the following:  exclusion of
evidence, severance, reading-in, and a cost order.
C3. COMMON LAW DELICTUAL REMEDIES
No. Name of Remedy Brief Explanation
1. Actio legis Aquiliae Available for damage of patrimonial loss.  Patrimonial
loss to person or property wrongfully and culpably
caused.  This remedy has lost its penal nature and is
purely compensatory in nature.
2. Actio inuriarum Available for satisfaction (emotional/mental
integrity/personality interests).  Defined as a wrongful
intentional infringement of a person’s corpus, fama or
dignitas.
3. Action for pain and
suffering
Available for damages for physical pain and suffering
and bodily disfigurement experienced (compensation).
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